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About UCL 
University College London (UCL) is a research led university whose research is 
consistently ranked as world leading.  In the 2008 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) 
UCL was rated the best research university in London, and third in the UK overall.  UCL 
has a breadth of energy research covering more than 20 departments with an income of 
over £20M in the area of energy.  The UCL Energy Institute provides a general role in 
facilitating and promoting this research as well as supporting UCL with its Grand 
Challenges. 
The UCL Energy Institute is at the forefront in modelling energy systems, so that we can 
fully assess the impact that changes to energy demand can have on a wide range of 
parameters (health, comfort, cost, energy, carbon, upstream infrastructure) at a range 
of different spatial and temporal scales from individual components through to an 
international scale.  Major modelling tools at UCL include energy-economic systems 
models including the UK MARKAL family (including elastic demand, stochastic, macro 
and other variants) and the Global TIAM-UCL model. 
  
 ii 
Executive Summary 
The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) was set up to provide advice to the UK 
Government on a range of issues, including setting legally binding carbon budgets for 
five year periods beginning from 2008, and a target for emissions reductions in 2050. In 
its first report (CCC, 2008), the Committee concluded that to respond to the threat of 
climate change, the UK must act now to significantly reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions by 34% by 2020 and 80% by 2050. CCC’s advice was based on a review of the 
science of climate change, the international context, the UK’s existing commitments, 
and an assessment of the costs and abatement potential associated with different 
measures. Formal energy-economic modelling – including the energy systems MARKAL 
model – has played a key role in the evidence base for CCC and the wider UK 
government. Over the last 8 years, the UK MARKAL model has been extensively used for 
UK long-term energy pathway analysis, benefitting from iterative energy model 
development, and developing a strong track record of peer reviewed documentation 
and outputs. 
CCC will provide advice on the 4th carbon budget period – covering 2023-2027 – in 
December 2010. As part of the underpinning evidence base for this advice, CCC 
commissioned this major energy modelling study, focusing on mid-term (2020-2030) 
uncertainties in the feasibility, costs and trade-offs of alternate pathways towards 
meeting the 2050 target. This latest project focused on more stringent reductions – up 
to a 90% or 95% reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emission by 2050. This additional 
effort in abating UK energy CO2 emissions recognises the uncertainties in the 
contribution of non-CO2 GHGs, emissions from land-use change and emissions from 
international bunker fuels. Furthermore this study encompassed two areas of major 
energy modelling development: 
Firstly, a series of model updates have been implemented. Some of these are following 
review of the UKERC Energy 2050 project (Anandarajah et al., 2009), and are detailed in 
section 3.1. Additional updates have been made via an iterative process with CCC, 
relating to their stakeholder engagement exercises and to encompass insights from 
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parallel analytical work. These updates are iteratively dealt with in two phases in the 
report and are discussed in detail in sections 0 and 3.3.  
 A range of updates on the model’s data and structure including a more detailed 
treatment of combined heat and power (CHP) technologies, additional detail on 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) resources, updated imported resource costs, 
updated energy service demands and a fuller depiction of conservation options in 
the residential and services sectors 
 Imposing constraints (build rates) on the feasible rate at which major technology 
classes can be implemented  
 Improving the representation of bio-energy chains, including the use of biomass in 
capture storage and sequestration (CCS) applications to generate electricity with 
negative emissions, and the inclusion of bio-methane in the conventional gas system 
 Additional flexibility in the industrial sectors, including fuel switching and process 
based CCS (as in previous model runs this sector can comprise around 40% of 
residual emissions by 2050) 
 The adoption of buildings sector technologies in terms of operation feasibility, 
notably heat pump technology given their unsuitability for some of the existing 
housing stock and in certain time periods 
 Model recalibration, including alternate discounting (using social discount rates) and 
subsequent hurdle rate adjustment, as well as inclusion of non-energy CO2 emissions 
 Near-term  policy announcements such as the Renewable Energy Strategy, DECC’s 
policy on new coal-fired capacity and indeed the acceptance of the Committee’s 
recommended emissions budgets to ensure the near-term aspects of this MARKAL 
analysis are up to date 
Secondly, to systematically investigate key mid-term uncertainties in achieving long term 
UK decarbonisation targets requires alternate analytical approaches within an energy 
systems framework. To respond to this, UCL has developed a Stochastic UK MARKAL 
model. This retains the strengths of the technological detail, energy systems coverage 
and demand response of the existing model, but relaxes the assumption of forward 
looking model solutions. The major benefit in the new stochastic MARKAL model is a 
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two stage stochastic decision (based on expected cost) where key parameters are made 
explicitly uncertain and in a first stage the model pursues hedging strategies based on 
the weighted costs of future (uncertain) outcomes. These uncertainties can include 
technology costs and characteristics, external drivers such as resource prices, policy 
drivers such as target stringency or complementary renewable polices, or consumer 
demand changes and prices responses. In a second stage the stochastic model then 
gives multiple recourse strategies as the model reacts to different outcomes of the 
uncertain variable(s). As well as generating insights into the optimal evolution of the UK 
energy-economic system under considerations of uncertainty (e.g., issues of path 
dependency), the expected value of perfect information (EVPI) can also be calculated. 
Thus stochastic MARKAL represents a new and insightful tool for the CCC to support 
long-term energy-economic systems analysis of long term decarbonisation targets. 
The scenario selection process was iteratively undertaken through a ten month period, 
and reflected key uncertainties of interest to CCC, inclusion of findings from 
complementary analysis of key issues, and insights from the outputs of prior runs. Note 
that just one reference scenario to aid comparison between scenarios.  The individual 
scenario changes are therefore included with the policy package for CO2 mitigation and 
are included only in the relevant sensitivity scenarios. 
Four core runs were developed (section 5).  These encapsulated two key elements that 
CCC wished to explore; i) the severity of a UK CO2 target that may be necessary and ii) 
the inclusion of a bundle of policy measures consistent with the ‘Extended Ambition’ 
target specified by the Committee.   
Following the definition of the four core runs, eight Phase 1 sensitivity runs (section 6), 
comprising both deterministic and stochastic scenarios were run, mainly off the COR1-
C90-S scenario (90% CO2 reduction and no extended policy assumptions). These 
explored less severe and more severe CO2 reduction targets, uncertainties surrounding 
CO2 targets, fossil fuel prices, CCS availability, and uncertain fossil fuel prices in 
combination with different assumptions on biomass availability. 
Iterative discussion following these Phase 1 scenarios generated feedback from the CCC 
leading to a revised set of assumptions for Phase 2 (see section 8).  In the interim period 
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a further eight sensitivity runs (section 7) explored uncertain fossil fuel prices, 
modulated electric vehicle uptake adoption of hydrogen as a transport fuel, and heat 
pump uptake and solid wall insulation mainly based on the (extended ambition, 90% CO2 
reduction) COR3-C90-S scenario. 
A new core run for Phase 2 was developed over three runs that explored the effects of 
new technologies such as industrial CCS, grid injection of bio-methane as well as 
modified hurdle rates to represent the investment barriers seen by different actors of 
the energy system.  From this 90% CO2 reduction run (P2-R3-HUR-C90-5), the final nine 
sensitivity runs covered bio-energy, build rates, uncertain fossil fuels prices and 
uncertainty over biomass availability in combination with approximations of the lifecycle 
emissions from biomass. 
In all, 32 full scenarios were delivered to the Committee on Climate Change (see Table 
18). However given the multiple recourse strategies from the stochastic variant runs this 
amounted to 73 output runs. This give a highly detailed and rich narrative on the 
interactions and uncertainties of stringent UK decarbonisation pathways. Distilling such 
a detailed modelling outcome is challenging, however results from the 32 different 
scenarios included in this project give rise to a number of emergent themes.  The results 
sections (5-8) detail for comparable runs; firstly the links, synergies and trade-offs via 
the interconnectedness of the energy system elements (sectors, energy chains, and 
supply vs. demand side measures), secondly the resilience, flexibility and uncertainty of 
consistent elements required to meet stringent decarbonisation pathways, and thirdly 
the scope of alternate supply and demand (technology and behaviour) mitigation 
measures. 
In overall conclusion, five key findings from the broad scope of scenarios from this 
energy-economic modelling analysis project are: 
 UK energy policy makers must be cognisant of a range of external drivers that they 
have only peripheral control over and which will have profound effects on the 
achievability and costs of stringent energy decarbonisation. These include fossil fuel 
prices, biomass imports, technology development and the scale of UK emissions 
reductions required in a global mitigation context 
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 There are a range of final configurations of a decarbonised energy supply with 
alternate elements of supply-side energy resources and secondary infrastructures 
(electricity, heat, hydrogen and liquid fuels), together with demand-side technology  
adoption and behavioural change. However, all deep decarbonisation scenarios 
require elements of change in supply and demand – i.e., technology and behaviour 
 The stringency of deep decarbonisation targets means that there are essential (or 
robust) elements of decarbonisation strategies in the mid-term with either limited 
flexibility to exclude and/or expensive implications of not including. These elements 
include investment in low carbon electricity, technological change in transport,  
implementation of buildings conservation options, and behavioural change to 
moderate demand requirements  
 Stringent decarbonisation targets options means that smaller emissions sources 
become increasingly important and need to be addressed by policy makers. 
Examples in the energy sector including industrial process emissions, residual 
emissions from CCS applications, emissions from essential consumer buildings 
energy service demands, and emissions from smaller transport modes (e.g., 
aviation). 
 The aggregate welfare costs of stringent emissions reductions are substantial, 
amounting to a median value of £30 billion (in £2000), by the year 2050. However, 
the wide range of model variants indicate a very substantial variation in welfare 
costs – by of a factor of four or more. Disaggregated parameters – including the 
change in energy costs through marginal CO2 values, and the role of sectors, 
resources and technologies – could see even greater variation. The continuation of 
iterative energy system analysis – using a range of modelling techniques – can shed 
further light on the response of consumers, feasibility of change in specific sectors, 
and impacts on the broader economy. 
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 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and context 
The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) was set up to provide advice to the 
Government on a range of issues, including setting legally binding carbon budgets for 
five year periods beginning from 2008, and a target for emissions reductions in 2050. In 
its first report (Committee on Climate Change, 2008), the Committee concluded that 
climate change poses a huge threat to human welfare, and the UK must act now to 
significantly reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 34% by 2020 (or 42% by 2020 
following a global deal) and 80% by 2050. CCC’s advice was based on a review of the 
science of climate change, the international context, the UK’s existing commitments, 
and an assessment of the costs and abatement potential associated with different 
measures. 
CCC will provide advice on the 4th carbon budget, covering 2023-27, in December 2010. 
As part of that advice, the Committee is undertaking analysis on the feasibility, costs and 
trade-offs of alternate pathways towards meeting the 2050 target.  
Committee on Climate Change (2008) recommended an 80% emissions reduction target 
for 2050 for all Kyoto GHGs including those from international shipping and international 
aviation. As noted in that report, an overall 80% target for all GHGs may mean a 
reduction in UK energy system CO2 emissions of much closer to 90%, depending on what 
one assumes about the long-term path of emissions from aviation, shipping and non-CO2 
GHGs. That report also set out possible pathways to meeting the 2050 target, drawing 
on analysis undertaken using the MARKAL model of various emissions trajectories and 
technology sensitivities (Pye et al. 2008) 
Since 2003, UK MARKAL has been used to assist policy makers (BERR, 2003; BERR, 2007; 
DEFRA, 2007; Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2009) through an iterative 
process with the model developers and academic research partners (Strachan et al. 
2008c).  UK MARKAL was developed primarily through funding from the UK Energy 
Research Centre (www.ukerc.ac.uk), with additional funding via policy related project as 
noted above, the UK Sustainable hydrogen energy consortia (UKSHEC) and the Japan-UK 
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Low Carbon Societies Project.  The UK MARKAL model has been the basis for a number 
of peer reviewed journal publications (Anandarajah & Strachan 2010; Kannan & 
Strachan 2009; Strachan et al. 2008a; Strachan et al. 2008b; Strachan et al. 2009) 
including the development of macro and spatially enhanced model versions. Under the 
UKERC project, UK MARKAL was subjected to peer-review (Martinus, 2006), the model 
assumptions critiqued in a series of stakeholder workshops (Kannan et al. 2007). A 
subsequent major study – UKERC Energy 2050 – further enhanced the technological 
description in the model (Anandarajah et al., 2009), including the development of an 
elastic demand version of UK MARKAL. 
Such an iterative energy model development and subsequent policy analysis (as detailed 
in (Strachan et al. 2008c), has provided a good analytical grounding for the CCC’s 
examination of possible paths to meeting the 2050 target. However this project 
encompasses two areas of major development. 
1.1.1 Model updates 
Firstly, a series of model updates have been implemented. Some of these are following 
review of the UKERC Energy 2050 project (Anandarajah et al., 2009), and are detailed in 
section 3.1. Additional updates have been incorporated on request of CCC, relating to 
their stakeholder engagement exercises and to encompass insights from parallel 
analytical work. These updates are iteratively dealt with in two phases in the report and 
are discussed in detail in sections 0 and 3.3. These main areas of update are: 
 imposing constraints (build rates) on the rate at which major technology classes are 
adopted  
 the representation of bioenergy chains, including the use of biomass in capture 
storage and sequestration (CCS) applications to generate electricity with negative 
emissions 
 Additional flexibility in the industrial sectors, including process based CCS;  in 
previous model runs this sector can comprise around 40% of residual emissions by 
2050  
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 the adoption of buildings sector technologies in terms of operation feasibility, 
notably heat pump technology given their unsuitability for some of the existing 
housing stock and in certain annual periods 
 Model recalibration, including alternate discounting (using social discount rates) and 
subsequent hurdle rate adjustment, as well as inclusion of non-energy CO2 emissions 
 Near-term  policy announcements such as the Renewable Energy Strategy, DECC’s 
policy on new coal-fired capacity and indeed the acceptance of the Committee’s 
recommended emissions budgets to ensure the near-term aspects of this MARKAL 
analysis are up to date 
1.1.2 Investigate uncertainties 
Secondly, to systematically investigate key mid-term uncertainties in achieving long term 
UK decarbonisation targets requires a new analytical approach within an energy systems 
framework. The large number of sensitivity runs carried out on long term energy 
scenarios for the CCC, UKERC and DECC in previous projects means there is less return in 
only pursuing more deterministic runs. This is particularly true in terms of undertaking 
conventional model runs under conditions of perfect foresight. To respond to this, UCL 
has developed a Stochastic UK MARKAL model. This retains the strengths of the 
technological detail, energy systems coverage and demand response of the existing 
model. The major benefit in the new stochastic MARKAL model is a two stage stochastic 
decision (based on expected cost or utility) where key parameters are made explicitly 
uncertain and the model pursues hedging strategies until such uncertainties are 
resolved. These uncertainties can include technology costs and characteristics, external 
drivers such as resource prices, policy drivers such as target stringency or 
complementary renewable polices, demand changes and prices responses etc. The 
uncertain variables can also be combined into integrated and consistency scenarios of 
key uncertainties. As well as generating insights into the optimal evolution of the UK 
energy-economic system under considerations of uncertainty, issues of path 
dependency, and the possibility of stranded assets, the expected value of perfect 
information (EVPI) can also be calculated. This represents a new and insightful tool for 
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the CCC to support long-term energy-economic systems analysis of long term 
decarbonisation targets. 
As a result of these two major areas of development, as well as a focus on more 
stringent CO2 emissions reductions, this project (building on earlier energy systems 
modelling studies), is a core element of CCC’s enhanced evidence base for its 4th 
Assessment Report. 
1.2 Aims of the project 
The aim of this project is to look at carbon abatement pathways through the 2020s, 
consistent with meeting the 2050 target, to inform Committee on Climate Change (CCC) 
consideration of an appropriate fourth period carbon budget of 2023-27.  It also 
addresses perceived weaknesses or limitations of the long-term modelling performed 
for CCC in 2008. 
The project has been divided into Phases 1 and 2, to facilitate iterative model analysis 
and development. 
The core project aims were: 
 To update the representation of a range of sectors or energy chains within the UK 
MARKAL model, e.g., inclusion of all relevant CCS options (electricity and process 
based); more detailed treatment of bio-energy chains; adoption of residential sector 
operational constraints 
 To update the near-term constraints (i.e. out to 2020) in the model to reflect both 
policy developments and areas in which there is now greater understanding of 
deployment constraints, e.g. in the CCC’s extended ambition scenario for wind and 
electric vehicles. These are categorised as “extended ambition” runs. 
 To utilize a stochastic version of the UK MARKAL energy systems optimisation model; 
to relax the assumption of perfect model foresights and investigate the impact of key 
uncertainties in long terms UK decarbonisation pathways. 
 In Phase 1 to undertake a set of four initial (deterministic) core runs for the overall 
path to 2050, to understand how these more stringent CO2 emissions targets (-90% 
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and -95% reductions by 2050) react to the range of model changes and near-term 
policy ambition levels  
 In Phase 1 to undertake a set of sensitivity runs (deterministic and stochastic) to 
investigate how key input parameter changes affect the model results and provide a 
assessment of key uncertainties and sensitivities.  
 In Phase 2 to undertake further detailed model development work for CCC areas of 
key interest, to update and compare a new core C-90 scenario, and also to undertake 
a second set of deterministic and stochastic sensitivity analysis. 
Examples of Phases 1 and 2 sensitivity runs (discussed in detail in sections 6, 7 and 8) 
include using different assumptions for CO2 and other GHG emissions constraints, fossil 
fuel prices, availability of biomass resource, technology availability and costs in the 
2020s, assumptions on the elasticities of energy service demands, sensitivities on 
renewable heat in different sectors, and sensitivities on transport uptake rates.  
The process steps in undertaking this energy systems modelling project are: 
• Explaining the UK MARKAL model updates and improvements (to version 3.24 in 
Phase 1 and version 3.25 in Phase 2), and the stochastic operation of the model 
• Enabling the stochastic version of UK MARKAL; this builds on the fully functional 
model with its improvements as outlined above  
• Changes to the reporting template to capture new data outputs, and stochastic 
information (expected costs) 
• Definition of core and sensitivity run variables including detailed CCC input into 
defining the probabilities of key uncertainties 
• Core runs, including an iterative calibration and analysis process 
• Phase 1 and Phase 2 Sensitivity runs, including an iterative calibration and 
analysis process 
• Report writing and presentation to CCC 
1.3 Layout of this report 
This report is laid out in 9 main sections. Section 2 details the underpinning deterministic 
and stochastic UK MARKAL models. Section 3 details the model updates for this latest 
CCC report, including updates and assumptions following the UKERC Energy 2050 report 
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(Anandarajah et al. 2009), and iterative updates for Phase 1 (version 3.24) and Phase 2 
(version 3.25) to the UK MARKAL model. Section 4 gives a full listing of the scenarios 
undertaken in this project. Section 5 detail the four core model runs; C-90 and C-95 CO2 
emissions with and without near term extended policy ambition. Sections 6 to 8 detail 
the Phase 1 and Phase 2 scenarios. Finally section 9 discusses main conclusions including 
drivers of model outputs and key policy insights. 
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2 Deterministic and Stochastic MARKAL Elastic Demand Models 
The family of UK MARKAL models have a range of variants to allow alternate 
specifications of the UK energy system and/or alternate objective functions to be 
enabled. For example, (Strachan et al. 2008a) develops a MARKAL Macro variant which 
calculates the impacts of energy systems decarbonisation on the overall UK economy, 
while (Strachan et al. 2009) incorporates a geographical depiction of key energy 
infrastructures. In this CCC project two model versions are used: MARKAL Elastic 
Demand (MED) and a stochastic version of MED. 
A more detailed description of MARKAL is given in the original model documentation 
(Loulou et al. 2004).  Detailed assumptions on the UK MARKAL model are contained in 
Kannan et al. (2007), Anandarajah et al. (2009) and in section 3 of this report. 
2.1 Deterministic MARKAL Elastic Demand 
MARKAL (acronym for MARKet ALlocation) is a model generator that allow model 
developers to generate region-specific energy system models to analyse the tensions 
trade-offs between the energy-economic-environment and technology nexus.  MARKAL 
is  a widely-applied bottom-up, dynamic, linear programming (LP) optimisation model. 
UK MARKAL portrays the entire UK energy system, and in its elastic demand formulation 
maximises welfare (via the sum of producer and consumer surplus).  
MARKAL portrays the entire energy system from imports and domestic production of 
fuel resources, through fuel processing and supply, explicit representation of 
infrastructures, conversion of fuels to secondary energy carriers (including electricity, 
heat and hydrogen (H2)), end-use technologies and energy service demands of the entire 
economy. As a perfect foresight partial equilibrium optimization model, MARKAL 
minimizes discounted total system cost by considering the investment and operation 
levels of all the interconnected system elements. The inclusion of a range of policies and 
physical constraints, the implementation of all taxes and subsidies, and calibration of the 
model to base-year (2000) capital stocks and flows of energy, enables the evolution of 
the energy system under different scenarios to be plausibly represented. 
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The UK MARKAL model hence provides a systematic exploration of least-cost 
configurations to meet demands for energy services. These are derived from standard 
UK forecasts on a subsectoral level (Anandarajah et al., 2099). Generally these sources 
entail a projection of low energy growth, with saturation effects in key sectors. Other  
key input parameters are detailed in section 3 and include resource supply curves and 
dynamically evolving technology costs.  
MARKAL optimises (minimises) the total energy system cost by choosing the investment 
and operation levels of all the interconnected system elements.  The participants of this 
system are assumed to have perfect inter-temporal knowledge of future policy and 
economic developments.  Hence, under a range of input assumptions, which are key to 
the model outputs, MARKAL delivers an economy-wide solution of cost-optimal energy 
market development.  Substantial efforts have been made in respect of the transparency 
and completeness of the model structure and assumptions, including through a range of 
stakeholder events (for example Strachan et al., 2007b), expert peer review, and 
publication of the model documentation (Kannan et al., 2007) 
A major development of the UK MARKAL model for the UKERC Energy 2050 project 
(Anandarajah et al., 2009) was the implementation of an elastic demand version (MED) 
to account for the response of energy service demands to prices. In MED, exogenously 
defined energy service demands are replaced with demand curves (actually 
implemented in a series of small steps). Following calibration to a reference case that 
exactly matches the standard MARKAL reference case, MED now has the option of 
increasing or decreasing demands as final energy costs fall and rise respectively. Thus 
demand responses combine with supply responses in an alternate scenario (e.g. one 
with a CO2 constraint). In MED, demand functions are defined which determine how 
each energy service demand varies as a function of the market price of that energy 
service. Hence, each demand has constant own-price elasticity (E) in a given period. The 
demand function is assumed to have the following functional form: 
ES/ES0 = (p/p0) 
E 
Where: ES is a demand for some energy service; 
ES0 is the demand in the reference case; 
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p is the marginal price of each energy service demand; 
p0 is the marginal price of each energy service demand in the reference 
case;  
E is the (negative) own-price elasticity of the demand. 
A combination of the proportional change in prices (p/p0) and the elasticity parameter 
(E) determines when the energy service demand changes by the step amount. Note that 
changes in energy service demand also depend on the availability and costs of 
technological conservation, efficiency and fuel switching options. The price elasticities 
used in this analysis (ranging from 0.25 to 0.61) are long-run elasticities (due to the MED 
model’s 5 year time periods and perfect foresight assumptions), and are derived from 
the literature of long-term energy modelling (see Anandarajah et al, 2009). 
Now the MED objective function maximises both producer surplus (PS) and consumer 
surplus (CS). This is affected by annualized investment costs; resource import, export 
and domestic production costs; taxes, subsidies, emissions costs; and fuel and 
infrastructure costs as before in the standard model. However in addition the MED 
model accounts for welfare losses from reduced demands - i.e. if consumers give up 
some energy services that they would otherwise have used if prices were lower, there is 
a loss in utility to them which needs to be accounted for. Note that the MED model 
actually calculates the change in area under the shifted demand curve. The sum of 
consumer and producer surplus (economic surplus) is considered a valid metric of social 
welfare in microeconomic literature, giving a strong theoretical basis to the equilibrium 
computed by MARKAL.  
Scenarios run using MARKAL Elastic Demand are deterministic.  That is, only one result is 
obtained for any one set of inputs parameters.  
2.2 Stochastic MARKAL Elastic Demand 
The objective function of the stochastic MARKAL model is different to that in 
deterministic scenarios.  It computes the expected cost of a scenario based upon a single 
average hedging strategy that minimises the cost of a probability weighted set of future 
scenarios.  Thus, in addition to the solutions from MARKAL Elastic Demand, the model 
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also computes equilibrium between ‘here-and-now’ decisions, that must be made 
before uncertainty is resolved and ‘wait-and-see’ decisions that can be delayed until 
better information is available (Hu & Hobbs 2009).  Stochastic MARKAL is a 2-stage 
stochastic model, with the second stage specified as that in which the uncertainty is 
resolved.  Up to this point, Stochastic MARKAL computes a hedging strategy, a social 
welfare maximising optimum based upon the resolution of multiple probability-
weighted future scenarios.  This hedging strategy is considered optimal and is solves one 
of the issues with deterministic models: multiple possible future strategies can be 
accounted for in just one model run.  Analysis of hedging strategies can result in insights 
additional to those available through the comparison of multiple deterministic scenarios 
(Loulou et al., 2004). 
Figure 1 shows a stochastic hedging strategy to the year 2010, with four separate 
recourse strategies from 2015 onwards.  Note that the hedging strategy is not an 
average of the deterministic scenarios, but responds to the exponentially increasing 
costs under higher CO2 caps.  In this case, the value of a CO2 cap is unknown until the 3
rd 
model period.  In contrast, under the assumption of perfect foresight, the dashed lines 
represent the optimum strategy when the emissions cap is known from 2000.  The 
stochastic model allows a relaxation of the assumption of perfect foresight, 
quantification of future uncertainty through metrics such as the Expected Value of 
Perfect Information (EVPI) and insights into optimal near-term strategies that minimise 
the expected costs of future uncertainties. 
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Figure 1: Stochastic and deterministic (perfect foresight) scenarios for four different values of 
a random variable, such as CO2 emissions (Loulou et al. 2004) 
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3 Model key elements – updates and assumptions 
3.1 Key Model Assumptions 
This section demonstrates the range of the primary assumptions incorporated in the 
most recent version (v.3.24) of the UK MARKAL energy system model.  
The UK MARKAL model is well recognised as a tool for the analysis of the UK energy 
system.  As such, there is a detailed and comprehensive collection of documentation to 
which the reader is directed.  See for example Kannan et al. (2007) for a description of 
the structure of the UK MARKAL model.  Chapter 2 in Anandarajah et al. (2009) gives a 
good introduction and overview of the most recent version of the UK MARKAL model 
which has been recently updated with the changes listed here. Anandarajah et al. (2009) 
lists the updates to the UK MARKAL model and draws attention to the following list of 
core model drivers.  These drivers are of fundamental importance to the operation and 
interpretation of the UK MARKAL model. 
Table 1: Core conversion factors 
Calorific values Source: http://stats.berr.gov.uk/energystats/dukes07_aa.pdf   
   Net Gross Conversion   
 Crude Oil GJ/bbl. 5.8 6.1 95.0%    
 Coal GJ/tonne 25.5 26.8 95.1%    
 Gas GJ/cu.m. 35.8 39.8 89.9%    
GDP deflators Source: http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file41491.pdf    
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
100.00 102.20 105.30 108.60 111.40 113.90 116.90 122.30 123.90 
Exchange rates Source: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/exrate/usa.htm    
Unit $/£ 1.8       
Unit €/£ 1.4       
Physical conversion factors   
1 MTOE = 11.6 TWh = 48.9 PJ   
3.1.1 Resource supply curves 
For this project, CCC provided four fossil fuel price scenarios, derived from Department 
of Energy and Climate Change (2010).  As these scenarios only extend to 2030, the 2030 
values were kept the same to 2050 for the purposes of this project. 
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Table 2: Fossil fuel price scenarios (2000£/GJ) 
Scenario Fuel 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2050 
Low 
Oil 4.12 9.35 4.58 5.31 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 
Gas 1.93 4.47 2.62 2.70 2.70 2.77 2.77 2.77 
Coal 0.91 2.97 1.62 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
Central 
Oil 4.12 9.35 6.41 6.87 7.33 7.79 8.25 8.25 
Gas 1.93 4.47 4.47 4.85 5.16 5.47 5.70 5.70 
Coal 0.91 2.97 2.23 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62 
High 
Oil 4.12 9.35 7.70 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 
Gas 1.93 4.47 5.39 6.40 7.47 7.47 7.47 7.47 
Coal 0.91 2.97 2.43 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 
High High 
Oil 4.12 9.35 9.44 13.01 13.74 13.74 13.74 13.74 
Gas 1.93 4.47 6.47 8.71 9.17 9.17 9.17 9.17 
Coal 0.91 2.97 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 
Note that the availability of domestic resources is constrained from 2020 onwards, to 
ensure the model’s resource prices are as above.   
3.1.2 Biomass 
Extensive updates to biomass energy chains and technologies have been implemented, 
taking key changes from a comprehensive review of the UK MARKAL model’s biomass 
treatment (Jablonski et al., 2010). The main biomass chains have been broken out into 
wood, ligno-cellulosic crops, bio pellets (high and low quality), first and second 
generation bio-oils, bio-diesel, ethanol, methanol, bio-gases, bio-methane and wastes. 
The range of bio delivery options (oils, pellets etc.) are disaggregated to the industrial, 
residential and service sectors. Biomass boilers, utilising both solid and liquid fuels, are 
included for all buildings sectors. In terms of electricity generation, biomass-based CHP 
and electricity-only plants are updated, and further detail is added on enhanced co-firing 
to use different biomass fuels. Finally in the transport sector the extensive bio-energy 
chains have been added to with the option of bio-kerosene fuel chains and technologies 
for aviation (domestic and international). 
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Figure 2: Resource Supply Curve for Imported Bio-alternatives to Petroleum Products 
(imported petrol shown for comparison) 
Biomass imports compete with limited domestic resources with prices based on 
opportunity costs of available land, as given in Figure 2 and Figure 3 and discussed in 
Jablonski et al. (2010).
 
Figure 3: Domestic Resource Supply Curves for Biomass Wastes and Biomass Crops 
3.1.3 Technology costs 
For examples of technology cost, see Appendix 5 of the UK MARKAL documentation 
(Kannan et al. 2007).  This table lists the primary electricity generating technologies 
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included in the model.  Recent updates have increased costs of CCS and biomass 
gasification plants, decreased all plant peak contribution, and reduced all plant 
availability factors.  Future technology costs in UK MARKAL are based on expert 
assessment of technology vintages, or for less mature electricity and H2 technologies via 
exogenous learning curves derived from an assessment of learning rates (McDonald and 
Schrattenholzer, 2002) combined with global forecasts of technology uptake (European 
Commission, 2006). Endogenous cost reductions from learning for less mature 
technologies are not employed as the relatively small UK market is assumed to be a 
price taker for globally developed technologies. The full set of upstream, power and 
heat, transport, industrial, commercial, agricultural, and residential technologies – 
together with their costs and source data – are listed in Kannan et al. (2007), with 
detailed assumption of updates for this report in sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
For some technologies, exogenous assumptions for rates of learning are integrated into 
the investment cost assumptions.  Table 3 shows an indexed comparison of investment 
costs for the technologies through time.  Table 4 shows an indexed comparison of 
investment prices for hydrogen road transport technology vintages. 
Table 3: Exogenous learning rates for renewable generation technologies 
 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Solar PV 100 66 44 36 30 24 
Marine 100 91 82 75 55 41 
Micro-wind 100 90 82 78 74 70 
Offshore wind tranche 1 100 91 83 79 75 72 
Offshore wind tranche 2 100 92 85 82 79 76 
Offshore wind tranche 3 100 93 87 84 81 78 
Offshore wind tranche 4 100 94 88 86 83 81 
Onshore wind 100 90 82 78 74 70 
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Table 4: Technology vintage rates for hydrogen transport technologies 
 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 
Buses 100 93 86 79 78 77 76 75 75 
Cars 100 83 75 67 65 63 62 61 60 
HGVs 100 80 70 59 57 54 53 50 47 
LGVs 100 79 69 59 56 54 53 50 49 
3.1.4 System Implementation 
This refers to the characterisation of intermittency and variability of electricity 
generation within the model.  Modelling intermittency within MARKAL is necessarily 
uncomplicated and is performed primarily through two parameters – contribution of the 
technology to peak electricity demand [PEAK(CON)] and availability or capacity factor, 
which can be disaggregated across the six seasonal time-frames 
(Winter/Summer/Intermediate & Day/Night). 
For intermittent power technologies, using the example of tranches of wind resource 
technologies are differentiated by wind speed, with greater contribution of wind power 
to the electricity system providing a decreasing contribution to peak electricity demand 
(i.e. a declining capacity credit).  A more detailed explanation can be found on page 17 
of (Anandarajah et al., 2009). 
3.1.5 Energy Service Demands 
All energy service demand projections are the same as those reported in the relevant 
chapters of the UK MARKAL documentation (Kannan et al. 2007) except Domestic and 
International Aviation, which has been updated according to government projections  
(Department for Transport, 2009). 
A new energy service demand for non-energy use of petroleum products has been 
introduced to account for the >500 PJ of energy equivalent used for chemical feedstock 
and other industrial and non-industrial uses such as lubrication.  The energy service 
demand follows a similar pattern of growth to that of Other Industry, as the majority of 
non-energy use of petroleum products is for industrial consumption. 
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3.1.6 Demand elasticities 
In MARKAL Elastic Demand, energy service demand elasticities define the energy service 
demand response to price.  More detailed information can be found about this is section 
2.1.2 in (Anandarajah et al., 2009). 
The current elasticities are listed in Table 5 below. 
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Table 5 Price elasticities of energy service demands 
ESD Code  Sector and Description  Price 
Elasticity 
AGR Agriculture Combined agriculture -0.32 
ICH Industry Chemical -0.50 
IIS  Iron & Steel -0.35 
INF  Non-Ferrous metals -0.35 
IOI  Other industry demand -0.15 
IPP  Pulp-Paper -0.15 
NONNRG Non-energy Aggregate of non-energy demands for commodities -0.15 
RCKH Residential Cooking -0.33 
RCL-N  Cooling -0.31 
RETC-E  other electrical appliances for Existing house -0.31 
RETC-N  other electrical appliances for New house -0.31 
RF##  Refrigeration -0.31 
RH-#-#  Space and Water Heating -0.34 
RLIT-#  Lighting -0.31 
SCK Service/ Commercial Cooking -0.23 
SCL  Cooling demand -0.32 
SETC  other electrical appliances -0.32 
SH-S  Space heating -0.26 
SH-W  Hot water -0.26 
SLIT  Lighting -0.32 
SREF  Refrigeration -0.25 
TA Transport air (domestic) -0.38 
TB  bus -0.38 
TC  car -0.54 
TF  rail (freight) -0.24 
TH  HGV -0.61 
TI  air (international) -0.38 
TL  LGV -0.61 
TM  marine (international) -0.18 
TR  rail (passenger) -0.24 
TS  shipping (domestic) -0.18 
TW  2-wheeler -0.41 
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3.1.7 Policy variables 
Policies are incorporated in MARKAL modelling through the imposition of constraints on 
processes, technologies, resources and emissions.  It is possible to restrict penetration of 
technologies, or place lower or upper bounds on technology activity, capacity or 
investment. The range of UK policies in MARKAL is primarily based of legislated 
measures through the 2008 Energy Bill, and are detailed in Anandarajah et al (2009). 
Newer policy variable implementation is discussed in section 5. 
When modelling using MARKAL, there is a balance to be made between the imposition 
of severe constraints and allowing the model to choose an optimal solution. 
3.1.7.1 Renewable Obligation 
The Renewable Obligation has been implemented in UK MARKAL.  All generation 
technologies covered by the RO are constrained to a minimum of 15% of total electricity 
generation by 2020.  In 2010, 8% of electricity is derived from renewable sources, rising 
to 13% in 2015 and 15% in 2020.  However, the weighting of technologies through 
banded allocation of ROCs is not modelled. 
3.1.7.2 EU ETS 
The EU ETS is not modelled explicitly to prevent double counting with imposed domestic 
CO2 emissions reduction and subsequent marginal pricing, but can be included in model 
runs through inclusion in the marginal price of carbon emissions. 
3.1.8 Taxes and subsidies 
3.1.8.1 Climate Change Levy 
Details of the Climate Change Levy incorporated into UK MARKAL are listed in section 
3.3 of chapter 9 of the UK MARKAL documentation (Kannan et al., 2007). 
3.1.8.2 Fuel Duty 
Transport fuel duty is levied at the same level as that specified in section 3.8 of chapter 8 
of the UK MARKAL documentation (Kannan et al., 2007). 
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3.1.9 System and technology-specific discount rates (market vs. social) 
3.1.9.1 Global discount rate 
The global discount rate has been changed to 3.5%, to coincide with the UK 
Government’s guidance of policy evaluation and appraisal (HM Government 2010). 
3.1.9.2 Technology Specific Discount Rates 
Hurdle rates are implemented on conservation and transport technologies.  These are 
scaled down to compensate for the change in discount rate from 5% to 3.5%; 12.5% to 
8.75% for conservation measures in both the residential and service/commercial sectors, 
10% to 7% for public transport, 7.5% to 5.25% for battery and methanol private 
transport, 7.5% to 5.25% for hybrid private transport modes and 10% to 7% for 
hydrogen private transport modes. 
In this project, hurdle rates were changed in Phase II (see 8.1.3) to reflect perspectives 
on differentiated actor investment risk, investment barriers or cost of capital. 
3.1.10 Emissions constraints 
The emission trajectories for C-80, C-90 and C-95 have been updated to reflect CCC 2020 
interim targets, with an exponential decline to 2050 targets.  Separate targets are in 
place for model runs with and without international emissions.  All targets are relative to 
1990 UK CO2 emission of 592.4 MtCO2 (619.4MtCO2 with international aviation and 
shipping). 
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Figure 4 shows the CO2 reduction trajectories used in this project 
3.1.11 UK CCS resources 
CCS resources have been updated since the previous version of the model to include the 
Utsira aquifer in the North Sea, available from 2030. 
Table 6: CO2 storage reservoirs available to the UK 
Site of CO2 Storage Cumulative maximum 
storage (ktCO2) 
Annual maximum 
injection (ktCO2) 
Aquifers (step 1) 5,043,000  
Aquifers (step 2) 5,043,000  
Aquifers (step 3) 5,043,000  
Enhanced Oil Recovery (step1) 350,000  
Enhanced Oil Recovery (step2) 350,000  
Oil / gas fields (high transport costs) (step 1) 267,000  
Oil / gas fields (high transport costs) (step 2) 267,000  
Oil / gas fields (high transport costs) (step 3) 267,000  
Oil / gas fields (low transport costs) (step 1) 1,567,000  
Oil / gas fields (low transport costs) (step 2) 1,567,000  
Oil / gas fields (low transport costs) (step 3) 1,567,000  
Utsira 15,000,000 53,700  
Total 36,331,000  
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3.1.12 Electricity T&D investment costs 
The assumptions for the transmission and distribution networks are listed in section 3.3 
in Chapter 5 of the UK MARKAL documentation.  Losses are assumed 1.5% for the 
transmission network and 6% for the distribution network. 
3.1.13 List of technologies that are centralised, distributed or micro-
generation 
MARKAL distinguishes between electricity generation technologies by exposure to 
transmission investment and O&M costs, transmission losses, distribution investment 
and O&M costs and distribution losses or neither.  Remote technologies have an 
additional cost to connect to the TT&D network. Centralised technologies export 
electricity onto the transmission network.  Distributed technologies are those that 
export electricity onto the distribution networks, therefore bypassing the losses incurred 
through transmission.  Micro-generation occurs on, or near to, the site of consumption 
therefore resulting in no electricity losses from distribution. 
For example, investment in micro-generation does not require the model to invest in 
grid reinforcement, whereas investment in transmission connected wind turbines will 
result in parallel investment in grid reinforcement and reoccurring O&M costs for the 
use of the electricity network. 
The technologies listed in the updated Appendix 5, included with this document, are 
signified as centralised, distributed or micro-generation by the letters C, D or M. 
3.1.14 List of core CHP and district heating technologies 
It is possible to characterise co-generation in multiple ways in MARKAL.  In the UK 
MARKAL model, district heating technologies are those that provide heat only to low-
temperature district heating networks.  CHP plants are also specified that generate both 
electricity and low-temperature heat for district heating.  CHP plants that represent 
industrial auto-generation, the production of high temperature heat (steam) and 
electricity, are also included. 
Details of the CHP and District Heating plants are included in the updated Appendix for 
Chapter 5 of the UK MARKAL documentation (Kannan et al. 2007). 
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3.1.15 H2 distribution costs by mode (scale and distance) 
Hydrogen is divided into three subsets of the hydrogen energy vector, liquid hydrogen, 
large gaseous hydrogen and small gaseous hydrogen.  Liquid hydrogen is transported 
using tube trailers.  Large-scale gaseous hydrogen is delivered via pipelines or in tube 
trailers.  Small gaseous-hydrogen is produced at the site of use.  It therefore incurs no 
transmission costs or losses.  Full details of the updates made to hydrogen infrastructure 
and processes in the UK MARKAL model can be found in (Joffe et al., 2007). 
3.1.16 EU-UK electricity imports 
The Pan EU TIMES model (PET) of IER Stuttgart has contributed a projection of future 
electricity imports for the UK, based on anticipated power flows in the entire EU 
network. 
Table 7: Imported UK electricity flows (PJ) 
    2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 
Total net Imports TWh 14 9 6 26 32 32 32 29 26 
  PJ 51 31 22 93 116 116 116 106 94 
3.1.17 Conservation uptake constraint 
Minimum uptakes of various conservation measures, such as tank insulation, lighting, 
cavity wall insulation and double-glazing are constrained into the model, with an upper 
cap for total uptake of energy conservation measures derived from CCC assumptions. 
In MARKAL, energy conservation measures are modelled using dummy technologies.  
These technologies deliver an energy service demand (actually a reduction in energy to 
deliver the same energy service demand) but with no fuel input.  More information on 
conservation technologies in UK MARKAL can be found in chapters 6 and 7 of the 
documentation (Kannan et al., 2007). 
Note that in the latest version of the model, conservation potential is limited according 
to following constraints based upon assumptions from the Committee on Climate 
Change. 
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Table 8: Residential Conservation Measures (maximum PJ/annum) 
 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Heating controls - upgrade with boiler 
replacement 
2 4 8 9 9 9 
Heating control extra 1 2 4 6 6 6 
Residential cavity insulation (Pre- 76) 22 43 78 86 86 86 
Residential cavity insulation (Post- 76) 2 5 8 9 9 9 
Residential Double glazing windows 17 34 62 166 166 166 
Draught proofing (2010) 2 4 9 13 13 13 
Residential floor insulation 2 4 10 23 23 23 
Residential loft insulation measures - 250 
mm 
2 3 8 8 8 8 
Residential loft insulation measures - 150 
mm 
7 14 27 27 27 27 
Residential Solid wall insulation 8 16 72 239 239 239 
Residential efficient lighting (CFL retail) 
(EEC2005-2008) 
1 3 11 11 11 11 
Appliances - Set top box 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Residential Hot water cylinder insulation 
75 mm 
2 4 8 12 12 12 
Residential Hot water cylinder insulation 
50 mm 
1 1 3 7 7 7 
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Table 9: Service Conservation Measures (maximum PJ/annum) 
 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
IRC Tungsten-Halogen - Spots 0 0 1 3 3 3 
ECG CFLs Replace Tungsten Lamps 1 1 2 10 10 10 
16 mm Fluorescent Tubes Replace 26mm 0 0 1 3 3 3 
Metal Halide Floodlights 0 0 0 1 1 1 
HF Ballast 1 2 3 21 21 21 
Basic Lighting Timer 1 2 7 24 24 24 
Sunrise-Sunset Timers 0 0 1 3 3 3 
Most EE Freezer 0 1 1 2 2 2 
Most EE Fridge 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Most EE Fridge-freezer 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TRVs Fully Installed 8 16 25 33 33 33 
Most EE Pitched Roof Insulation 1 2 5 26 26 26 
Most EE Flat Roof Insulation 2 3 8 29 29 29 
Most EE Cavity Wall Insulation 0 1 1 23 23 23 
Most EE Double Glazing 0 0 0 139 139 139 
Most EE External Wall Cladding/Insulation 0 0 0 40 40 40 
Programmable Thermostats 4 7 23 70 70 70 
Optimising Heating Start Times 1 2 8 24 24 24 
Total investment in conversation measures are governed by a global constraint derived 
from DEFRA estimates of total conservation installation rates: 
Table 10: Upper constraint to conservation measures in residential and service sectors  
(PJ per 5-year period) 
Sector 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Residential    114.8 120.3 134.5 148.5 164.0 181.1 200.0 220.8 
Service 0.0 5.0 7.1 10.2 14.65 20.9 29.9 42.9 61.4   
3.1.18 All key build rate constraints 
In the power sector, these apply to generation capacities, which hold the majority of 
capital costs and are in the following categories - large coal (conventional and CCS), large 
gas, CCS (coal and gas), wind (on and off shore), nuclear, marine (tidal and wave), 
distributed generation (gas, H2 and micro wind).  We initially proposed that the rates be 
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set at, until 2030, - 1GW pa per technology class and from 2030 - 2GW pa per 
technology class (see section 3.2.1.3 for more information). 
Following consultation with the Committee on Climate Change, after examination of the 
first model runs, build rates were revised down to the following values in the earlier 
periods of the model. 
Table 11: Build rate constraints for main generation technologies (e.g. nuclear, large coal) 
 2000  2005  2010  2015  2020  2025  2030  2035-
2050  
GW per 5 year 
period 
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 5.0 7.5 10 
The Committee believed the near term build rates to be unrealistically high, especially 
for nuclear, marine and CCS as MARKAL averages 2.5 years each side of a given year 
rather than a ‘snapshot’ of a given year. 
Large gas is constrained by an upper bound of 2.5GW pa, the peak building rate seen in 
the ‘dash-to-gas’ in the 1990s.  An existing constraint ensures that gas generation cannot 
account for more than 50% of total electricity generation in any period. 
Distributed generation is constrained to a rising fraction of the electricity sector, from 
10% in 2000 to 20% in 2030.  This constraint is intended to represent the grid 
management/security issues with incorporating distributed generation onto the 
electricity network. 
3.1.19 Limits on heat pumps, night storage heaters, solar heating 
Heat pumps are currently constrained to a maximum of 30% of total residential heating 
activity, with no new heat pump investment allowed until 2010. 
Night storage heaters are constrained to a maximum of 30% of all residential electricity 
used for space heating. 
New upper constraints were imposed in the model for the CCC scenarios: 
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Table 12: Upper bounds on heat pump activity 
PJ/annum 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Upper bound on residential 
sector heat pump activity 
1 8 39 72 131 237 431 781 1417 
Upper bound on 
service/commercial sector 
heat pump activity 
3 23 119 168 237 334 470 662 933 
New upper bounds were also imposed for solar heating: 
Table 13: Upper bounds on solar heating 
PJ/annum 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Upper bound for service sector 
solar heating (hot water, 
district heating) 
0 1 3 4 4 5 7 8 10 
Upper bound for residential 
sector solar heating (hot 
water, district heating) 
1 7 17 21 28 36 46 59 76 
 
3.2 Exposition of Phase 1 Model Changes 
The previous section detailed the changes undergone since the UKERC 2050 Carbon 
Pathways report (Anandarajah et al. 2009). For this project a further set of changes were 
made following supporting analysis by CCC and are incorporated for Phase 1 runs 
(sections 5 and 6). These changes are subdivided into three sections. 
 Updates made due to new data are listed first.  These include responses to criticism 
of previous versions of the model. 
 Secondly, this document lists the updates that extend functionality of the model and 
what this new functionality includes. 
 Listed lastly are changes to the model necessary to recalibrate to the updated DUKES 
energy statistics and NAEI emissions inventory. 
3.2.1 Model v. 3-24 changes due to new data 
3.2.1.1 CCS costs and efficiencies and start dates 
All CCS early vintage process and electricity technology's start dates have been put back 
to 2015. The start dates for all CCS storage options have been pulled forward to 2015. 
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CCS capture efficiency has been lowered from 90% to 85% from comparison with the EU 
PET model. Pulverised coal capital costs have been increased also from comparison with 
the EU PET model. 
3.2.1.2 CCS storage extension to full North Sea resources 
The CCS characterisation in the model has been extended to include the Utsira aquifer 
under the North Sea with transport at €4.6/tCO2 based on a 730km, 20Mt/year pipeline 
and storage at €2.8/tCO2 based on Utsira injection level as below. 
Cumulative capacity is limited to 15 GtCO2 - 42 GTtCO2 overall storage and 35.8% share 
according to UK population relative to other North Sea Countries.  Annual injection is 
limited to 53.7 MtCO2 - 150 MtCO2 overall injection and 35.8% share according to UK 
population relative to other North Sea Countries. 
Generic CCS costs have also been updated to include transportation at €3-5 /tCO2, 
storage at €0-8 /tCO2, conversion to £/PJ, electricity costs separated out and CCS O&M 
costs at 15% of capital costs. Finally, cumulative CCS limits for the UK have been raised 
to 36 GtCO2. 
3.2.1.3 Build rates 
 In the power sector, these apply to generation capacities (which hold the majority of 
capital costs) and are in the following categories - large coal (conventional and CCS), CCS 
(coal and gas), wind (on and off shore), nuclear, marine (tidal and wave), distributed 
generation (gas, H2 and micro wind).  The rates are: 
 until 2030 - 1GW pa per technology class 
 from 2030 - 2GWe pa per technology class 
These build rates reflect both the ability of the supply chain to raise and commit capital, 
find qualified personnel, pass regulatory/planning requirements on a project basis as 
well as the requirements to sequentially upgrade the grid to accommodate these new 
resources.  The build rates are stepped to reflect progress in underpinning capability to 
deliver. 
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These build rates are well below those imposed by the CCC in their inaugural report 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2008). These were set at 3GW pa through 2030 and 
5GWe pa for 2030-2050.  This was despite calls for lower build rates in the report's peer 
review (Strachan, 2008d). 
In terms of historical data, the highest capacity addition in the UK was gas CCGT in the 
'dash for gas', which averaged at 2.5GW pa from 1990 to 2000 - see Fig 21 in the CCC 1st 
annual report (Oct 09) supporting research by Pöyry on CCS Milestones to deliver large 
scale deployment in the UK by 2030 (Pöyry, 2009). As noted in this report, CCGT is an 
ideal case for quick expansion, being a proven technology, relatively low capital cost, 
quick to build and flexible in operation.  Newer, less flexible plant would expect to have 
lower build rates.  Hence, modelled investment in gas generation has a fixed upper 
bound of 2.5 GW per annum. 
Looking at the UK as a whole (BERR, 2002, p.20) gives total UK capacity expansion at 
2.5GW from 1950 through 1974 (12GW to 72 GW). Looking at nuclear and assuming a 
70% load factor for generation (recent years has seen an improvement in load factors) 
the UK built on average at 0.36GW in the 1960s, 0.16GW in the 1970s and 0.38GW in 
the 1980s.  The final choice of build rates is somewhat arbitrary but this 1-2GW step 
appears reasonable. 
Outside the power sector, build rates are much harder to justify.  We have considered 
both H2 and bio infrastructures (with bio a lower priority).  However, not imposing build 
rates of bioprocess could unfairly bias the model in terms of replacement transport 
fuels.  However, the uncertainties on bio fuels may not transcribe well to build rates if 
these are liquid or solid fuel replacements and can utilise existing (adapted) supply 
chains.  A better process would be to examine the resources limitation of biomass - 
which has been updated following UKERC Energy 2050 but more detailed information 
and scenarios, could be put in following the reviews by Jablonski et al. (2010).  The 
exception to using bio build rates would be if the constraint were linked to large process 
facilities. 
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On hydrogen, the only good historical precedent is the UK development of town and 
then natural gas.  For the energy sector as a whole and the residential sector in 
particular the respective average annual changes were: 
Table 14: Historic UK growth of natural gas 
Year Range Whole Energy Sector Residential Energy Sector 
1955-65 10.7PJ 6.6PJ 
1965-75 92.1PJ 38.6PJ 
1975-85 71.3PJ 40.1PJ 
1985-96 54.1PJ 22.7PJ 
1995-2006 137.3PJ 13.3PJ 
The latter numbers show the dash to gas in the power sector. 
Hydrogen may well, but not necessarily, be focused on the transport sector.  In PJ terms, 
UK transport consumption was 1855PJ in 2000 falling to 1705PJ and around 1300PJ in 
most scenarios in 2050 reflecting efficiency gains.  In most constrained scenarios, H2 
grows to around 220PJ in around 15 years - i.e. a 15PJ pa growth rate.  An arbitrary 
suggestion would be for a hydrogen growth constraint at 25PJ pa, or 125PJ per period, 
which corresponds to the average residential penetration of gas.  This is not expected to 
be triggered. 
Finally, given the existing process and distribution infrastructure in a system of expected 
flat or falling demand, and especially falling UK fossil production, we have not and do 
not intend to impose build constraints on the gas or oil sectors. 
3.2.1.4 Restricted ‘floors’ (25% decline) for behavioural change reductions 
The variation in energy service demand (ESD) changes under MARKAL Elastic Demand - 
the floor and ceiling that ESDs can fall or rise to under price rises or falls - is an arbitrary 
assumption.  Due to concerns that under high CO2 prices ESDs in certain sectors may fall 
below a justifiable threshold, such as residential heating below comfort temperatures, 
or industrial facilities unable to operate, then the following changes are made. 
 All ESDs can only fall or rise by 25% - note this is the ESD movement and not the 
final energy demand 
 All ESDs can change in 1% increments 
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3.2.1.5 Distributed generation technologies 
DG is currently constrained to 20% of total installed capacity in 2030 rising in the linear 
fashion from 10% in 2000.  No constraint is imposed on periods after 2030 to represent 
improvements in integrating distributed generation - i.e. distribution network 
reinforcement and adoption of smart grid technology.  However, some distributed 
technologies, such as micro CHP, infer a positive benefit upon system security while 
others, like wind contribute more energy than capacity value (Strbac et al., 2007). 
3.2.1.6 Further biomass chain placeholders 
As described in Anandarajah et al. (2009), biomass chains have been updated 
extensively through Jablonski et al. (2010). 
3.2.1.7 Biomass CCS options 
Two new technologies have been created, both a CCS option from pure biomass, 
required under very stringent reduction scenarios.  These are built off the later vintages 
for biomass gasification CCGT with new multipliers for the additional costs from 
conventional CCGT with CCS.  See line 29a in the updated Appendix 5 of the UK MARKAL 
documentation (Kannan et al., 2007). 
3.2.1.8 Aviation energy service demand projections 
The parameters in version 3.24 include revisions of both domestic and international 
aviation energy service demands.  These are in agreement with the forecasts in 
(Department for Transport, 2009) and result in a peak in aviation CO2 emissions around 
2025 of 62.1 MtCO2 in the base case.  After 2025, emissions reduce to around 55 MtCO2 
and stay below 58 MtCO2 to 2050.  Table 3.4 of (Department for Transport, 2009) shows 
the efficiency assumptions included in UK MARKAL, an average of 1.1% per annum 
improvement on fuel efficiency from technical and operational improvements between 
2005 and 2030 and 0.75% per annum improvements beyond 2030.  This results in an 
aggregate 31% improvement in fuel efficiency between 2005 and 2030 and a further 
16.1% aggregate improvement from 2030 to 2050.  However, beyond 2030, the majority 
of efficiency improvement of the fleet occurs through replacement of earlier, less 
efficient technologies.  In line with this, further technology efficiency improvements due 
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to newer aviation technologies are halted after 2030 with cost improvements only 
included.  International flights become more efficient from 2020 onwards due to the 
introduction of blended wing technologies, which are assumed 10% more efficient than 
the non-blended wing technologies.  Efficiency increases to 30% in 2050 mean that 
carbon emissions stay relatively flat despite increases in demand for travel. 
A RESID parameter was added to the 2000 international aviation technology to force out 
the existing fleet to 10% of 2000 Bvkm by 2020.  This simulates the replacement of 
ageing aircraft purchased before 2000. 
As an indicative sense check, we can compare the forecast increase in terminal 
passengers with the forecast increase in billion aircraft kilometres.  We might expect 
operational efficiency to increase the number of passengers carried per flight 
(decreasing the aircraft km per person), but if overall patterns of flying stay similar and 
are simply scaled up, then the percentage increases of both should be comparable.  This 
is the case, with a 224% increase in terminal passengers, and a 243% increase in aircraft 
kilometres for both domestic and international aviation. 
In comparison to previous versions of the model, the projections to 2050 for both 
international and domestic aviation have changed shape and increased slightly.  The 
previous projections of international aviation demand showed a steep increase to over 
2Bvkm by 2010 and then a less rapid increase to 3.25 Bvkm by 2050.  The revised 
forecasts show a rapid increase to 3 Bvkm by 2030 followed by a less rapid increase to 
3.5 Bvkm by 2050.  The slower growth after 2030 is due to the DfT assumptions of 
airports reaching capacity and general saturation of the market.  Domestic aviation 
follows a similar pattern, peaking at 1.4 Bvkm by 2050 up from 1.25 Bvkm. 
In comparison to a recent report on aviation (Committee on Climate Change, 2009), UK 
MARKAL shows a doubling of fuel use from 2000 to 2030 under a base case.  Under 
carbon-constrained scenarios, aviation fuel demand peaks in 2030 with the adoption of 
alternate aviation fuels. 
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3.2.1.9 Solar technologies 
We increased lifetime of solar technologies to 30 years in response to a report (Jäger-
Waldau, 2009). 
Solar plant for district heating systems has been added as a technology option. 
3.2.1.10 Heat pump technologies 
All residential heat pump technologies now have a lifetime of 20 years.  Later residential 
heat pump technologies (higher efficiency options) have had their investment costs 
lowered to be the same as their respective earlier vintages. 
3.2.1.11 Updated mid-term CO2 constraints to match CCC targets 
The emission trajectories for C-20, C-80 and C-90 have been updated to reflect CCC 2020 
interim targets, with an exponential decline to 2050 targets.  Separate targets are in 
place for with and without international emissions.   
3.2.2 Model v. 3-24 extensions in functionality 
3.2.2.1 Substitution flexibility in industrial sector 
The industrial sector has an aggregated structure with fuel share equations designed to 
mimic inabilities to shift part of the demand in this heterogeneous sector.  However, this 
fuel share equation has been found to be too restrictive in terms of residual emission 
under severe CO2 constraints.  For all relevant industrial sectors, the natural gas 
minimum fuel share constraints are moderated - this increases the flexibility of this 
sector to an acceptable standard. 
3.2.2.2 CHP and district heating treatment greatly enhanced 
New CHP and district heating technologies have been added to the model with 
corresponding improvements to the results template.  Users can now view penetration 
of CHP into the electricity system and the proportion of electricity and district heating 
from each group of technologies. 
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3.2.2.3 International aviation and international shipping as an option 
International aviation and shipping energy service demands have been reviewed and are 
available to be included in model runs.  As mentioned above, corresponding CO2 
emission reduction trajectories are used when operating the model with international 
aviation and shipping. 
3.2.2.4 Residential and service sector conservation reorganisation 
Previous versions of the model included two different options for conservation 
technologies within the wider UK MARKAL model.  This function has now been removed 
with the less conservative upper bound on conservation adopted as standard. 
3.2.2.5 CCS Retrofit technologies 
Two process technologies are placed upstream of a retrofit coal or gas plant technology, 
one a dummy pass-through that converts EHCO to EHCOCC with no efficiency penalty or 
cost.  The other is the retrofitted CCS capture plant with all normal parameters (e.g. 
INVCOST, VAROM, FIXOM etc.) also outputting EHCOCC.  The model can then build the 
retrofit coal plant and use the pass-through technology until CCS capture is required.  It 
will then build the CCS retrofit plant and stop using the pass-through. 
Retrofit coal plants have the same parameters as standard coal plants, but with an upper 
bound on building in the 2015 period to 1GW (to represent demonstration 
plants/prototypes).  There are no constraints after this time.  The model is free to 
choose each period, from 2020 onwards, whether to use the CCS retrofit process or the 
pass-through process, although if there was a carbon constraint imposed it is unlikely 
that the model would revert to using the pass-through technology.  The CCS retrofit 
process has both a cost and efficiency penalty for the plant to which it is fitted – the 
model must invest in the CCS process and use more fuel to generate the same quantity 
of electricity. 
3.2.2.6 Backstop technology 
A backstop technology price (set at £5000/tCO2) enables the model to solve under 
extreme scenarios (e.g. no biomass imports).  This was defined and placed in the 
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PROC18 scenario.  A similar process is used for a CO2 international permit purchase price 
and constraint - although this is in a separate scenario (CO2PERMIT).  Both carbon prices 
are defined as follows: 
Table 15: Details of backstop technology and CO2 permits 
  Technology  Carrier  Emission  Secondary 
emission(s)  
Price  Constraint  
Backstop  CCC-B  CO2B  CO2BCKSTP  -CO2, -CON  £5000/tCO2  none  
Permit  CCC-P  CO2P  CO2PERMIT  -CO2  from CCC 2009 
central case  
12.5% of 1990 
levels ~50MtCO2  
3.2.3 Model v. 3-24 calibration 
3.2.3.1 Model horizon reduced from 2070 to 2050 (with appropriate salvage 
values for late investments) 
Previous versions of the model included the periods beyond 2050 due for computational 
reasons.  The latest version of UK MARKAL has removed these later periods in order to 
reduce the size and increase the speed of model solution.  This is especially important 
when running the model in stochastic mode as this can take up to 10 times longer than 
standard MARKAL. 
3.2.3.2 Year 2000-2005 total, sectoral and fuel matching for final energy  
Primary energy is calibrated to within 1% in 2000 and 3% in 2005.  For primary energy, 
the main discrepancy is through excess exports of petroleum products. 
Final energy is calibrated to within 0.3% of DUKES 2000 and DUKES 2005. 
3.2.3.3 Year 2000-2005 total and sectoral CO2 matching 
Carbon Dioxide emissions match to NAEI statistics (NAEI 2008) in 2000 and within 3-4% 
in 2005, depending on the model constraints. 
3.2.3.4 Non energy CO2 emissions added, with placeholder for future CCC 
mitigation 
In order to calibrate the energy balance for primary energy, it is necessary to include the 
514 PJ of petroleum and gas commodities used for non-energy uses such as feedstock or 
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that are manufactured into another product (like plastics for example).  Emissions from 
the non-energy use of products are not reported, although a small number of emissions 
do arise from the oxidisation of lubricants, and through gas feedstock use in the 
manufacture of ammonia. 
Differences between MARKAL and the NAEI methodologies include the carbon dioxide 
emissions from industrial processes, such as sinter or concrete production, or other 
processes where the primary CO2 emissions are not derived from the combustion of 
fossil fuels. 
To account for this, the emissions factors applied to the feedstock are adjusted to match 
emissions from the non-energy sector (mainly lubricants and some feedstock) while the 
quantities of commodity remain the same in order to match the DUKES commodity 
balance. 
The demand growth profile for non-energy products matches that of the Other Industry 
sector and has similar elasticities. 
3.2.3.5 Disaggregation of fuel CO2 emissions and linking of MARKAL CO2 
emissions and NAEI reporting methodologies 
Model calibration is based on both fuel consumption and primary energy.  This also 
matches with existing UK standardised record keeping methodologies for CO2 emissions. 
3.3 Exposition of Phase 2 Model Changes 
3.3.1 Implementation of industrial and process CCS options 
All values for industrial CCS are taken from the Element Energy (2010) report as 
provided by CCC.  This report breaks out the potential for CCS into key sectors and then 
processes (e.g. high temperature heat) within these sectors for 70 sites surveyed 
through the UK. Owing to the aggregation of our industry sector, we have linked these 
onto our industrial sector classes. This has the added advantage of making the tracking 
of fuels and emissions easier as it occurs still at an upstream level, and avoids the need 
to rejig the results template which captures final industrial energy at the process level. 
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As requested by CCC, we have split out CCS emissions into industry and non-energy as 
per Figure 9 of the Element Energy (2010) report, and the process emissions by sector 
statistics from NAEI (2008).  It is important to note that CCS-CO2 and other emissions on 
fuel applications is in industry and on processes is in non-energy (as defined in MARKAL). 
However all CCS related energy vectors (e.g. INGA) are allocated to the industrial sector. 
This is because of the limited and strict fuel use in the non-energy sector (e.g. where the 
majority is in misc. oils). Any change to that mix (outside the defined bands on which 
price changes can substitute fuels) has severe implications for overall fuel use - 
especially considering that MARKAL only tracks coal and gas based CCS. And additionally, 
fuel use in the industry vs. non-energy sectors is equivalent and is really an accounting 
mechanism in the model. 
Minor points include that there may be a rounding error in 2025-30 in comparing CCS-P 
vs. overall CCS or reservoir CCS. This is due to the model investing in industrial or process 
CCS one period before utilizing the CCS reservoir due to the requirement for capital 
investment and as it is then cheaper to invest in CCS equipment rather than 
conventional equipment for just a single period. Another minor point is that the 
template CCS-P includes hydrogen based CCS and hence can be higher than the process-
industry 38.3 MtCO2 amount. 
Key assumptions include: 
• Installation size limit of 50 ktCO2 pa for CHP and 200 ktCO2 pa for other industrial 
sites 
• Central DECC fossil prices (as we use in the rest of the model) 
• 10% discount rates with capital annualised over 20 years (we have adjusted 
these for our values of 3.5% and 25 years respectively) 
• costs in £2009 - we have deflated these to £2000 using HMT deflator of 1.239 
• Majority of industrial process investigated (not aluminium) 
• 90% storage potential - we utilize 85%, and have made commensurate 
adjustments 
• Total technical limit of 43MtCO2 by 2000 falling to 38MtCO2 by 2030. Note this is 
dependent on fuel input - e.g. sequestering coal as part of CHP gives a higher 
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storage than gas, and this is accounted for with 38MtCO2 as an upper bound in 
UK MARKAL 
• Total CCS costs ranging from £30 to £250/tCO2 - however the final (convex) part 
of the industrial MACC curve is dependent on very high costs for transport and 
storage which we calculate separately 
• Average costs are (in £/tCO2): Refineries (62), Iron and Steel (42), CHP or steam 
(36), Other (26) - we actually utilise the range given by Element Energy (see 
below) 
Implementation details into MARKAL are: 
• All capture data taken from Table 3 (p22) of the Element Energy report 
• Assume CCS build constraints only apply to the power sector - as this constraint 
is already hit, industrial CCS would not be built 
• We separately calculate fuel costs via electricity requirements - this is 
comparable to Element Energy's figures 
• We utilise a standard calculation to put £/tCO2 metrics in terms of equivalent 
annualised capital, fixed O&M and variable O&M - as all our CCS chains, 31% of 
costs are assumed to be fuel (electricity) and of the remainder this is split 85/15 
between capital and variable costs. Standard yearly deflators, discount rates and 
currency conversions are used. 
• We separately calculate T&S costs using our more sophisticated approach based 
on type, distance and depth. For the first 93% of CCS T&S our costs match theirs, 
the final part of their costs curve spikes to £65/tCO2 whereas we have access to 
the Utsira North Sea formation 
• We retain the CCS capture cost floor at Element Energy's learning rate of 68% of 
first of a kind costs for CCS capture (and do not go to their lower level (54% by 
2050)) 
• Note that our capture costs are incorporated in the capture nodes, not the 
distribution of industrial gas or coal with CCS 
• We have a high and low capture cost elements (-HI and -LO tracking technologies 
below), with a 50/50 split between them, in order to mimic the cost range given 
by Element Energy 
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• Coal sequestration options are assumed to be the majority for Iron and steel 
• Gas and bio-methane options are assumed for fuel use in refineries and other 
industry (note this is implemented via a separate constraint [ICCS-NGA]) 
• CHP sequestration is tied onto Industrial steam, with a flexible source of 
feedstock (coal, gas, oil, wood, blast furnace gas) 
• Process emissions (accounted in the non-energy sector) are attributable to 
cement, ammonia, ethylene, and a minority of iron and steel 
 Potentials in 2030 are (in MtCO2): 
 Iron and Steel: 9.5 industry ; 2.5 process 
 Refineries:  8 industry 
 CHP (steam): 10 industry 
 Other (cement, ammonia, ethylene): 8.2 process 
• SIX new distribution technologies are used to allocate possible industrial CCS - 
SC14 coal; SG12 gas; SG13 bio-methane; SISTM-CCS steam; SX01 - gas based 
process; SX02 - coal based process 
• EIGHT new CCS tracking technologies are used to funnel CCS through into the 
CO2 capture, transport and storage costs and emissions tracking. For industrial 
fuel, this is (coal and gas): CCS-CIR-HI; CCS-CIR-LO; CCS-GIR-HI; CCS-GIR-LO. For 
processes this is (coal and gas): CCS-CNR-HI; CCS-CNR-LO; CCS-GNR-HI; CCS-GNR-
LO 
o These 8 tracking technologies are used instead of the conventional CCS 
process tracking technologies to differentiate between COH and COI tracking. 
Note however that all emissions are finally counted are process CCS - i.e. CCS-
--P. Also note the split in COI and CON for process based accounting purposes 
o Bounds (in PJ) placed on these technologies are converted from the MtCO2 
as above (using the relevant carbon content of coal or gas) 
• All technologies are implemented from 2025, with a lifetime of 25 years 
• An extensive checking process was undertaken that all emission match (CO2, 
CO2 sectoral, CCS, CCS storage, CCS process vs. electricity) 
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3.3.2 Modified constraints on industrial, process and electricity CCS 
Three overlapping constraints were implemented for the 2nd Phase II run for the CCC 
project. 
1. Industry CCS - no uptake by 2025 and maximum build rates in each following 5-
year period of 5 MtCO2, 10 MtCO2and then 15 MtCO2, post-2040 build rates 
should be adding a maximum of 20 MtCO2in any 5-year period 
2. On CCS as a whole - combine the build-rate constraint pre-2030 with that for 
power, but then not doing so post-2030, i.e. power reverts to a 2 GW per annum 
build constraint regardless of industry CCS deployment 
3. On electrical CCS - keep in the existing build-rate constraint 
 These constraints were implemented under the following Rule-based User Constraints: 
 Build_CCS - the original build constraint on electrical CCS 
 Build_CCSI - a constraint on CCS process emissions from coal and gas (including 
hydrogen CCS) 
 Build-ACCS - a constraint on all (electrical and process) CCS 
The rule-based constraints are weighted, as there is a constant relationship between the 
activity of the processes and the amount of carbon sequestered, but this changes 
according to the fuel consumed.  Thus, the different weighting to the left hand side of 
the constraint are derived from the ratio of the gas to coal CO2 factor. 
Note that five new Named Filters have been created.  These are: 
 CCS-P-G - gas process CCS technologies 
 CCS-P-C - coal process CCS technologies 
 CCS-E-G - gas electrical CCS technologies (power stations) 
 CCS-E-C - coal electrical CCS technologies (power stations) 
 CCS-P - all process CCS technologies 
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3.3.3 Including a bio-methane to gas grid option 
All costs are taken from the CCC given report - DBFZ (2009).  This work covers the 
upgrade process for biogas to bio-methane, using PSA (pressure swing absorption). 
Some notes on implementing: 
 No compression costs are included - these are in the gas pipeline depiction 
 No production costs of biogas are included - these are in the derivation of 
biogas (and landfill and sewage gas options) 
 A 15 year lifetime is used - reflecting the corrosive nature of biogas impurities 
 A 1km pipe network is assumed to connect to the gas pipeline 
 Average plant size of 500m3/hour is used 
 The efficiency loss is 2.5% 
 90% availability is assumed – i.e. 7884 hours per annum 
 Energy content of biogas fuels at 38.6MJ/m3 is used 
 A conversion of 1.239 from 2009£ to 2000£ is used 
Data is taken on capital and O&M costs from table 4 of the DBFZ (2009) report. It has 
been checked (and is consistent) to the Biosys-MARKAL model of Sophie Jablonski. 
Process elements SB21, SB22, and SB23 have been changed respectively. SB06 has been 
removed as the bio-solid to bio-methane route is available via SB23. 
For consistency, the cost of bio gasification (via AD processes) has been lowered in line 
with the DBFZ (2009) report (i.e. SB05). 
3.3.4 Revised constraints on heat pump deployment 
The lower bounds on biomass boilers, heat pumps and solar thermal heating have been 
removed in both the residential and service sectors. Investment smoothing constraints 
are placed on residential and service sector heat pumps to prevent investment spikes. A 
70% maximum market share is applied to service sector heat pumps (in recognition of 
potential building types). The table below details the residential assumptions - taken 
from the Central CCC set of assumptions 
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Table 16: Revised constraints on heat pump deployment 
Residential sector  2000 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 - 2050 
SWI # of homes  0.0  0.0  1.0  2.0  2.8  3.5  
SWI PJ  0.0  0.0  29.8  59.5  81.9  104.2  
Total conservation PJ  0.0  0.0  144.6  179.9  216.5  252.8  
Upper % heat pumps  0.0  0.0  23.7  47.4  50.0  52.6  
 
3.3.5 Inclusion of lifecycle emissions for non-waste bioenergy chains 
In UK MARKAL, biomass resources include a range of solid, liquid and gaseous forms, 
which are subject to conversion processes or used directly in one of the five end-use 
sectors.  To provide an approximation of the lifecycle emissions from bio-energy 
resources, emission factors have been applied to the extraction and import 
technologies.  These emission factors are based upon a fraction of the fossil equivalent.  
For example, in Phase 2, scenario 6, solid biomass is subject to a 0.25 x 91.68 kTCO2 / PJ 
emission.  In Phase 2, Scenario 7, gaseous forms of biomass are subject to a 0.50 x 51.66 
kTCO2 / PJ factor (see 8.4 for the scenario description). 
Table 17: Emission factors assumed for bioenergy lifecycle emissions 
Fossil 
equivalent 
commodity 
UK MARKAL Fossil 
emission factor 
(kTCO2/PJ) 
75% saving lifecycle 
emission factor for bio-
energy (kTCO2/PJ) 
50% saving lifecycle 
emission factor for bio-
energy (kTCO2/PJ) 
Natural gas 51.660 12.915 25.830 
Coal 91.680 22.920 45.840 
Diesel/Petrol 76.260 19.065 38.130 
Lifecycle emissions were tracked at resource and at sector level, and further 
disaggregated by biomass type (solid/liquid/gas). 
Note that there is a known small discrepancy in the emissions tracking which amounts to 
a total of 1-2 MtCO2 in the sectoral representations of emissions.  The discrepancy 
occurs because no effort has been made to account for the complex accounting required 
to apply differentiated emissions factors to processes that allow for conversion between 
solid, liquid and gaseous forms of energy carriers from energy resources.  The binding 
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emission factors are those at the resource, so the model will be giving the ‘correct’ 
result for the given assumptions.  The bio-product chains in UK are very complex and 
would require further structural development to allow sectoral tracking of lifecycle 
emissions. 
3.3.6 Revised hurdle rates 
Modified hurdle rates were applied for the runs P2-R3-# onwards (see 8.1.3).  These 
include: 
 Power (and electricity CCS): 10% 
 Industry (and industrial CCS): 10% 
 Hydrogen (and process CCS): 10% 
 Service: 10% 
 Residential: 3.5% 
 Transport vehicle technologies: 
o Cars and 2-wheelers: 3.5% 
o Buses: 6% 
o HGV and LGVs: 8.5% 
 Not specified by CCC: 
o Aviation: 3.5% 
o Navigation: 3.5% 
o Rail: 3.5% 
Hurdle rates were also applied to conservation technologies in relevant sectors (so 10% 
in commercial sector and 3.5% in residential sector).  All CCS storage technologies have a 
10% power sector hurdle rate assigned.  Changes to hurdle rates were consistent with 
the rationale of a private sector discount rate of 10% and public sector discount rate of 
3.5%. 
Existing hurdle rates (8.75% for conservation measures in both the residential and 
service/commercial sectors, 7.00% for public transport, 8.75% for battery and methanol 
private transport, 5.25% for hybrid private transport modes and 7.00% for hydrogen 
private transport modes) are overridden by the new amended hurdle rates. 
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4 Scenarios 
The Committee on Climate Change required a new set of scenarios to inform their 
advice to the Government on carbon abatement pathways through the 2020s, 
consistent with meeting the 2050 target. 
Scenarios were designed to address the following: 
 Previous scenarios conducted in the UK have not explicitly represented uncertainty 
in a systematic manner – new scenarios should use a stochastic model to quantify 
uncertainty 
 Policy has changed since the previous modelling projects – new scenarios should 
reflect an updated policy landscape 
 Understanding of technology pathways is improved – new scenarios should 
represent the latest knowledge of energy technologies 
 The particular focus is on carbon abatement pathways in the mid-term e.g. 2020-
2030 – scenarios should address this 
Scenario design starts with the specification of the reference, or business-as-usual 
scenario.  The reference case is important, because it is against the reference case that 
the costs of constrained scenarios are measured.  All welfare costs in the following 
scenario descriptions are a relative measurement for comparison between scenarios.  By 
definition, the change in welfare of the reference scenario is zero.  However, the 
magnitude of constrained case welfare costs can be increased or decreased by altering 
the assumptions included in the reference scenario.  For example, if a 20% CO2 
reduction was included in a reference scenario, then the welfare cost of an 80% CO2 
reduction scenario would be less than if the reference scenario did not include a CO2 
reduction. 
For this project, the assumptions contained in the reference scenario are listed in 
section 3.  Note that just one reference scenario (see the description of BM-REF-S in 
section 5.1) was used for the entire project to aid comparison between scenarios.  The 
changes to hurdle rates, industrial CCS and inclusion of bio-methane are therefore 
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regarded as the results of policy that are inseparable from CO2 mitigation and are 
included only in sensitivity scenarios. 
After agreeing a reference scenario with CCC, four core runs were developed.  These 
included the main assumptions that CCC wished to explore, notably i) the severity of a 
UK carbon dioxide target that may be necessary and ii) the inclusion of a bundle of policy 
measures consistent with the ‘Extended Ambition’ target specified by the Committee.  
These runs (COR1-C90-S, COR2-C95-S, COR3-C90-S and COR4-C95-S), together with an 
overview of the assumptions they contain are found in section 5. 
Following the definition of the four core runs, eight sensitivity runs, comprising both 
deterministic and stochastic scenarios were run, mainly off the COR1-C90-S scenario.  
These explored less severe and more severe CO2 reduction targets, uncertainties 
surrounding CO2 targets, fossil fuel prices, CCS availability, and uncertain fossil fuel 
prices in combination with different assumptions on biomass availability. 
A provisional report containing the descriptions of Phase 1 scenarios generated 
feedback from CCC which fed back into a revised set of assumptions for Phase 2 (see 
section 8.1).  In the interim period a further eight sensitivity runs (see section 7) 
explored uncertain fossil fuel prices , modulated electric vehicle uptake adoption of 
hydrogen as a transport fuel, and heat pump uptake and solid wall insulation mainly 
based on the COR3-C90-S scenario. 
A new core run for Phase 2 was developed over three runs that explored the effects of 
new technologies such as industrial CCS, grid injection of bio-methane as well as 
modified hurdle rates to represent the investment barriers seen by different actors of 
the energy system.  From this run P2-R3-HUR-C90-5, the final nine sensitivity runs 
covered bio-energy; build rates, uncertain fossil fuels prices and uncertainty over 
biomass availability in combination with approximations of the lifecycle emissions from 
biomass. 
In all, 32 runs were delivered to CCC, with several exploratory run undertaken internally 
to assist in mapping out such a complex array of findings. 
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Table 18: Complete set of 32 model runs included in this analysis under Phase I and Phase II 
# Scenario Code Scenario Description Stochastic or 
Deterministic 
Page 
 
PHASE I CORE RUNS  
 
 
0 
BM-REF-S Base case, social discount rate D 50 
1 
COR1-C90-S 90% reduction in CO2 emissions, no extended ambition, social discount rate D 52 
2 
COR2-C95-S 95% reduction in CO2 emissions without extended ambition D 53 
3 
COR3-C90-S 90% reduction in CO2 emissions, with extended ambition D 56 
4 
COR4-C95-S 95% reduction in CO2 emissions, with extended ambition D 57 
 
PHASE I SENSITIVITY RUNS  
 
 
5 
COR0-C80-S 80% CO2 reduction D 59 
6 
COR1-HF-C90-S 90% CO2 reduction with high-high fossil fuel prices D 61 
7 
COR000-C97-S Extreme CO2 reduction D 63 
8 
CUMCOR1/2-C90/C95-S Uncertain CO2 reduction (C90/C95 cumulative equivalents) S Error! 
Book
mark 
not 
defin
ed. 
9 
COR1-STOC-FF-# Uncertain fossil fuel prices under central biomass imports S 69 
10 
COR1-STOC-HBFF-# Uncertain fossil fuel prices under high biomass imports S 72 
11 
COR1-STOC-LBFF-# Uncertain fossil fuel prices under severe biomass import constraint S 72 
12 
COR1-STOC-CCS/NOCCS-# Uncertain availability of CCS and uncertain fossil fuel prices S 75 
 
PHASE 2 PRELIMINARY 
RUNS 
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1 
COR3-LOWGAS Extended ambition, 90% CO2 reduction with low gas prices and central fossil fuel prices D 80 
2 
COR3-STOC-FF#-S Extended ambition, uncertain fossil fuel prices S 82 
3 
COR3-CUMC90-S Extended ambition, cumulative emissions equivalent to 90% CO2 reduction D 84 
4 
COR3-CUM2030-S Extended ambition, cumulative emissions equivalent to 90% CO2 reduction, with additional straight-line 
emission constraint through 2030 
D 86 
5 
COR3-T1H-FF[L,C,H,HH]-S Uncertain fossil fuel prices, extended ambition, C-90 emission reductions with restriction on electric vehicles S 88 
6 
COR3-T1NH-FF[L,C,H,HH]-S Uncertain fossil fuel prices, extended ambition, C-90 emission reductions with restriction on electric vehicles 
and hydrogen as a transport fuel 
S 91 
7 
COR3-HP1-FF[L,C,H,HH]-S C-90 extended ambition except heat sector, alternate (lower SWI) assumptions on heat pumps and solid wall 
insulation, uncertain fossil fuel prices  
S 92 
8 
COR3-HP2-FF[L,C,H,HH]-S C-90 extended ambition except heat sector, alternate (higher SWI) assumptions on heat pumps and solid 
wall insulation, uncertain fossil fuel prices 
S 95 
 
PHASE 2 CORE RUNS  
 
 
1 
P2-COR3-ALL-S-2 Industrial CCS, bio-methane, solid wall insulation and heat pumps D 97 
2 
P2-R2-NEW-C90 Like run 1, with lower wind uptake, 30% renewable energy target, constrained mid-term CCS D 99 
3 
P2-R3-HUR-C90-5 Amended hurdle rates D 102 
 
PHASE 2 SENSITIVITY RUNS  
 
 
4 
P2-R4-INV-C90-0 Increased electricity sector investment costs D 105 
5 
P2-R5-# Stochastic biomass availability S 109 
6 
P2-R6-# Stochastic biomass availability with crude bioenergy lifecycle emissions at 75% saving of fossil equivalents S 113 
7 
P2-R7-# Stochastic biomass availability with crude bioenergy lifecycle emissions at 50% saving of fossil equivalents S 113 
8 
P2-R8-HUR-CUMC90 Cumulative CO2 constraint (equivalent to a C90 scenario) D 118 
9 
P2-R9-BUILD Power sector build-rate sensitivity D 121 
10 
P2-R10-#  Stochastic fossil fuel prices on P2-R3-HUR-C90 S 124 
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11 
P2-R11-LOWGAS Central fossil fuel prices for coal and oil, low fossil fuel prices for natural gas D 128 
12 
P2-R12-HUR- C95  95% reduction in CO2 emissions D 130 
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5 The four core runs 
The Committee on Climate Change specified four core scenarios following a simple 
matrix shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Phase 1 – Four core scenarios 
The primary assumptions for the first two core runs are summarised in Table 19 below. 
Table 19: Summary of the assumptions in the four core runs 
Carbon Target 2050 target of -90% (59.3MtCO2) and -95% (29.6MtCO2), relative to 
1990 emissions of 592.4MtCO2 
Equal annual reduction from 2020 target of 380.2MtCO2 (35.8% 
reduction from 1990 levels) 
Fossil Fuel Price CCC Central scenario for oil, oil products, natural gas and coal; with 
no domestic fossil fuel production post 2020. 
Extended 
Ambition 
No CCC near-term (to 2020) extended ambition assumptions: 
(residential and service sector conservation, CCS demonstration 
projects, commissioned nuclear plants, commissioned wind plants 
plus relaxation of 2020’s build rates, electricity vehicle uptake) 
Biomass 
Imports 
Central biomass import constraint (increasing to 1260PJ by 2050) 
Renewable 
Heat 
Constraints 
Constraints included on heat pumps and solar heating in the 
domestic and service sectors 
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The second set of core runs differ through the inclusion of the CCC extended ambition 
scenario.  This is summarised in Error! Reference source not found.section 5.3.1. This 
revised set of CCC core runs are run with social (S) discount rates (3.5%) and 
corresponding hurdle rates.  
The core runs have 2050 target of -90% (59.3MtCO2) and -95% (29.6MtCO2), relative to 
1990 emissions of 592.4MtCO2. The path consists of equal annual reduction from 2020 
target of 380.2MtCO2 (35.8% reduction from 1990 levels) 
CCC Central scenarios are used for oil, oil products, natural gas and coal; with no 
domestic fossil fuel production post 2020 (Table 20). A central biomass import constraint 
is imposed (increasing to 1260PJ by 2050). 
Table 20: Four fossil fuel price scenarios (2000£/GJ) 
Scenario Fuel 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2050 
Low 
Oil 4.12 9.35 4.58 5.31 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 
Gas 1.93 4.47 2.62 2.70 2.70 2.77 2.77 2.77 
Coal 0.91 2.97 1.62 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
Central 
Oil 4.12 9.35 6.41 6.87 7.33 7.79 8.25 8.25 
Gas 1.93 4.47 4.47 4.85 5.16 5.47 5.70 5.70 
Coal 0.91 2.97 2.23 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62 
High 
Oil 4.12 9.35 7.70 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 
Gas 1.93 4.47 5.39 6.40 7.47 7.47 7.47 7.47 
Coal 0.91 2.97 2.43 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 
High 
High 
Oil 4.12 9.35 9.44 13.01 13.74 13.74 13.74 13.74 
Gas 1.93 4.47 6.47 8.71 9.17 9.17 9.17 9.17 
Coal 0.91 2.97 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 
 
The global discount rate has been changed to a social metric of 3.5%, to coincide with 
long-term UK government guidelines (HM Government, 2010). Hurdle rates are 
implemented on conservation and transport technologies.  These are reduced in line 
with social discounting to 8.75% for conservation measures in both the residential and 
service/commercial sectors, 7% for public transport (battery buses, hydrogen buses and 
 51 
HGV and LGV), 5.25% for private transport (battery, hybrid, plug-in hybrid, hydrogen, 
methanol). 
5.1 Base Case, social discount rate (BM-REF-S) 
 Primary energy decreases from the 2000 value of ~9500 PJ to ~8000 PJ in 
2030, then increases to 8,100 PJ by 2050.  Lower overall primary and final 
energy stems from more efficient transport options and higher conservation 
uptake as people make “more optimal” decisions under a social discount rate 
 There is a transition from natural gas supplying the majority of primary 
energy to a coal based energy system, via low gas prices – this switch is both 
in terms of electricity and hydrogen production. 
 Efficiency (esp. transport) improvements and adoption of conservation 
measures occur throughout the time horizon of the model and result in a 
gentle reconfiguration of final energy use, with a slightly larger amount of 
delivered electricity and less delivered natural gas. 
 Wind, bio-wastes and other forms of renewable energy are adopted from the 
beginning of the model horizon, and make up roughly one third of electric 
capacity and 23% of energy by 2030, staying relatively constant to 2050.   
 Due to oil savings in the transport sector, oil generation is retained through 
2025. About 8 GW of new nuclear is constructed between 2025 and 2030, 
although this is less than before with reduced demand for electricity.  Coal, 
gas, wind and bio-waste are the largest investment technologies, with an 
average of ~10 GW of new capacity installed in each period over the model 
horizon (~2 GW per year). 
 CHP capacity increases 3 fold between 2010 and 2030, and supplies ~15% of 
electricity from 2025 onwards and 20-30% of annual residential heating 
requirement between 2020 and 2050. 
 Transport fuel demand halves by 2030 largely driven by a significant 
proportion of cars moving early to petrol and diesel hybrids and then on 
towards electric power and LGVs towards petrol plug-in hybrid technologies.  
Rail is largely electrified by 2045. 
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 Biofuel and biomass consumption is largely driven by the RTFO policy, 
although 20 PJ of biomass is used in the residential or service sectors for 
heat. At most, biomass makes up <1% of final energy demand. 
 CO2 emissions reduce from 2000 levels to a trough of ~480 MtCO2/year in 
2030 before rising steeply to a peak of ~600 MtCO2 in 2050. This is driven by 
high emissions in the electricity and hydrogen sectors 
5.2 Core Runs 1 & 2: 90%/95% CO2 reduction without extended 
ambition 
5.2.1 Scenario Notes 
To add to the assumptions included in the core runs, specific model updates were: 
 Revised tracking of investment in CCS retrofit capacity.  Note the general 
assumption that retrofitting activity is not to be included under the new CCS 
plant build rates. 
 A second change was to disallow the take-up of hydrogen aircraft due to 
stratospheric warming impacts  
 A third change was the inclusion of a backstop price (set at £5000/tCO2) to 
enable the model to solve under extreme scenarios  
 The Results template is updated, and includes calculation of CO2 backstop 
and CO2 international permit emissions 
Additional model updates previously carried out for CCC are: 
 Uptake of residential and service sector conservation technologies  
 Uptake of heat pumps - short term restrictions on the uptake from AEA/NERA 
renewable heat scenarios with a geometric increase until the technical 
potential in 2050 (note this combines with a constant 30% upper limit for 
heat pumps in the residential stock) 
 Retrofit options for CCS implemented via a dummy pass-through and a 
retrofitted CCS capture plant with all normal parameters (e.g. INVCOST, 
VAROM, FIXOM etc.).  This is implemented for both coal and gas plants.  
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Costs are derived from the (Hoefnagels et al. 2010) model and (Metz et al. 
2005) 
 A small number of minor changes to parameters and constraint 
implementation in the model, as a number of minor updates to the results 
template. 
 The RO and RTFO constraints are maintained at 15% and 5% from 2015 
respectively. This represent the state of legislation under the 2008 Energy 
Bill, and not extended ambition under the low carbon transition plan 
5.2.2 COR1-C90-S – 90% Reduction in CO2 emissions, no extended ambition, 
social discount rate 
 By 2050, the primary energy flows are dominated by nuclear electricity (fossil 
fuel equivalent) and coal, with oil, biomass and wastes and renewable 
electricity (electrical output) providing the remaining third.  Total primary 
energy follows a decline and then increase as the energy system follows first 
a transition to the optimally efficient technologies, followed by a second 
transition beyond 2030 as the system decarbonises. 
 Conservation measures double between 2010 and 2020 then double again by 
2050 to around 400PJ with a 33:67 split between service and residential 
sectors. 
 Final energy demand declines significantly over the course of the model 
horizon to ~4,000 PJ in 2050.  
 Electricity is a dominating decarbonisation pathway, rising from 1300PJ to 
2900PJ despite a declining overall energy systems size 
 Transport fuel demand is largely similar to the base case and is highly 
efficient (hybrid) in the mid-term moving to advanced (fuel and efficiency 
gains) drive-trains in the long term. Petrol and diesel vehicles are largely 
squeezed out in the latter periods of the model horizon.   
 The later transport fuel mix is largely electricity (cars, buses), hydrogen (HGV, 
cars), plug-ins (LGV), traditional hydrocarbons (air, 2 wheels, some cars) and a 
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minor contribution from bio-diesel and ethanol/methanol (with bio resources 
(especially in the latter periods) being directed to the power sector. 
 By 2050, CO2 intensity of electricity is negative, with significant, co-firing CCS, 
nuclear and renewable resources providing energy. Biomass CCS is utilized in 
2050.  The capacity of the energy system is double that of the base case, 
largely due to the variable nature of renewable energy, while electrical 
energy generated is somewhat less than double the base case in 2050. 
 Small amounts of coal CCS come onto the system between 2020 and 2030, 
largely through retrofitting ‘CCS ready’ plants although these are superseded 
by more efficient CCS (co-firing) plant.  The model appears to use the 
retrofitted coal CCS as backup plant in the later periods, although gas plants 
(37GW) are a dominant back up option. 
 The COR1-C90 electricity sector is larger than the base case from 2025 
onwards, although greater quantities of electrical energy are generated until 
2035. 
 Conservation options (boosted by lowered hurdle rates) reach 400PJ by 2050 
 Hydrogen production is gas SMR with CCS in the mid-term then electrolysis 
 The marginal cost of CO2 emissions reaches £100/tonne in 2025 and 
£300/tonne in 2050.  Annual welfare costs reach £10 billion by 2030 and £30 
billion by 2050 
5.2.3 COR2-C95 – 95% reduction in CO2 emissions without extended ambition 
 In 2050, the primary energy sources in COR2-C95 sees a switch from CCS to 
nuclear compared to COR1-C90, with overall higher primary energy. The 
growth in nuclear, biomass and imported electricity is offset by a decline in 
coal and gas. 
 Final energy sees a move away from petrol, coal, delivered heat (CHP/DH) 
and towards electricity, natural gas and hydrogen. 
 Overall final energy falls further to 3970PJ, with industry accounting for the 
majority of the additional fall. 
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 The larger electricity sector (up 200PJ) send this additional electricity to the 
residential sector 
 Electricity generation is achieved through an increased nuclear program, with 
an approximate 100% increase in energy generated compared to COR1-C90.  
Biomass CCS has a much larger role, displacing co-firing CCS.  Wind, biomass, 
imports and marine make up the remainder of the generation in 2050, 
although renewable electricity is only 29% of generation. The electricity 
sector now contribute -46MtCO2 in 2050, compared to an economy wide 
target of +29MtCO2 
 Gas CHP is a transitional technology – rising to 330PJ in 2030 but is largely 
marginalised (only 20PJ) by 2050, with residential and service sectors heat 
demand electrified through the use of heat pumps and storage heaters. 
 Hydrogen is produced largely from electrolysis in 2050, although gas SMR 
technology is used in earlier periods when the problem of residual emissions 
is lower.   
 In transport, traditional fossil fuels, bio-diesel and ethanol/methanol are 
marginalised towards the end of the period as hydrogen and electricity 
emerge as the transport fuel of choice. Compared to COR1-C90, cars see 
small boosts in H2 and biodiesel vehicle, with LGVs seeing small gains in H2 
(from petrol hybrids) 
 The majority of biomass is used in the transport sector, with a small amount 
for the provision of renewable heat in the residential sector. Biomass in the 
transport sectors is a transitional fuel – falling from 300PJ to only 50PJ by 
2050 
 Biomass is consumed between 2025 and 2035 in this scenario, slightly later 
than in COR1-C90 and later again than in the reference scenario.  The 
quantity of biomass in final energy is also higher in this scenario ~1,600 PJ, 
compared to ~1,000 PJ in the COR1—C90 scenario and ~600 PJ in the 
reference case. 
 Demand reductions are stretched out in 2050 in order for targets to be met, 
with most industrial sectors hitting the limit of a -25% change in ESDs, 
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together with increased reductions in residential sector ESDs and in aviation 
(the latter from -14.7% to -23.5%) 
 In order to decarbonise in 2050 the marginal CO2 costs are very high, rising 
from £230/tCO2 in 2035 to £386/tCO2 in 2045 and to £1415/tCO2 in 2050 
 The welfare cost implications compared to COR1 are less dramatic but still 
reaches £11.2 billion in 2025, £23 billion in 2035 and £43 billion in 2050. 
 In terms of which build rates bite the hardest, in COR1-C90 it is CCS; in COR2-
C95 it is nuclear 
5.3 Core Run 3 & 4: 90%/95% CO2 reduction with extended ambition 
5.3.1 Scenario Notes 
The extended ambition scenarios characterise technology-specific actions as detailed by 
the Committee on Climate Change.  To analyse the effect of the chosen policies, the 
extended ambition scenarios have been compared with the first two core runs. 
The assumptions are listed in the table below: 
Table 21: Assumptions included in the CCC defined extended ambition scenario 
Technology Assumption Notes 
Electric Vehicles 1.7 million by 2025, 2.7 million by 
2030 and held to 2050 
 
On-shore & offshore wind 26.6 GW by 2020 rising to 51 GW 
by 2030 
 
CCS 1.5 GW demonstration plants in 
an early period 
Model chooses from a limited 
pool of early CCS technologies 
Nuclear 2 GW new capacity by 2020 plus 
1 GW new capacity by 2025 
 
Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles 4.1 million by 2030  
Biomass District Heating 3 PJ/annum by 2015 rising to 9.1 
PJ/annum by 2025 
Source for all renewable heat: 
(Radov et al. 2009) and CCC 
assumption 
Biomass Boilers – Service & 
Domestic 
~8 PJ/annum by 2015 rising to 
~23 PJ/annum by 2025 with the 
majority of effort in the service 
sector 
Heat pumps ~41 PJ/annum in 2015 rising to 
~120 PJ/annum in 2025 with a 
2:1 ration between service and 
domestic sectors 
Energy conservation CCC assumptions regarding mix 
of conservation technologies and 
availability 
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5.3.2 COR3-C90 – 90% reduction in CO2 emissions, with extended ambition 
 This scenario sees the introduction of the CCC extended ambition scenario.  
The change in structure of the energy system is especially evident in the 
electricity sector as 26GW of wind turbines are introduced by 2020, rising to 
51 GW by 2030.  There is also 10 GW of extra gas capacity as backup for the 
22 GW of extra wind turbines on the system. 
 By 2050 the energy system looks similar to that in COR1-C90 with the 
exception of a switch of 270PJ from biomass to renewable electricity (with 
small declines in nuclear and oil) 
 Comparing the electricity system size, COR1-C90 suggests that the cost 
optimal system is somewhat smaller than that in the COR3-C90 scenario, with 
approximately 25 GW less wind, and a corresponding reduction in backup 
plant. 
 The change in the electricity system occurs in tandem with the introduction 
of battery electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles.  These two technologies result 
in storage capabilities available to the electricity system.  However, in 
comparison to COR1-C90, which sees ~200 GJ of storage from plug-in hybrid 
technologies, COR3-C90 sees electrical storage heaters and electric vehicles 
‘competing’ for the provision of storage. 
 The main change in final energy follows a now familiar pattern.  Electricity 
use doubles, tradition fossil fuel sources decline.  Hydrogen becomes a 
common energy carrier from 2030 onwards in the transport sector. 
 The largest change in final energy demand occurs in the transport, residential 
and service sectors, with energy demand reduction accelerating from 2030. 
 Transport energy demand reduction occurs through a step change in 2030 as 
the model adopts battery electric vehicles and hydrogen simultaneously.  The 
extended ambition targets for electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids are 
dwarfed by the endogenous technology choices post-2030. 
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 In the mid-term additional electricity facilitate the use of petrol plug-in 
vehicle as a transition technology and in the long terms boosts the number of 
hydrogen vehicles (with H2 from electrolysis) 
 The level of CHP and district heating is less than that in COR1-C90, with 
greater electrification of residential heat and some uptake of residential solar 
water heating. 
 Conservation uptake in the buildings sectors increases by another 70PJ to 
470PJ 
 In comparison to COR1-C90, annual welfare losses are ~£2.5 billion in 2020 
and £1.3 billion in 2050 more costly – this reflects the model being made to 
select less optimal solutions than it otherwise would have chosen    
 Marginal cost of CO2 are generally lower (e.g. in 2020; £25/tCO2 vs. £38/tCO2 
in COR1) as additional assumptions supplement the carbon price signal. By 
2050 marginal cots are the same at £288/tCO2. 
5.3.3 COR4-C95 – 95% reduction in CO2 emissions, with extended ambition 
 Comparing extended ambition under a C95 constraint (COR4 vs. COR2) is a 
similar story to that of a C90 comparison (COR 3 vs. COR1). Wind is the 
largest change and the model overall sees a shift from nuclear and coal 
towards renewable electricity 
 Final energy levels are similar, but with additional hydrogen from electricity 
(30PJ) and an additional 40PJ biomass owning to constraints in the service 
and residential sectors 
 The marginal price of CO2 emissions reaches £400/tonne in 2045 and more 
than £1,600/tonne in 2050.  This is in the same range as COR2-C95 which 
indicates that it is the severity of the carbon constraint that causes the very 
high marginal price of CO2 and not the extended ambition scenario.  With 
additional effort being taken up by other changes in the extended ambition 
case it sees low marginal CO2 prices in 2025-2045).  
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 Welfare losses due to the imposed extended ambition constraints are an 
extra £1 billion in 2020 and £3 billion in 2050, amounting to a cost of £44.8 
billion in 2050 
 The model chooses the optimal configuration of storage devices from plug-in 
hybrid vehicles (including battery electric vehicles) and storage heaters, with 
pumped hydro contributing a little.  In COR4-C95, we see 20 PJ less storage 
than in COR3-C90 and more from electric and plug-in vehicles to storage 
heaters and heat is progressively electrified from 2030 to 2050. 
 Extra conservation measures, largely in the service sector, boost overall 
conservation to the extended ambition limit of 470PJ by 2050. 
 Unlike COR2-C95, ethanol/methanol transport fuel play a relatively minor 
part in the transport fuel mix, with a greater emphasis on traditional 
transport fuels in the middle periods of the model as the extended ambition 
scenario forces in plug-in hybrid vehicles – i.e., this is a different transition 
path. 
 Negative emissions in the electricity sector play a major role in this scenario, 
especially as the ‘non-energy use’ sector (about which little is known in terms 
of abatement technologies) in the final period comprises the entire carbon 
budget. 
 Hydrogen plays a major role in the transport sector in latter periods, 
contributing to fuel demand from cars, HGVs and LGVs. 
 Energy service demand reductions are severe across all sectors (an average of 
-15%), and as in COR2 focused on those demands with few efficiency or fuel 
substitution options. 
 Neither in this, nor in other core scenarios is the backstop mitigation 
measure required 
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6 Phase 1 Sensitivity Runs 
6.1 80% reduction in CO2 emissions, no extended ambition, social 
discount rate  
6.1.1 Scenario Notes 
Note that the CO2 trajectory used in this run is slightly different in 2020 than the two 
core runs.  This allows the model more flexibility in the earlier periods and is intended to 
be comparable with earlier C80 runs. 
6.1.2 Results Notes 
 The C-80 run is broadly similar to the C-90 runs but with far less pressure on 
key resources, sectors and technologies 
 For example electricity remains a low carbon vector, but with much less 
pressure (in 2050 rising from 1705PJ in a base case to 2155PJ in C-80 and 
2919 in C-90) 
o The overall electricity system is smaller, with reduced need for gas 
back up plant 
o The reduction in electricity is seen in less hydrogen electrolysis and 
less industrial sector electricity use 
 Natural gas and oil are generally retained longer and overall (in 2050 natural 
gas rises from 500PJ in C-90 to 1150PJ in C-80).  Coal remains in final energy 
until 2045, whereas it is squeezed out by 2025 in C-90 runs. 
 Natural gas and electricity see important substitution in C-80 vs. C-90 
o An important switch is in the industrial sector, where in C-80, natural 
gas is retained in low and high heating instead of electricity 
o Additionally, natural gas share in residential heating is boosted 
o Hydrogen production moves from electrolysis to SMR (with CCS) 
 CHP is primarily fuelled from fossil sources until 2040 when a dramatic switch 
to predominantly renewable sources.  Heat from CHP in C-80 reaches a 
plateau of ~200 PJ in 2025 and falls in between the base and C-90 cases. In 
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the base case, high quantities of fossil fuelled CHP are used and heat 
production remains around 600PJ. In C-90, renewable fuels dominate CHP 
from 2020 onwards via a gradual increase to only ~140 PJ in 2050 is 
observed. 
 A major finding is the retention of efficiency uptake (e.g., conservation and 
new transport drive-trains) - this is due to optimal decision making under a 
3.5% discount rate. Hence final energy reductions in C-80 are similar to C-90. 
o Demand changes are also very similar in C-80 and C-90 
 With transport remaining highly optimised, only small changes and 5-10 year 
lags in new fuels and technologies are seen 
o There are some small differences in minor transport transitional 
technologies (e.g., petrol hybrids instead of ethanol in cars) 
 There is much less need for both biomass and coal. Both these resources 
halve from C-90 levels. This is due to the absence of biomass CSS and the 
demise in co-firing CCS from 1320PJ to 55PJ (with the retention of some coal 
CCS in C-80). 
o Without negative emission CCS, nuclear boosts its overall generation 
share in 2050 
o Similar level of renewable electricity are seen (22% in 2050) 
 Generally all build constraints are hit less hard. Marine build constraints are 
not triggered in C-80, although now conventional natural gas plant build rates 
are hit harder 
 Costs in C-80 are moderate compared to C-90 
o In 2050 marginal CO2 costs are only £163/tCO2 vs. £288/tCO2, and 
welfare costs are £B 17.5 vs. £B 29.5 
o Through 2030, costs in C-80 are especially modest, being less than 
£50/tCO2, with an overall welfare costs in 2030 of only £B 3.6  
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6.2 90% CO2 reduction with high-high fossil fuel prices 
6.2.1 Scenario notes 
Note: When thinking about major changes (like fossil fuel prices movements), it is 
critical to consider the comparable base case – i.e., does this change occur in the 
base case or just in the CO2 case. It is important in the comparison of demand 
changes and of overall costs. For the example of central vs. higher fossil fuel prices: 
A:  We assume this change occurs only in the CO2 case – i.e. we still have a central 
base case. Now in the CO2 case demand changes will be comparable as consumers 
take into account the extra costs imposed by both the CO2 price and the higher 
fossil prices. However the overall cost comparison will be skewed upward as our 
welfare and energy systems cost change will include both the impact of the CO2 
price and the impact of higher fossil prices 
B:  We assume this change occurs already in the base (new higher fossil base) case. 
In our new base case we reconfigure the demand marginal prices to ensure that 
consumers still demand the same amount of energy services (even if these are 
delivered more efficiently or with alternate fuels and technologies). Now in the CO2 
case, demand changes will be skewed downwards as consumers are already paying 
higher prices to meet demands and hence the demand shift from a CO2 price 
increase is less. However costs will be comparable as our energy systems and 
welfare cost change will only include the impact of the CO2 price. 
Generally in these CCC 2010 runs (and all stochastic runs) we assume option A (i.e. 
one central base case). For broader discussion this run is undertaken with an 
alternate base case. 
6.2.2 Result notes 
 This scenario is compared against a new high-fossil fuel price base case.  The 
base case shows a move towards nuclear electricity, biomass and renewable 
electricity (mainly marine).   
 The base case moves away from oil and gas, but not coal however, which 
remains at similar levels to the central fossil fuel price base case.   
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 Other trends include more efficient use of fossil resources e.g. through CHP. 
 Base case energy system costs are £B 15.5 higher in 2050 owing to higher 
priced fossil fuel purchases 
 When comparing COR1-HF-C90-S with COR1-C90, we see broad similarities in 
the overall trends governing the decarbonisation of the energy system.  
Namely, increasing electricity system size as a low carbon vector; a highly 
optimised transport sector; decrease in final energy; the predominance in 
electricity generation of CCS, nuclear and wind; and biomass CCS introduced 
towards the latter periods. 
 The effect of the high fossil fuel prices mirror the differences viewed in the 
base case.  Nuclear electricity increases in COR1-HF-C90-S, co-firing CCS 
decreases dramatically – to only 50% of levels in COR1-C90 from 2035 
onwards.  Renewable electricity rises from 23% to 27% of generation. 
Biomass primary energy also increases. 
 The assumption of higher fossil prices in the base case leads to a reduced 
demand response from the CO2 price signal. On average, demand reductions 
are only 10.7% (as opposed to 11.7% in COR1-C90). This leads to a larger final 
energy system. 
 Smaller changes included 
o District heat production is boosted by 70PJ which flows through to the 
residential sector 
o Remaining hydrogen production from gas SMR is avoided and is 
replaced by hydrogen electrolysis. 
 Marginal CO2 prices remain below £100/tonne until 2035.  They then 
increase at a higher rate than that seen in the COR1-C90 scenario reaching 
£350/tonne by 2050. This illustrates the reduced demand shift. 
 However welfare cost changes are comparable, with the COR1-HF-C90-S 
strategy at almost £1B less than that of COR1-C90-S, due to the more 
optimised (lower carbon) energy systems due to base case higher fossil fuel 
prices. 
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6.3 Extreme CO2 reduction - 97% reduction in CO2 emissions, no extended 
ambition, social discount rate 
6.3.1 Scenario notes 
The purpose of this scenario is to explore the limit to which the current version of the 
MARKAL model can decarbonise the UK energy system through to 2050.  While 
exogenous constraints imposed by the modeller may have an impact on the value of this 
limit, the structure of the model, the pool of available technologies and resources all 
contribute.  The current version of MARKAL, version 3.24 includes a backstop 
technology, essentially a buy-out, which allows the model to always solve.  It does this 
by allowing the model to select a technology that sequesters carbon dioxide at 
£5000/tonne.  Selection of this technology is equivalent to the failure of the model to 
solve under the particular constrained scenario. 
The model was run under increasingly stringent decarbonisation targets, until the 
backstop technology was chosen.  This occurred at a 97% CO2 reduction on 1990 levels 
by 2050.  A 97% reduction is equivalent to 18 MtCO2/annum by 2050, whereas a 95% 
reduction allows 30 MtCO2/annum in 2050. 
6.3.2 Results notes 
 This run represents a highly extreme case, pushing the model to the limit of its 
solution, and owning to uncertainties in the solution obtained, likely beyond its 
explanatory power 
 The structure of the model and the pool of modelled technologies and resources 
contribute to the limit of the model solution, together with the imposed 
exogenous constraints  
 The differences between C-95 and C-97 are radical despite this entailing the 2050 
emissions limit falling only from 29.6MtCO2 to 18.1MtCO2 
 Note that UK MARKAL has limited treatment of ‘other emissions’ and residual 
industrial emissions (21MtCO2 compared to base case of 83MtCO2). Note that no 
industrial CCS for example is available (see Phase 2 runs for its inclusion) 
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 Marginal costs in C-97 hit the backstop as 4MtCO2 are met at a backstop 
mitigation price of £5000/tCO2. 
o However in 2045 the difference is still stark at £1870/tCO2 vs. £381/tCO2 
 In 2050, welfare costs in C-97 are £B 79.9 vs. £B 42.7 
 The electricity system follows a similar decarbonisation path to the COR2-C95 
scenario to 2030.  Beyond this period, there is a move away from co-firing CCS, 
and early (2035) adoption of biomass CCS and a concurrent expansion of nuclear 
and wind.  By 2050, co-firing CCS is squeezed out of the electricity sector with 
nuclear, wind and biomass CCS contributing to a much larger overall system, 
producing a smaller quantity of electricity. 
 Many bounds are hit, and hit hard 
o Biomass imports are maxed out 
o Nuclear, marine and other build rates are strongly hit 
o Final energy only reduces another 100PJ as demand changes and 
conservation levels are maxed out 
 The model chooses very uncertain solutions as primary energy reduces by 100PJ 
o Hydrogen imports (150PJ) are required – note the costs, availability and 
carbon emissions from imported hydrogen are currently very uncertain 
 Coal use falls dramatically, from 1370PJ to 70PJ – its embodied emissions are just 
too high 
o Biomass CCS is maxed out (+130PJ) but co-firing CCS falls dramatically 
(from 690 to only 30PJ in C-97) 
 Electricity swings to additional wind and even 10PJ additional hydro 
 The overall electricity sector is smaller with less CCS upstream and less hydrogen 
electrolysis, but the capacity of the system rises to accommodate additional wind 
generation 
 Residential sector and service sector heat undergoes strong electrification, with 
district heating from CHP acting as a bridging technology, peaking in 2035, before 
being displaced by storage heating and heat pumps. 
 Any available/possible remaining transport shifts occur – e.g. 2 wheeler 
hydrogen 
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o Aviation cannot shift to bio kerosene due to lack of available bio 
resources (used for bio CCS) 
 As noted earlier, demand (ESD) reductions hit the -25% limit, including non-
energy use (note the ambiguous nature of this category calling into question the 
feasibility and accuracy of this reduction) 
o Demands that are already served with zero carbon resources do not 
reduce further (no CO2 reduction benefit) 
o Demands that are met via (negative emission) electricity can actually 
increase. This is seen in (e.g.) electricity boilers instead of heat pumps, or 
higher air conditioning demands. Effectively the model is increasing its 
electricity use (demand for electricity) in order to maximise its biomass 
CCS and hence negative emissions. This implication illustrates the 
counter-intuitive implementation of such a stringent runs. 
 In terms of transitions, C-97 is generally 5 years ahead of C-95 in key 
technologies. For example, car H2 fuel cell vehicles in 2030 and bio CCS in 2035. 
This further stretches the credibility of mainstream availability and use of these 
technologies. 
6.4 Uncertain CO2 reduction target 
6.4.1 Scenario Notes 
This stochastic run on CO2 emissions constraint levels, assumes a 75% likelihood of a 
2050 target of -90% (59.3MtCO2) relative to 1990 emissions of 592.4MtCO2, but with a 
25% likelihood of a deeper -95% (29.6MtCO2) CO2 reduction by 2050. In these revised 
stochastic emissions runs the resolution date of 2030 is now retained.  
A core challenge is in having comparable deterministic runs. This is due to the annual 
emission bounds (2015-2050) in the C-90 and C-95, that the stochastic run must ignore 
in order to generate a hedging strategy pre 2030, and hence a greater degree of 
freedom in these stochastic runs. In order to have comparable runs the following four 
runs are compared: 
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1. CUMCOR1-C90-S – fixed CO2 emissions (as C-90) in the near term (2000-2010), 
freedom to select emission levels in the mid-term (2015-2025), annual bounds 
(as C90) in the long term (2030-2050), and overall cumulative limits 
(16,652,544MtCO2) similar to C-90 
2. CUMCOR2-C95-S – fixed CO2 emissions (as C-95) in the near term (2000-2010), 
freedom to select emission levels in the mid-term (2015-2025), annual bounds 
(as C95) in the long term (2030-2050), and overall cumulative limits 
(15,538,792MtCO2) similar to C-95 
3. COR1-STOC-C90-S – As run #1, 75% likelihood of C-90, resolution in 2030 
4. COR2-STOC-C95-S – As run #2, 25% likelihood of C-95, resolution in 2030 
Comparing emissions in the COR1 and COR2 runs to the cumulative COR1 and COR2 runs 
(Table 22), we see identical outputs through 2010 (as expected) and again post 2030 
(again as expected). In the flexible mid-term (especially under socially optimal decision 
making), some inter-temporal trade-offs occur. This flexibly allows a cumulative savings 
of £B 1.4 and 2.9 respectively vs. the costs of C90 and C95. This represents 0.9% and 
1.3% of cumulative scenarios costs. 
Table 22: CO2 emission pathways (MtCO2) 
 
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
COR1-C90-S 550.2 550.0 528.3 437.9 380.2 278.9 204.6 150.1 110.2 80.8 59.3 
COR2-C95-S 550.3 548.7 529.3 437.9 380.2 248.5 162.4 106.2 69.4 45.4 29.6 
CUMCOR1-C90-S 550.2 550.0 528.3 441.2 350.9 304.9 204.6 150.1 110.2 80.8 59.3 
CUMCOR2-C95-S 550.2 550.0 528.3 435.3 345.3 285.7 162.4 106.2 69.4 45.4 29.6 
COR1-STOC-C90-S 550.2 550.0 528.3 440.3 353.2 303.4 204.6 150.1 110.2 80.8 59.3 
COR2-STOC-C95-S 550.2 550.0 528.3 440.3 353.2 303.4 137.1 100.8 69.4 45.4 29.6 
This adjusted cumulative run comparison is a more elegant solution that earlier 
stochastic runs, retaining a consistent uncertainty resolution date and recognising inter-
temporal trade-offs. 
 68 
6.4.2 Results Notes 
6.4.2.1 The hedging strategy 
 Under a 75% likelihood of a C-90 scenario, the stochastic hedging strategy looks 
similar to CUMCOR1-C90. In 2025, emissions are 303.4 MtCO2 (vs. 304.9 MtCO2). 
Note that the cumulative C-95 runs is 285.7MtCO2 
o This small hedge consists of additional biomass (90PJ) replacing coal and 
natural gas.  
o This transcribes into additional heat provision (vs. gas in the residential 
sector, bio and waste generation vs. coal co-firing CCS in the electric 
sector and an additional movement to ethanol E85 cars) 
 The hedging strategy avoids CUMCOR2-C95 measures including: 
o No coal in industrial low and high temperature processes 
o Demand reductions across the board 
o Boost in coal CCS 
o Car petrol hybrids to car petrol plug ins 
6.4.2.2 Recourse strategy 
 In 2030, if this hedge is wrong (i.e. the 25% chance of C-95 does occur) then the 
model has to quickly adjust.  
o Emissions falls below the annual limit in 2030 and 2035 (to 139.1 and 
100.8MtCO2 respectively. The social discount rate and stringent target 
ensures that any required over-compliance does not occur in 2050 
 In 2030 this entails higher costs: £198.MtCO2 and £B 18.1 in the stochastic run vs. 
£124/tCO2 and £B 13.4 in the deterministic C95 run. 
o In terms of measures, (additional) demand reductions (generally 2%) 
occur across all sectors 
o Note that only industrial, service and residential see less final energy due 
to changes to low carbon but higher energy fuels/technologies in the 
transport sector 
o Biomass (+300PJ) is a major substitution for coal (-200PJ) 
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o This is seen in -70PJ of coal CCS (conventional coal CCS falls out by 2040 in 
all runs to be replaced by co-firing and biomass CCS options 
o Shift to delivered heat instead of natural gas in the residential sector 
(note in C-95 biomass heat is a critical transition technology – before a 
shift to biomass CCS 
o In C-90 biomass heat is an important end of period technology leaving 
more room under the CO2 cap 
o A final major transformation is in domestic aviation where dual fuel 
planes (which can switch fuels following maintenance and retrofit) switch 
to bio kerosene (and switch back to conventional kerosene by 2040) 
 In terms of the pace of change, Table 23 compares the deterministic and 
stochastic emission change in the immediate recourse strategy 
Table 23: 2030-2035 sectoral emissions change 
Sectoral Emissions (MtCO2) 
CUMCOR2-C95-S COR2-C95-STOC-S 
2025 2030 2025 2030 
Upstream 14.7 6.7 15.3 6.3 
Agriculture 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.1 
Electricity 33.3 1.7 33.4 -0.7 
Hydrogen 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.5 
Industry 50.8 48.5 53.8 45.4 
Residential 45.6 28.7 54.4 20.9 
Services 17.1 6.2 19.3 2.6 
Transport 87.3 30.7 89.9 23.3 
Other Emissions 34.8 36.1 35.4 35.6 
Total 285.7 162.4 303.4 137.1 
 By 2050 C-90 largely converges to its deterministic solution 
o This is unsurprising given the small divergence of the hedging strategy  
 By 2050 C-95 also largely converges to its deterministic solution 
o This is largely driven by the stringency of the target and the limited 
freedom to meet this strategy 
o Costs in 2045 and 2050 are slightly cheaper (0.3 out of cost of £B 42.8) 
due to the effort of 2025-30 readjustments 
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 Comparing the expected value of perfect information (EVPI) gives a measure of 
the value of knowing now (perfect foresight) what the uncertainty resolution is, 
rather than waiting until the recourse period. 
o EVPI = Expected cost of hedge – (∑(probi * cost of PFi), where i is the 
stochastic scenarios (or states of the world). 
 Under a 75% chance of a C-90 and a 25% chance of C95 resolved 
by 2030, the EVPI =£M 1,431 
6.5 Uncertain fossil fuel prices under Central Biomass Imports and 
90% CO2 reduction 
6.5.1 Scenario Notes 
 The two-stage stochastic variant of UK MARKAL calculates a hedging strategy and 
recourse strategy for each pre-defined state of the world.  The objective function is an 
expected cost criterion (as opposed to expected utility), based upon the weighted 
average expected cost of the each future states of the world.  The defining assumptions 
are the predetermined weightings given to the future states of the world, the 
assumptions chosen to represent these future states, the period in which uncertainty is 
resolved, and the above assumption of risk neutral decision-making.  Stochastic MARKAL 
is limited to defining nine future scenarios in each 2-stage stochastic run. 
The C90 stochastic run with uncertain fossil fuel prices is identical in most respected to 
the COR1-C90 deterministic run.  However, in addition to the central fossil fuel prices 
derived from the DECC central scenario, three other fossil fuel price scenarios are 
included.  These include low, high and high-high scenarios.  Each of the four fossil fuel 
price scenarios has a weighting of 0.25.  Note that the model will hedge against high 
fossil fuels prices due to the inclusion of the two above-central fossil fuel price scenarios. 
6.5.2 Results Notes 
6.5.2.1 The hedging strategy 
 There are only minor differences between the deterministic COR1-C90 
scenario and the C-90 stochastic fossil fuel price hedging strategy. With a 50% 
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chance of higher fossil fuel prices vs. only a 25% chance of lower fossil fuel 
prices, the model hedges slightly and reduces some fossil fuel use. 
 By the end of the hedging strategy (2025), in primary energy there are very 
minor movements away from oil (-28 PJ) towards natural gas (+20 PJ) and 
biomass and waste (+15 PJ).  In final energy, there is a small move towards 
ethanol/methanol in the transport sector (+23 PJ).  This reflects a switch from 
petrol to ethanol. 
 The electricity generation mix in energy terms is virtually identical to the 
deterministic scenario, while investment in capacity is some 5 GW lower.  
Here, the differences are more clear, as there is less investment in coal CCS (-
1.7 GW), more investment in unabated coal (+1.7 GW).  The model invests in 
retrofit ready CCGTs (+5 GW) instead of normal CCGTs.  The smaller system 
means that the renewable energy share increases 2 percentage points to 38% 
by capacity. 
 There is a minor reconfiguration in end-use fuels, notably less demand 
reduction and an increase in natural gas (the most efficient fossil fuel) 
 By 2025 this very modest hedging strategy costs an additional £B 0.17. 
6.5.2.2 Recourse strategy 
 In 2030, uncertainty is resolved and recourse strategies move to the optimal 
configuration for each state of the world.   
o Note that all scenarios follow the central fossil fuel price until 2030 
when the low, high or high-high scenarios take over.  This results in a 
different fossil fuel price trajectory to those seen in deterministic 
fossil fuel price runs, and as such, the runs are not directly 
comparable. 
 Secondly, due to the use of the central reference price, the model is reacting 
to both the imposition of a CO2 constraint and the alternate fossil fuel prices. 
 In 2030, there is an instant response to the different fossil fuel price 
scenarios, seen most notably in the low fossil fuel price recourse strategy.   
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o Here, 5.3 GW of the un-retrofitted gas plant invested in at the end of 
the hedging strategy are converted to CCS, generating about 10% of 
the electricity from the sector.  The gas CCS retrofit plants are not 
seen in any of the other strategies, and the plant stay in throughout 
the rest of the model horizon. 
o Similarly, under the high-high case, transport bio-diesel and industrial 
steam and coal are seen in 2030 
 As the recourse strategy works through there is a logical progression in terms 
of energy use and costs from low to central to high to high-high runs. 
 Given that the hedging strategy was so similar to the deterministic COR1-C90 
run, one would expect to see little effect on the recourse strategy of the 
central fossil fuel price scenario - this is the case and indeed any minor 
changes in 2025 have converged by 2050. 
 By 2050, there is a clear difference between the fossil fuel price scenarios, 
with an interplay between nuclear and CCS. The high high fossil fuel price 
recourse strategy has approximately 50% of the capacity of co-firing CCS as 
the high fossil fuel price strategy (~24GW vs. ~46 GW), although a much 
larger nuclear power sector (~45 GW vs. 34 GW).   
o Overall electricity system size decreases with increasing fossil fuel 
price  
o Use of bio-waste in the electricity sector increases with fossil fuel 
price.  
o Wind uptake is consistent between all the scenarios, including the 
deterministic COR1-C90, at ~28 GW, with marine also providing a 
large contribution at ~13 GW.   
o All recourse strategies invest in biomass CCS in 2050 to meet the final 
reduction to 90% below 1990 levels. 
 There is a trade-off between negative emissions in the electricity sector (from 
increasing co-firing CCS in the central and low fossil fuel price scenarios vs. 
high and high-high fossil fuel price scenarios) and decarbonisation effort in 
the transport sector.  There is significant movement between fuel types, 
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primarily the displacement of diesel with bio-diesel. This is throughout the 
model horizon, although use spikes in the midterm. 
o Overall transport fuel demand remains relatively consistent in 2050 
between the recourse strategies, a reflection of high optimisation 
under a social discount rate 
 Over half of hydrogen production is derived from natural gas SMR with CO2 
capture in the low-gas recourse strategy, with the other scenarios using 
electrolysis. 
 CHP increases dramatically as the fossil fuel price increases, with the resulting 
delivered heat displacing electric storage heaters.  This efficient generation 
reflects the high fossil fuel prices  
 Demand changes increase as fossil prices increase - in 2050 rising from an 
average reduction of 10.9% to 13.0% in the low to high-high cases 
 In terms of costs, with fossil fuel price rises aiding the decarbonisation 
process, marginal CO2 prices fall, from £304/tCO2 in low to £263/tCO2 in high-
high fossil price cases. 
 Higher fossil prices entail a greater demand reduction which offsets higher 
system costs until the high-high case which sees an increase in welfare costs 
of £2.8B 
6.6 Uncertain fossil fuel prices under High Biomass Imports and 
Uncertain fossil fuel prices under Severe Biomass Import 
Constraint 
6.6.1 Scenario Notes 
In setting up these stochastic runs, we have followed our earlier method B - in that the 
(deterministic) bio imports assumptions and the (stochastic) fossil fuel prices changes 
are implemented together in the policy case (i.e. in meeting the C-90 CO2 target). Of 
particular interest is that the demand change, welfare cost calculation and general 
energy systems changes will combine three effects (the imposition of the CO2 constraint, 
the role of bio-imports, and the impact of the stochastic fossil prices). The reference 
case remains a central bio-imports and central fossil fuel price case. 
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Note that we are running and reporting on sensitivity runs with multiple things changing 
- in order to better understand these runs, one could examine the individual elements of 
the runs first (e.g. base or C-90 runs with just high or low bio imports). The interim runs 
would then be compared sequentially to glean the clearest insights. And note that the 
interim runs could be run in a different order to develop further insights into the 
interaction between drivers. 
In running these sensitivities, if we impose no bio-imports (and no 1st generation 
domestic biodiesel) from 2000, we get very strange results (and indeed the model may 
not solve) as the model cannot meet the RTFO (renewable transport fuels obligation) in 
the transport sector. To alleviate this, the no-bio constraint is imposed only from 2020. 
For consistency the doubling of potential bio-imports in the high case is also imposed 
from 2020 (although this makes no practical difference). Further, we must have a very 
small amount of bio-diesel (around 0.1% of primary energy) through the model horizon, 
and so a small amount of domestic rape seed oil is allowed (and is selected in the 
absence of bio-imports).  As requested, the option of domestic wheat is removed in the 
low biomass runs. 
6.6.2 Result Notes 
 The availability of biomass is a key constraint.  In the low (no) biomass cases, 
the backstop technology is just triggered in 2050. 
 This extreme solution holds similarities to the no CCS stochastic runs (see 
section 6.7, page 75), as co-firing CCS is effectively unavailable. The role of 
stochastic fossil fuel prices is a secondary role on the overall solution 
trajectory 
 Compared to COR1-C90, welfare costs in the central run jump (by 2050 from 
£B 25.5 to £B 58.7. The fossil fuel variation are +/- £B 1.3 around this higher 
figure. 
 The effect of the changing fossil fuel prices is much less evident in the low 
biomass scenario, as the lack of biomass imports makes the level of co-firing 
CCS seen in COR1-C90 difficult.  Until 2030, co-firing CCS is very similar to the 
deterministic scenario, in 2035; the influence of fossil fuel price is seen, with 
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smaller amounts of co-firing CCS as fossil fuel prices increase.  In 2040, the 
biomass constraint begins to limit co-firing CCS activity until it is largely 
unused in the system by 2050. 
o As a premium avenue to overall stringent reductions, the amount of 
biomass CCS in 2050 is the same as in the unconstrained deterministic 
case COR1-C90. 
 Overall electricity generation (and hence zero or negative emissions 
electricity) is reduced with consequences across all other sectors, from fuel 
switching in the industrial sectors, maxing out demand reductions, or new 
transport technologies 
o In 2050, the electricity system configuration is broadly similar 
between the fossil fuel recourse strategies, although the low fossil 
fuel price scenario sees uptake of gas CCS technologies, used between 
2030 and 2045.  In comparison to the COR1-C90 scenario, co-firing 
CCS capacity is halved and nuclear and wind capacity doubles in 
response to the biomass constraint.  
 Noticeably in C90 scenarios, primary coal demand is contingent on the 
availability of biomass.  The only plants in which coal can be used are those 
that also require biomass e.g. co-firing CCS.  When the biomass runs out, as it 
does in 2050 in this scenario, coal demand is forced to near 0 PJ. 
 There are some extreme effects in the transport sector, evident even in the 
hedging strategy.  For example, the model invests in battery buses in 2010, 
with all buses battery powered by 2035, although the latter is common to 
COR1-C90 as well.  In the hedging strategy, the car fleet is primarily petrol 
hybrid vehicles, with bio-diesel to satisfy the renewable transport fuel 
obligation.  Hydrogen HGVs play a role, also from 2010, with hydrogen (~200 
PJ) derived from gas SMR, then liquefied for domestic delivery. 
 Similarly to other scenarios in this series, hydrogen plays a large role in the 
transport sector from 2030.  What is different in the low biomass scenario is 
the source of the hydrogen, 100% is imported as liquefied H2 in 2050.  Prior 
to the final period, hydrogen is predominantly derived from the natural gas 
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SMR process with carbon capture, there is a small amount of electrolysis and 
some liquefaction of domestic H2. 
 At the end of the hedging strategy, the model shifts away from biomass and 
wastes and increases renewable electricity.  Natural gas demand also 
increases slightly.   
 In the residential sector, heat pumps are adopted at the end of the hedging 
strategy (+24 PJ) with a corresponding decrease in the use of gas condensing 
boilers and storage heaters.  Biomass is used for service and residential 
sector heating in 2025, but then is removed in all recourse strategies from 
2030 onwards.  
 Welfare costs at the end of the hedging strategy (2025) increase by ~£1B on 
the COR1-C90 run. 
6.7 Uncertain availability of CCS and uncertain fossil fuel prices 
This stochastic run aims to determine the implications for the near term given the 
uncertainty surrounding the timely availability of carbon capture and storage technology 
together with uncertainty in future fossil fuel prices. 
6.7.1 Scenario Notes 
Previous stochastic runs in this project have modulated just one variable; with one state 
of the world (SOW) corresponding to each view of the future.  To define the stochastic 
model for two variables, weighting given to each outcome for each variable are 
multiplied together.  There are four defined outcomes for fossil fuel price, each assigned 
a weighting of 0.25.  There are two outcomes for CCS availability – available from 2030 
onwards only – 0.75 – and not available at all – 0.25. 
There are therefore eight possible outcomes listed in the table below: 
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Table 24: Weighting assigned to the eight states of the world 
SOW CCS availability Fossil Fuel Price Weighting 
1 2030 onwards Low 0.1825 
2 2030 onwards Central 0.1825 
3 2030 onwards High 0.1825 
4 2030 onwards High High 0.1825 
5 Never Low 0.0625 
6 Never Central 0.0625 
7 Never High 0.0625 
8 Never High High 0.0625 
Note that there is no deterministic run to account for the effect of adjusting both the 
availability of CCS (i.e. now available from 2030 or not at all) and fossil fuel prices (from 
2030). Hence the Expected value of perfect information (EVPI) cannot be calculated. This 
stochastic run can only then be compared with the COR1-C90 case taking into account 
both changes. 
6.7.2 Result Notes 
6.7.2.1 The hedging strategy 
 The hedging strategy is dominated by the unavailability (at least until 2030) of 
CCS, combined with the small probability that it will not be available at all (with 
expected high prices). Laid on top of this, is the secondary influence of altered 
expectations of (likely higher) future fossil fuel prices. 
 Compared to COR1-C90, no CCS entails the loss of 9.6GW of CCS capacity by 2025 
o This leads to -100PJ of electricity generation overall, despite a boost in 
bio-waste and gas fired generation 
o Nuclear, wind and marine generation cannot be increased in the mid-
terms due to build constraints 
o Unabated co-firing coal plant is added as back-up capacity 
o Coal and gas retrofit-ready plants are built (7.4 GW gas and 0.1 GW coal). 
 As a response, demand reduction is further increased, especially in modes that 
predominately use electricity (e.g. residential electric appliances, cooling 
refrigeration; service sector cooling, lighting, electrical appliances; transport rail) 
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 In terms of higher expected fossil prices, a major shift in transport from diesel to 
ethanol vehicles as a hedging strategy. This also aids in hitting the midterm 
emission target 
o A further impact is seen in increased demand reduction in domestic air 
 Lastly, CHP and district heating is boosted as an efficient use of fossil fuels, 
displacing gas in the residential sector and electric heating in the service sector 
 Overall in 2025, marginal CO2 costs rise from £105 to £120/tCO2 and from £B 7.9 
to £B 12.1 compared to COR1-C90 
6.7.2.2 Recourse strategies 
 In 2030 reacts to the resolution of uncertainty 
 If CCS is available, there is a surge in investing in it - all runs invest in 7.5GW 
of co-firing CCS, with low and central cases adding 11.4GW and 5.6GW of gas 
CCS respectively, with the high price cases adding small amounts of Coal CCS 
o Between 34% and 20% in low and central cases of sequestered CO2 is 
from retrofitted gas plants (~1.5% coal in high and high-high cases and 
~8% in COR1-C90) 
o Investments in wind depend on the fossil fuel price (from low (0.5GW) 
to high-high (10GW) 
o Some of the demand reductions in the hedging strategy are given up 
o Heat and biomass both reflect the influence of rising fossil fuel prices 
 If CCS is not available, wind investments are maxed out together with more 
electricity generation from bio wastes 
o However there is less electricity generation overall 
o Final energy overall is reduced, including the retention of demand 
reductions from the hedging strategy, with the impact of the fuel 
price overlaid on these  
 By 2050 trends play out with the availability (or not) of CCS again being the 
dominating factor. Fossil fuel price differences are a secondary overlay on 
this. 
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o The 3.5% social discounting sees the system already highly optimised - 
e.g. conservation options are always maxed out 
o Further, the model runs are all meeting a 90% CO2 target which 
shapes the evolution of the energy system 
 If CCS is available, the model tends to converge (in a central price case) to 
COR1-C90 
o There is some impact from the including less co-firing CCS (with 
resulting additional bio-CCS, but still less electricity overall 
o District heating increases its share by 40PJ, although transport fuel 
use is similar. In terms of overall cost, the hedging strategy imposes 
only a small penalty (£B 30.8 compared to £B 29.5) 
 Looking across the fossil fuel scenarios with CCS sees a logical progression 
o Overall electricity generation sees increases in nuclear, wind, bio-
wastes, and imports 
o Co-firing CCS halves in the high-high case 
o Transport sees minor shifts from petrol/diesel to bio-fuels (e.g. in LGV 
vehicles) 
o Hydrogen production under low fossil prices is substantially from gas 
SMR with CCS 
o CHP and heat production (efficient fossil fuel use) grows 
o Energy service demands reduce further (by an additional 1.5% on 
average) 
o With high fossil fuel prices assisting, CO2 marginal prices fall from low 
through high-high from £304 to £288 to £277 to £261/tCO2  
 If CCS is unavailable, the model sees a radical transformation. The loss of 260 
MtCO2 of CCS by 2050 sees the model struggle to adapt to meet a 90% CO2 
reduction and it is pushed into extreme territory. On top of this fossil fuel 
price variation makes little difference 
o With no coal (-2600PJ) and a -550PJ decrease in bio primary energy, 
the model maximises all mitigation options 
o Renewable electricity and nuclear hit build rates 
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o A further 160PJ of final energy is reduced (despite the already 
optimised system size) 
o Demand reductions (for those demands that use fossil carriers) are 
maximised to 25% reductions 
o A further 160PJ of oil use is reduced 
o With electricity no longer a negative emissions carrier, it still falls to 
zero CO2 emissions 
o Industry (19), transport (14) and non-energy (18) constitute the 
majority of the MtCO2 residual emissions 
o The backstop technology is hit - with 11 MtCO2 of 2050 reductions at 
£5000/tCO2 
o However even in 2045 very high marginal prices are required (ranging 
from £986 to 1085/tCO2 depending on fuel prices) 
o In 2050 welfare costs leap from £29.5 to £B 98. 
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7 Phase 2 Preliminary Runs 
7.1 Extended ambition, 90% CO2 reduction with low gas prices and 
central fossil fuel prices 
This scenario is similar to the COR3-C90-S scenario; including the extended ambition 
scenario, a 90% CO2 reduction target and central biomass availability. Fossil fuel prices 
for coal and oil are central, with the low scenario used for gas.  This analysis compares 
COR3-LOWGAS to COR3-C90-S. 
 The fossil fuel price scenarios begin to diverge from 2010 in deterministic 
runs and maintain this difference in gas price through the 2050 model 
horizon. 
 Two major impacts are seen 
o Firstly in boosted natural gas use in the mid-term 
o Secondly residual differences in the long-term portfolio of fuels, 
technologies and measures as the decarbonisation drivers compete 
and then outweigh the impact of changed fossil fuel prices  
 In comparison to COR3-C90-S, primary gas demand increases from 2010 
(+200PJ) to peak in 2020 (+600 PJ) before reaching a plateau after 2030 (+200 
PJ). 
o Primary gas demand moves around between 2020 and 2040 as the 
conflicting aims of decarbonisation and least-cost delivery of energy 
service demands results in a ‘flip-flop’ between the various 
technology options.  For example, gas CCS is still more expensive than 
coal CCS, so in the middle periods natural gas is directed towards 
residential gas use for heating, with less used in district heating 
systems. 
 In 2020, the COR3-LOWGAS scenario has an extra 4.1 GW of gas generation 
capacity, with a corresponding reduction in coal (-1GW), marine (-1.7 GW) 
and hydro (-0.8 GW). 
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 By 2030, the disparity between the scenarios is less noticeable, although the 
electricity system is 6 GW smaller, a trend which continues until 2045 when 
the carbon constraint essentially forces in the mixture of technologies 
common with the COR3-C90-S scenario. 
 In 2050, natural gas use is diminished overall (due to the C-90 constraint) but 
retains a greater use than in the COR3-C90-S case (+270PJ) 
o The majority of hydrogen production is through gas SMR with CCS, 
freeing the ~200 PJ of electricity for other sectors (e.g. electrification 
of heat mentioned below).  This is a pervasive change, with 
ramifications throughout the energy system. 
o The electricity system looks very similar to that in COR3-C90-S, albeit 
with a decline in bio-CHP   
o Additional electricity (not required for H2) flows through to the 
residential sector, where it trades off against reduced heat provision.  
o A greater proportion of residential heat is derived from storage 
heaters (~170 PJ) and far less from district heating (-130 PJ). 
o As heat (from biomass-CHP) is reduced, the transport sector sees a 
larger proportion (65% vs. 35%) of 2nd Generation Fischer-Tropsch 
biodiesel from imported lingo-cellulosic feedstock from 2030, 
displacing mineral diesel. 
 The marginal CO2 price is ~10% higher in the COR3-LOWGAS scenario, finally 
meeting the COR3-C90 price in 2050 of ~£280/tonne. 
o This reflects the additional effort required from a carbon price as the 
cost gap between conventional fossil and low carbon alternatives is 
now higher 
 Annual welfare cost is less than in COR3-C90-S, largely as a result of the lower 
gas prices in the CO2 constrained case (vs. a reference base), which leads to a 
smaller energy system enabled through the use of gas SMR for hydrogen 
production, and the smaller demand reduction required.  The difference in 
discounted welfare cost is ~£B60 over the entire model horizon. 
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o The annual reduction in welfare costs start in 2010, rising from ~£ 1.0 
B to £2.5B from 2010 to 2020, peaking at around £4B-5B in 2030 
when lower prices gas use is at its peak, and retained at ~£2.0B 
through to 2050. 
7.2 90% reduction and extended ambition with uncertain fossil fuel 
prices 
Runs to compare to: COR1-STOC-FF[L,C,H,HH]-S, COR3-C90-S 
7.2.1 Hedging strategy 
 The period through 2025 is considerably different from COR1-STOC-FF-S due to 
the addition of the extended ambition scenario, as seen in the deterministic run 
COR3-C90-S (see page 56).   
o In comparison to the deterministic equivalent, the hedge is very similar to 
the central fossil fuel price trajectory, with small movements in biomass, 
natural gas and oil primary energy demand. 
 This very minor hedging strategy costs an extra £B0.25 in 2025 over the COR3-
C90-S run.   
o Although COR1-STOC-FF-S also had a modest hedging strategy, it should 
be noted that it is influenced both because the central deterministic path 
is already near-optimal when uncertainty is later considered, and because 
of the lack of flexibility in the model (e.g. due to the forcing in of specific 
technologies) 
7.2.2 Recourse strategies 
 Many of the insights regarding the pattern between fossil fuel price recourse 
strategies from COR1-STOC-FF-S run carry over to this scenario (see page 69). 
 In 2050, primary energy demand changes sharply according to fossil fuel price, 
more dramatically than COR1-STOC-FFS. 
o Biomass increases from ~1400PJ to ~1700PJ between low and high-high 
fossil fuel price scenarios; natural gas ~740 to ~480PJ; coal ~2500 PJ to 
~1000 PJ; while nuclear increases ~2800 PJ to ~3100 PJ. 
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 In final energy in 2050, a similar pattern to COR1-STOC-FF-S emerges across the 
fossil fuel scenarios. 
o Delivered electricity reduces from ~2500 PJ in low fossil fuel price 
scenario to ~2000 PJ in a high-high fossil fuel price case 
o Gas demand remains stable, as does petrol, biomass/waste and hydrogen 
o Delivered heat from CHP increases from ~50 PJ to ~430 PJ 
o Diesel is displaced by increasing bio-diesels (210/5 to 180/40 PJ) 
 Electricity from co-firing reduces from ~1300 PJ to ~500 PJ across the fossil fuel 
price scenarios. 
o The paucity of alternatives to co-firing CCS mean that the electricity 
system size reduces by an almost equivalent amount (increasing biomass 
- non-CCS - and waste and imports are used to ease the cuts). 
o Uptake of biomass CCS does not relate directly to fossil fuel price, instead 
reliant on the availability of biomass, itself subject to demand from other 
sectors. 
o Wind produces between one sixth and one fifth of all electricity, with 
marine producing the next largest proportion of renewable electricity. 
o Renewable electricity totals between 28% and 39% of a larger (low FF) or 
smaller (high FF) energy system in 2050 
o CHP (largely bio) plays a strongly increasing role in rising fossil fuel price 
scenarios in 2050, with the smaller electricity system leading to a de-
electrification of the heat sector and a move towards district heating 
(again largely bio fired) 
 The move away from CCS in the electricity sector as FF price increases puts 
pressure on other sectors to decarbonise, with the most effort seen in transport. 
o The high-high scenario uses around double the biomass in the central 
scenario through the recourse strategy, with the bulk of the biomass 
converted to 2nd gen FT biodiesel 
 Hydrogen appears in all the recourse strategies with demand increasing from 
~140 PJ in 2030 to ~365 PJ in 2050 across all scenarios.  An increasing proportion 
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of H2 is produced through electrolysis, with the low fossil fuel price scenario 
retaining gas SMR w/CCS in 2050 
 Demand changes respond to higher prices, with average demand reduction 
increasing by a further 2.5% from low to high-high cases 
 Higher fossil fuel prices mitigate the required carbon price required to 
decarbonise the system, ranging (from low though high-high) from £304/tCO2 to 
£264/tCO2 
o The impact on welfare is more nuanced with lower decarbonisation costs 
being balanced by higher cost fuel purchases 
 It appears that forcing in the mix of technologies in the extended ambition 
scenario is a factor both in the ability of the model to substantially hedge and to 
adapt to a variety of fossil fuel prices (when compared with other stochastic 
runs). 
 The EVPI for this scenario is high at £20 billion.  This indicates that the model 
results are sensitive to the uncertainty in fossil fuel prices under the assumptions 
contained within this scenario. 
7.3 Extended ambition, cumulative emissions equivalent to 90% CO2 
reduction 
The first run emissions path is a cumulative constraint of (16,656 MtCO2), that corresponds to C-
90 run with extended ambition (COR3). The model has freedom from 2015 (i.e. emissions in 
2000-2010 are fixed to the COR3 path. In the second run (see page 86), two additional 
constraints are imposed on a COR3-C90 cumulative run: 
 Straight line emissions from 2020-2030, from a 2020 target of 380.2MtCO2 to a 2050 target 
of 59.3MtCO2 
 Additional constraints in 2035, and 2040 to ensure that emissions reductions are never more 
than 50% in any 5 year period 
The figure below illustrates the emission path for the reference, COR3 (C90), and the two new 
runs. The impact of the social discount rate is profound, with a higher weight placed on avoiding 
(very expensive) later period reductions. Hence in a cumulative run (COR3-CUMC90) the model 
undertakes earlier action, with 2050 emissions only at 85 MtCO2. When emissions are further 
constrained (COR3-CUM2030) the straight line trajectory through 2030 give higher emissions, 
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and then the model decarbonises very hard to avoid later period expensive reductions. The 50% 
period-on-period limit is hit in both 2035 and 2040, and by 2050 this run is forced down to 35 
MtCO2 to reach the cumulative limit. 
 
Figure 6: CO2 emissions under cumulative CO2 emission targets 
 The additional flexibility of the cumulative constraint leads to an overall 
discounted welfare gain of £B 4.5 
o High costs are imposed earlier and lower costs are seen later as the 
socially optimal model minimises (expensive) emissions reductions in 
later years 
 CO2 emissions diverge in from 2015, and in 2020 are 380 MtCO2 vs. 333 
MtCO2 in COR3-C90 
 In 2020 this entails a CO2 price of £71/tCO2, up from £25/tCO2, and a welfare 
cost of £B 6.6, up from £B 4.0 
 By 2035 emission levels converge 
 By 2050 the higher CO2 emissions cap gives a CO2 price reduction to 
£200/tCO2 (from £288 in COR3-C90) and a corresponding welfare 
improvement of £B -24.7 (from £B -30.8) 
 In 2020 (and other early periods) higher demand reductions are a major 
feature of this run, in 2020 rising from an average of -5% to -8% 
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o Note that in this socially optimal run, some energy sector (e.g. 
transport is already highly efficient and conservation options are fully 
taken up 
o Demand reductions operate across the board but especially in 
residential and industry sectors 
o Demand reductions (along with fuel substitutions) enable a 280PJ 
reduction of coal primary energy  
 In 2020 the electricity portfolio is almost the same, with only some 
acceleration of switching from coal to coal CCS 
o Note that 1/3 of this coal CCS is retrofit plants 
 Other substitutions included LGV transport diesel hybrids to petrol plug-ins 
and removal of coal and coke oven gas from industry sectors 
 In 2050 this run has a significantly large emission allowance – 85 vs. 59 
MtCO2 
o This eases pressure on zero or negative emission electricity, with 
330PJ less electricity overall, no biomass CCS and a reduction in co-
firing CCS 
o Hydrogen production switches from 100% electrolysis to 60/40 
electrolysis vs. gas SMR with CCS 
o Expensive options in end use sectors also revert (e.g. residential 
heating from electricity to heat and direct biomass) 
o The accelerated demand reductions are no longer required and 
converge (by around 2030 or so) 
7.4 Extended ambition, cumulative emissions equivalent to 90% CO2 
reduction, with additional straight-line emission constraint 
through 2030 
 The straight-line trajectory through 2030 gives a much lower effort, with CO2 
marginal prices in 2030 only £18/tCO2 (vs. £91/tCO2) 
o The emission budget in 2030 is 273 MtCO2 (from 205 MtCO2) 
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o The additional emissions budget is mostly allocated to electricity, 
hydrogen (for transport) and the service sector 
 Average demand reductions plummet, from 7.5% to only 2.5% 
o The 500 PJ additional final energy is parcelled out to the industry, 
residential, services sectors (transport remains highly optimised) 
o The share of natural gas and heat in final energy is also boosted 
o With electricity generation slightly reduced, the portfolio shifts from 
imports, marine and nuclear to retain 100PJ of gas fired generation in 
2030 
o CHP and DH (including steam production) remain fossil (as opposed to 
biomass) 
o In industrial sectors, coal and coke oven gas are retained 
 In 2035, the model quickly reduces emissions in an attempt to minimise very 
expensive later reductions 
o Without lower bounds (of 50% reduction 5-year on 5-year) the model 
would reduce emissions by 63% 
 With 50% maximum emission reduction in 2030-2035, demand reductions 
quickly ramp up (from 2.5% to 9.5%) and apply to all sectors 
 In terms of sectors in 2035: 
o Electricity emissions contract from 39 to 5 MtCO2, via growth in co-firing 
CCS and nuclear;  
o Hydrogen (for transport) decarbonises from 9 to only 1 MtCO2 via shift to 
electrolysis and CCS being applied to SMR H2 production  
o The residential sector falls from 24 to 3 MtCO2 via switching from gas and 
heat to electricity 
o Industry falls from 58 to 39 MtCO2 with the elimination of coal 
o Service sector falls from 13 to 1 MtCO2 with the elimination of natural gas 
 In 2035-2045 transition technologies include natural gas in industry, biofuels in 
transport, and gas SMR with CCS in hydrogen production  
o These eventually fall out as the emission caps tightens severely 
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 In 2050 the emission cap is much tighter than COR3-C90 at 34.8 MtCO2 which is a 
94% reduction  
o Hence the overall structure of the energy system has similarities to a C-95 
run, but with important differences at the margin 
o As costs are extremely convex at this point in the abatement curve this 
run’s marginal price is £468/tCO2 as opposed to £1415/tCO2 for COR2-C95 
 Welfare losses (at £B 38.6) are more comparable falling between a C-90 case (£B 
30.8) and a C-95 case (£B 42.7) 
 Compared to the COR1-C90-S case, major changes include a larger electricity 
sector, with a coal to biomass (CCS) switch and more nuclear.  
o The electricity sector’s emissions fall even further into negative territory 
(from -26MtCO2 to -42MtCO2) 
o The already optimised energy system sees a further 1.5% reduction in 
energy service demands 
o A range of additional changes include bio resources being switched from 
CHP to CCS (which results in residential heat being replaced by 
electricity), and a contribution of hydrogen cars to the LGV subsector 
7.5 Uncertain fossil fuel prices, extended ambition, C-90 emission 
reductions with restriction on electric vehicles 
In the first set of scenarios, restrictions are placed on electric vehicles (EVs). The overall 
limit on EV car-kms (63%) is maintained for a combination of Battery EVs and Plug-in 
Hybrid EVs, but BEVs uptake is zero until 2030 and are allowed to comprise no more 
than 20% of car-kms by 2050 (ramped up from 0% in 2030, by 5% per 5-year period). 
Hence the other 43% can only be done with PHEVs. Furthermore, no battery electric 
buses are allowed. 
In the second set of scenarios, in addition to EV restrictions as above, no hydrogen is 
allowed for any transport mode. 
The runs have 2050 targets of -90% (59.3MtCO2) relative to 1990 emissions of 
592.4MtCO2. The path consists of equal annual reduction from 2020 target of 
380.2MtCO2 (35.8% reduction from 1990 levels). 
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Under the stochastic formulation, alternate CCC scenarios are used for oil, oil products, 
natural gas and coal; with no domestic fossil fuel production post 2020.  Uncertainty is 
resolved post 2025 - i.e. 2030 is the first period of the recourse strategy. This resolution 
date has been retained in all the stochastic emissions runs.  
Runs to compare to: COR3-STOC-FF[L,C,H,HH]-S, COR3-C90-S 
Note there are no direct deterministic runs to compare to, and hence no EVPI can be 
calculated. 
7.5.1 Hedging strategy 
 Compared to earlier COR3 extended ambition runs, the model is responding both 
to the restricted availability of electric cars and buses, and to an upper bias in 
future fossil fuel price expectations 
 As the previous electric bus transition cannot occur, less electricity is required 
o This means less co-firing CCS (less biomass availability, more expensive 
coal) and less marine (more expensive) 
 With electric cars restricted, a major hedging technology is E85 ethanol cars. 
These are retained until a further transition to hydrogen in 2040/45.  
 Overall slightly higher mid-term CO2 marginal prices are required (£87/tCO2 
instead of £80/tCO2 
7.5.2 Recourse strategies 
 In 2030, immediate changes are seen under lower/higher fossil fuel prices 
o This is seen in the marginal CO2 signal having to be stronger/weaker 
respectively – with the range from £39/tCO2 in the high high to 
£111/tCO2 in the low case 
o Energy service demand reductions under higher fossil fuel prices are 
relaxed 
o Under higher FF prices, a further intermediate transition to E85 and 
bio diesel vehicles is seen 
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o In terms of prioritised electricity investment this varies from co-firing 
CCS in low FF cases, to marine in high-high. Gas back up plant 
investment is required on all scenarios 
 In 2050, the overall impact of the C-90 emission reduction is seen across all 
scenarios with the impact of fossil fuel variations laid on top of this 
o Marginal CO2 prices continue to vary from low to high-high (from 
£305/tCO2 to £268/tCO2) as the fossil fuel price rise ensures some 
emissions reductions 
o A range of key technologies are similar to earlier COR3 stochastic runs 
– e.g. hydrogen cars by 2050 
o Looking across low to high-high scenarios 
 Low favours natural gas, oil, coal and electricity (nuclear), H2 
from SMR 
 High-high favours heat, biomass, renewable & nuclear 
electricity, demand reductions, and H2 from electrolysis 
 The demise of coal in high-high is the most striking (from 2400 
to 840PJ) 
 The role of nuclear is interesting and is boosted in the low case 
due to the need for a large zero carbon electricity sector to 
meet targets, and it is large in the high-high case due to costs 
of fossil CCS alternates. Nuclear’s role is less in intermediate FF 
cases 
 Low to high-high cases sees a shift from electricity to (bio) 
heat, primarily in the residential sector 
 In transport there is an additional switch from diesel to 
biodiesel 
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7.6 Uncertain fossil fuel prices, extended ambition, C-90 emission 
reductions with restriction on electric vehicles and hydrogen as a 
transport fuel 
Note that the restrictions on hydrogen constitute a major further change. In COR3 runs, 
H2 comes in from 2030 (140 PJ, rising to 370 PJ in 2050). In the above restricted EV 
transport sensitivity, the long term role of H2 is boosted to 500 PJ in 2050 
7.6.1 Hedging strategy 
 The hedging strategy is similar to the above run in section 7.5, but with an 
additional hedge due to the future costs of not being able to substitute to H2 in 
the transport sector. 
o A reduction of 120PJ of coal and 20PJ of gas is partly replaced by 50PJ 
more of biomass 
o This is seen in a rise in biomass CHP and heat production, and a switch 
from diesel to bio-diesel in transport 
7.6.2 Recourse strategies 
 The 2030 transition is similar to the previous transport sensitivity but by 2050 
very considerable difference emerge 
 Not having access to H2 for any transport model ensures a rapid increase in 
welfare costs, and a greater impact than restriction on EVs: from a central case of 
£B 30.8 in COR3, to £B 33.8 under the above transport sensitivity to £B 40.2 in 
this transport (no H2) sensitivity by 2050 
 Cars cannot transition to hydrogen and remain predominately ethanol E85 
o In 2050, 44% E85 in the low case to 85% ethanol in high-high 
 Buses and HGV vehicles remain bio-diesel hybrid options 
 Domestic air switches to bio-kerosene - 0% in low to nearly 100% in high-high FF 
price cases 
 With 800 to over 100PJ of biomass in the transport sector, overall biomass 
requirements come largely from imported sources (around a 75/25 share of 
imports vs. domestic production). 
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o By 2050 import constraints on biomass are triggered 
 Demand reduction requirements are up in all scenarios, and most notably in 
higher FF price case (ranging from an average of 12.4% to 14.6% in 2050) 
 Overall electricity requirements are substantially reduced (owing to less 
electricity in transport (either directly or indirectly via hydrogen electrolysis) 
o In terms of the electricity portfolio, low FF price use of co-firing CCS 
switches to bio CCS, nuclear, hydro, marine and imports in higher price 
variants 
o Note wind penetration levels are maxed out at 500PJ by 2050 
 Although all no H2 variants are more expensive than earlier comparative runs, 
the FF price signal still impact the require CO2 marginal with falls from £511/tCO2 
to £397/tCO2 as fossil prices rise. 
7.7 C-90 extended ambition except heat sector, low assumptions on 
heat pumps and solid wall insulation, uncertain fossil fuel prices 
CCC assumptions on extended ambition (COR3) are used (except in the heat sector as 
below).  Lower bounds (from CCC) are removed in the residential sector on biomass 
boilers, heat pumps, solar thermal heat.  Lower bounds (from CCC) are removed in the 
service sector on biomass boilers, heat pumps, solar thermal heat.  A 70% maximum 
limit on service sector heat pumps is put in place.  Investment smoothing constraints are 
placed on overall categories of residential and service sector heat pumps to prevent 
unrealistic spikes of investment.  Revised CCC assumptions on solid wall installation 
(SWI) conservation and on heat pump potentials are included in the residential sector: 
1. For the first run (below), low SWI conservation assumptions are made for 0.3 
million homes in 2020 and 0.6 million in 2030 (linearly interpolated from 
2010) and held at the upper level through 2050. In the model this is 
transcribed into a PJ/a conversation uptake. The overall limit on all 
conversation measures is also updated to take this SWI uptake into account. 
Corresponding maximum heat pump uptake in the residential sector is 41.5% 
in 2020 and 42.5% in 2030. 
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2. For the second run (see page 95), high SWI conservation assumptions are 
made for 2.7 million homes in 2020 and 5.7 million in 2030 (linearly 
interpolated from 2010) and held at the upper level through 2050. This is 
transcribed into a PJ/a conversation uptake. The overall limit on all 
conversation measures is also updated to take this SWI uptake into account. 
Corresponding maximum heat pump uptake in the residential sector is 49.8% 
in 2020 and 60.3% in 2030. 
Runs to compare to: COR3-C90-S; COR3-STOC-FF[L,C,H,HH]-S 
Note there are no direct deterministic runs to compare to, and hence no EVPI can be 
calculated. 
7.7.1 Hedging strategy 
 As in previous stochastic fossil fuel runs, we would expect some hedging bias 
against the overall higher likelihood of higher fossil prices 
 This will be laid on top of the changes from Solid wall insulation (SWI) and 
heat pump assumption changes 
 In 2025 
o The higher level of conservation forced into the residential section 
(15PJ) and a rise in residential heat pumps is only partly balanced out 
by less penetration of service sector heat pumps (no lower bound). 
Hence final energy is 60PJ less overall. 
o The reduction of service biomass (removed lower bound assumption) 
is taken up in the residential sector, partially in response to higher 
expected fossil prices 
o An additional small hedge is seen (also 15PJ) in a switch from natural 
gas and oil to renewable electricity and biomass 
o CO2 marginal prices rise from £80 to £82/tCO2 as a result of these 
scenario changes plus hedging strategy 
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7.7.2 Recourse strategies 
 In 2030 some immediate changes are seen 
o Coal quickly comes down (co-firing CCS) in the power sector in the 
high-high case. This ensures that electricity does not decarbonise until 
2035 in the HH run. 
o In the HH run there is an additional immediate switch from diesel to 
biodiesel 
o The fossil fuel runs see a range in CO2 prices as the carbon signal has 
to work more or less hard to meet interim targets – from low to high-
high runs, CO2 prices vary from £109 to £48/tCO2 in 2030 
o Similar demand reductions rage from 5.4% to 8.2% 
 In 2050, the core assumption changes to conservation and heat pumps play 
out 
o By enabling additional conservation (which is cost effective) and 
raising the limits on heat pumps, this run is generally cheaper than 
the equivalent COR3 extended ambitions runs 
o The increase in conservation and increases in residential heat pumps 
continue to outweigh the reduction in service sector heat pumps to 
give an overall -70PJ final energy decline 
 By 2050 the changes from stochastic fossil fuel prices have also played out 
o In terms of final energy there is a 1000PJ range (from a central value 
of 8760PJ 
o Moving from low to high-high scenarios; gas, oil and coal, is replaced 
with biomass, nuclear, imported electricity and demand reductions 
o Coal in the high-high cases is decimated, with a major swift between 
co-firing CCS to a combination of biomass CHP and biomass-CCS 
o The high-high run sees an addition diesel – biodiesel switch 
o Low price runs retain more fossil fuels e.g., in SMR (with CCS) in 
hydrogen production 
o Renewable electricity is limited by build rates and power sector 
operation, and does not increase its absolute energy production 
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o A major resultant end-use shift is in the residential sector with (as 
fossil prices rise) a move from electricity to (bio) heat) 
o Demand reductions vary from 10.1% to 13.1% under low to high-high 
cases 
o CO2 marginal costs sees a 2050 variation from £305 to £261/tCO2 
7.8 C-90 extended ambition except heat sector, high assumptions on 
heat pumps and solid wall insulation, uncertain fossil fuel prices 
Note that the high heat pump and insulation assumptions constitute a major further 
change. The energy systems is substantially smaller (and cheaper), which alleviates 
pressure on other sectors and energy chain to decarbonise; although the overall pattern 
of technologies and measures are similar. 
7.8.1 Hedging strategy 
 Now in 2025, overall conservation increases from 225 to 350PJ 
 A 50% increase in residential heat pumps is only partially balanced out by interim 
declines in service sector heat pumps 
 Overall in 2025, final energy is reduced by 70PJ 
 This reduced pressure on mid-term decarbonisation, for example in the decline 
in natural gas requirements for buildings 
o Marginal CO2 prices ease back from £80 to £73/tCO2 
 This also means that any impacts of an additional hedging strategy is very small 
7.8.2 Recourse strategies 
 By 2050 the conservation and heat pump assumptions give a relative 190 PJ 
decline in final energy 
 In particular the SWI conservation and the further rise in heat pumps give a much 
smaller residential sector 
 Marginal CO2 prices at the margin are the same as in the HP1 case, but overall 
welfare costs are down by around £B 2.3 (to an average of £B 27.7 in 2050) 
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 Fossil fuel difference give a similar pattern of variation but at a much reduced 
variation and impact, as the model has much more flexibility in its smaller energy 
system 
o Hence the fossil fuel scenario range in primary energy is now only 600PJ 
(8290 – 7700PJ 
o Demand changes now range from 9.9% to 12.7% (low to high-high) 
o The electricity to biomass-heat trade-off is much less pronounced (now 
only tens instead of hundreds of PJ) 
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8 Phase 2 Core and Sensitivity Runs 
8.1 Revised Core Runs  
8.1.1 P2-COR3-ALL-S-2 
This run demonstrates the dramatic effect of including: 
 industrial CCS (process and combustion) 
 grid injection of bio-methane and 
 revision of solid wall insulation and heat pumps 
All comparisons are made against the COR3-C90 scenario. 
The majority of changes occur in the latter half of the model horizon, noticeably in the 
large reduction in primary energy consumption (-500 PJ in 2035 >-1000PJ in 2050).  This 
reduction in primary energy is largely in coal and biomass & waste and is due to a 
significant decrease of electricity demand in the hydrogen, industrial and residential 
sectors.  Primary biomass and waste reaches a maximum of ~600 PJ in 2050.  Primary 
coal demand resurges in the late 2020s after reaching a low of ~400 PJ in 2025, plateaus 
at ~1000 PJ in the 30-40s and peaks at ~1500 PJ in 2050 as new co-firing CCS capacity 
comes online.  In the COR3-C90 run, decarbonisation of the electricity system was 
largely through co-firing CCS, and in the later periods, biomass CCS.  This scenario sees 
10 GW less co-firing CCS capacity in 2035 and ~30 GW less co-firing CCS capacity in 2050.  
4 GW of nuclear investment is delayed by a decade to 2045-50.  As a result of the 
reduction in electricity demand, the electricity system in 2050 is much smaller; ~185 GW 
instead of ~220 GW in the COR3-C90 scenario. 
As mentioned above, the reduction in electricity demand comprises reductions in 
hydrogen, industrial and residential sectors.  These are explored briefly below. 
Hydrogen demand (~360 PJ in 2050) is very similar to that in the COR3-C90 scenario, and 
is used in the transport sector for HGVs from 2030 and cars from 2040.  The reduction in 
emissions generated by industrial CCS allows hydrogen production to remain 50% gas 
SMR (with CCS), instead of fully moving to electrolysis. 
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There is a dramatic increase in the use of bio-products in the industrial sector, mainly 
through the adoption of bio-methane, later combined with CCS to achieve negative 
emissions.  Total industrial bio-methane demand increases from ~70 PJ in 2025 to ~120 
PJ in 2050.  As the industrial gas demand decreases from ~600 PJ in 2020 to ~400 PJ in 
2050, bio-methane makes up an increasing percentage. 
The increase in solid wall insulation coupled with high uptake of heat pumps in the 
residential sector creates a dramatic overall reduction in residential electricity demand.  
Half of this is due to the higher efficiency of the heat pumps and the move from (less 
efficient) storage heaters.  The other half is due to increase in energy conservation 
measures (~100 PJ in 2030 onwards).  Energy demand for heat pumps increases from 
~40 PJ in 2025 to ~200 PJ in 2050 while gas demand from boilers reduces from 900 PJ in 
2020 to 0 PJ in 2045.  Note that bio-methane is concentrated in the industrial sector and 
does not penetrate the residential sector; under a 90% CO2 reduction target the residual 
emissions are too high, together with the opportunity cost of taking bio-methane CCS 
away from the industrial sector.   
Compared to the COR3-C90 scenario, consumption of bio-products increases overall, 
although this increase is dominated by the uptake of bio-methane in the industrial 
sector.  Wood demand between 2020 and 2035 switches from the service sector to 
residential sector.  Bio-products in final energy peak at ~100 PJ in the 2020s, and 200 PJ 
in 2030-40s.  This is an increase of ~100 PJ over the COR3-C90 scenario.  Note that bio-
fuels in the transport sector are lower and decline from a high of ~70 PJ in 2010 to ~10 
PJ in 2050.  This is in contrast to the COR3-C90 scenario in which biofuels increase to a 
peak of ~90 PJ in 2035 before declining to ~10 PJ in 2050. 
Industrial CCS is adopted from 2030 onwards, with 20 MtCO2 captured increasing to 45 
MtCO2 in 2050.  Note that the extra 7 MtCO2 in 2050 over the industrial CCS is from 
hydrogen SMR with CCS.  Compared with COR3-C90, overall levels of CCS are reduced by 
~10 MtCO2 in 2035 and ~80 MtCO2 in 2050.  The reduction is entirely from lower (co-
firing) CCS capacity in the electricity sector.  However, this still results in ~100 MtCO2 
captured per year from 2030 rising to around 180 MtCO2 captured per year in 2050.  
One third goes to enhanced oil recovery, with the remainder stored in aquifers. 
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Emissions move around between sectors, primarily as the reduction in industrial 
emissions (process and combustion emissions down 9 MtCO2 and 11 MtCO2 
respectively) give more freedom to the electricity sector (up 17 MtCO2), transport 
sector (up 1 to 4 MtCO2), and hydrogen production (up 1 MtCO2).  This is shown in 
Figure 7.  Note that the reduction in ‘Other emissions’ is a result of the reduction in 
industrial process emissions.  Reductions in industrial emissions through combustion CCS 
measures are included under the industry category. 
 
Figure 7: Change in sectoral emissions (COR3-C90 to P2-COR3-ALL-S-2)  
The extra freedom given to the energy system through inclusion of industrial CCS and 
bio-methane is significant.  Under a 90% CO2 reduction target, the welfare benefit of 
industrial CCS, bio-methane, and revised solid wall insulation and heat pumps 
constraints rises from £1B in 2020 to £9B in 2050.  Two thirds of the welfare benefit is as 
a result of the smaller energy system, with the remaining third from smaller energy 
service demand reductions – concentrated in residential and industrial sectors. 
8.1.2 P2-R2-NEW-C90: Run 2, with lower wind uptake, 30% RE target, 
constrained mid-term CCS 
8.1.2.1 Scenario notes 
The following changes are made to the model since the previous (P2-COR3-ALL-S-2): 
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 Offshore wind forced in as per the previous extended ambition run to 2020, but 
then that 2020 minimum constraint installed capacity kept flat to 2050 
 Wind build-rate constrained to the maximum seen pre-2025 e.g. ~13 GW per 5-
year period 
 From 2020 to 2050, a minimum of 30% renewable electricity is constrained in 
 On industry CCS, no uptake by 2025, and the maximum build rates in each 
following 5-year period of 5 MtCO2, 10 MtCO2and then 15 MtCO2 (i.e. if it hits the 
build constraint in each period the cumulative installed capacity would be 5 
MtCO2 in 2030, MtCO2 Mt in 2035 and 30 MtCO2 in 2040); post-2040 build rates 
added using a maximum of 20 MtCO2 in any 5-year period 
 On CCS as a whole (including industrial, electricity and hydrogen), combined 
build-rate constraint pre-2030 (0.5 GW/annum 2020; 1GW/annum 2025; 1.5 
GW/annum 2030), but then not doing so post-2030, i.e. power reverts to a 2GW 
per annum build constraint regardless of industry CCS deployment 
Table 25: CCS emissions captured in P2-R2-New-C90 
Emissions (ktCO2) 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Industrial coal CCS (combustion) 2,991 5,678 7,883 8,973 8,973 
H2 SMR with CCS   126 7,649 7,649 
Industrial gas CCS (combustion)  1,474 7,798 8,002 2,804 
industrial bio-methane CCS 
(combustion) 
    4,994 
CHP CCS   2,478 9,444 9,444 
Process CCS coal 802 5,468 8,202 8,202 8,202 
Process CCS gas 787 1,574 2,361 2,361 2,361 
 4,580 14,194 28,847 44,630 44,426 
% hydrogen   0.4% 17.1% 17.2% 
8.1.2.2 Results 
This run builds on the first phase II run, P2-COR3-ALL-S-2.  In this run we relax an 
aggressive constraint forcing in wind technologies in favour of a least cost renewable 
portfolio standard post-2030 and constrain back industrial, hydrogen and electricity 
sector CCS technologies.  Industrial CCS is unavailable pre-2030, growth in both 
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industrial and hydrogen CCS is limited from 2030 onwards, and hydrogen CCS is 
incorporated into the power sector build rate constraint before 2030.  The 2030 period 
is important, as this is when hydrogen becomes available and electricity sector 
decarbonisation is well under way. 
As wind is no longer forced in, installed capacity drops by ~11 GW in 2025 and ~7 GW in 
2030, with a small compensatory increase in bio-wastes (~7 GW) and marine (~7 GW).  
Installed wind capacity from 2035 onwards, both onshore and offshore exceeds the 
levels seen in P2-COR3-ALL-S-2, largely to meet the 30% renewable electricity constraint 
in the latter periods (post-2035).   Electricity generation dips by around 100 PJ during 
this 10 year period compared to P2-COR3-ALL-S-2.   The smaller electricity system 
requires a corresponding reduction in energy service demands.  Energy service demand 
reductions increase in response to price on average ~6% in industry, ~5% in residential 
and ~1% in transport and service sector in 2030.  Note that wind capacity actually 
increases above the level seen in P2-COR3-ALL-S-2, reaching ~70 GW in 2050. 
The reductions (in final electricity) are split between industry, residential and service 
sectors in the middle periods, and hydrogen and industry in latter periods.  Residential 
decarbonisation occurs through a combination of supply and demand measures; there is 
a move from gas condensing boilers (-200 PJ in 2030) to electricity and heat pumps.  
District heating plays an important role in conjunction with solid and wood fuels (up 80 
PJ in 2030).  Final energy demand is around 90 PJ lower than the P2-COR3-ALL-S-2 
scenario. 
Electricity CCS hits the build rate in 2020 and 2025 as the co-firing CCS fleet reaches 17.7 
GW of installed capacity in 2035, increasing to 26 GW in 2050.  Growth in electricity CCS 
capacity in 2030 is lower than the build-rate as some CCS resource is concentrated upon 
industrial sector.  This demonstrates the trade-off between industrial, hydrogen and 
electricity sector CCS investment. 
The mid-term (2035-40) uptake of CCS increases marginally in this scenario, compared 
to P2-COR3-ALL-S-2 as the model is forced to choose the least-cost CCS option from the 
hydrogen, industrial and electricity sectors.  Adoption of both hydrogen and industrial 
CCS is delayed (reduced) until 2045, with electricity CCS taking preference in the near 
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term (2035-40) - CCS increases from ~10 MtCO2 in 2015 to ~180 MtCO2 in 2050. 
However, the preference for electricity sector CCS is reversed in the later periods, with 
the hydrogen and industrial sectors demanding equal share of the CCS potential.  By 
2045, the mid-term constraint no longer applies, and electricity, industry and hydrogen 
CCS processes resume the pathways seen in P2-COR3-ALL-S-2. 
Note that overall CCS capacity declines in comparison to the P2-COR3-ALL-S-2 scenario.  
However, the electricity sector increases in capacity (as more wind than base load plant 
is built) but is smaller from an electrical generation perspective.  The inclusion of 
hydrogen CCS in the industrial CCS constraint in the latter periods has a significant effect 
on the consumption of electricity, with ~160 PJ of electricity diverted to hydrogen 
electrolysis in 2035.  Hydrogen production switches to electrolysis from natural gas SMR 
from 2030 onwards, with gas SMR with CCS increasing over the remaining periods (as 
the constraint on industrial & hydrogen CCS decreases in severity). 
For most sectors, energy service demand reduction is marginally increased over P2-
COR3-ALL-S-2 from 2025 onwards e.g. due to the increased system cost of electricity. 
The welfare cost changes over time in a very similar way to the pattern seen in P2-COR3-
ALL-S-2.  Discounted welfare costs for the two scenarios are close enough to be within 
the margin for error.  The marginal price of CO2 increases smoothly from 2015 
(~£40/tCO2) to 2050 (~£230/tCO2). 
8.1.3 P2-R3-HUR-C90-5: Run 3 Amended hurdle rates 
In this scenario, alternative hurdle rates (as discussed in section 3.3.6) are applied: 
 Power (and electricity CCS): 10% 
 Industry (and industrial CCS): 10% 
 Hydrogen (and process CCS): 10% 
 Service: 10% 
 Residential: 3.5% 
 Transport vehicle technologies: 
o Cars and 2-wheelers: 3.5% 
o Buses: 6% 
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o HGV and LGVs: 8.5% 
 Not specified by CCC: 
o Aviation: 3.5% 
o Navigation: 3.5% 
o Rail: 3.5% 
Hurdle rates are applied to conservation technologies in equivalent sectors (so 10% in 
commercial sector and 3.5% in residential sector).  All CCS storage technologies have 
10% power sector hurdle rate assigned.  The changes to hurdle rates were consistent 
with the rationale of a private sector discount rate of 10% and public sector discount 
rate of 3.5%. 
Existing hurdle rates (8.75% for conservation measures in both the residential and 
service/commercial sectors, 7.00% for public transport, 8.75% for battery and methanol 
private transport, 5.25% for hybrid private transport modes and 7.00% for hydrogen 
private transport modes) are overridden by the new amended hurdle rates. 
8.1.3.1 Results 
 New hurdle rates result in pervasive and system wide effects 
 There is a focus on "well-to-wheel" efficiency i.e. increase in CHP, reduction 
in electricity conversion technologies 
 Demand reductions are greater than the previous scenario (P2-R2),  but not 
significantly so and are balanced with the reduction in supply side 
 H2 demand is slightly lower than in run 2, and bio-fuels replace a portion of 
H2 in transport 
 50-150 PJ of hydrogen production moves from electrolysis to gas SMR with 
CCS 
 The electricity system is significantly smaller than run 2 (~60 GW in 2050 – 40 
GW less renewables and 16 GW less co-firing CCS) as a result of the hurdle 
rate increases 
 105 
This scenario was run as a constrained scenario - without running a separate base case.  
The added (or reduced) cost of investing in technologies due to the imposition of 
amended hurdle rates therefore result in some relatively large changes across the 
energy system.  This occurs because the cost of meeting almost all energy service 
demands increases as a result of the new hurdle rates.  However, where one might 
expect a significant demand response, this scenario demonstrates a large 
reconfiguration of the entire energy system, with a much smaller electricity sector than 
previous scenarios, in partnership with demand side reduction in response to increases 
electricity prices.  Electricity makes up a lower proportion of delivered (final) energy as 
the cost of conversion has increased relative to the use of primary fuels in final energy, 
or more efficient technologies such as CHP. 
Primary energy demand is ~200 PJ lower from 2010 onwards and significantly lower in 
2050 (by ~600 PJ).  The largest reductions are in coal, nuclear electricity and renewable 
electricity.  Biomass and natural gas increase roughly equally by ~500 PJ (over P2-R2) in 
2050.  The largest increase is in biomass, increasing to ~1,100 PJ (overall) in 2050, with 
much of the increase directed to wood-fired CHP for residential heating. 
Final energy demand is on average ~125 PJ lower over the model horizon, while final 
demand for heat from CHP displaces gas/bio-methane and electricity.  An increase in 
bio-diesel and petrol displaces mineral diesel and hydrogen in transport. The reduction 
in final energy demand occurs in different sectors in different periods.  Between 2010 
and 2015, final energy demand in transport is reduced by 50-100 PJ.  In the mid periods, 
2025 to 2035, final energy demand is reduced in the residential sector.  In the later 
periods, reductions in final energy demand are equally distributed between transport, 
service, residential and industrial sectors.  Final energy demand for electricity is the 
single largest reduction from 2040 onwards. 
The reduction in final electricity demand explains only part of the ~500 PJ (and ~60 GW 
capacity) reduction in electricity generation.  The increase in the hurdle rate of the 
power sector to 10% has stimulated a reorganisation of the energy system, with a much 
smaller electricity system, less conversion of energy commodities, an increase in 
efficiency and direct delivery of fuels to demand sectors (e.g. less electricity and more 
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gas to meet final industrial demand).  The biggest reduction is in large, capital intensive 
plant and accompanying infrastructure, such as CCS technologies, wind and marine and 
to a lesser extent nuclear.  There is a small increase in biomass CCS (2 GW in 2050) and 
bio-waste technologies. 
In this set of scenarios, hydrogen is a resilient fuel in the future low carbon transport 
sector.  Hydrogen meets an increasing percentage of transport fuel demand (12% in 
2030 rising to 37% in 2050) and is produced using a mixture of electrolysis (~100 PJ) and 
natural gas SMR with CCS (~180 PJ). 
The changes in hurdle rates for hybrid transport technologies (from 5.25% to 3.5%) 
result in a move from standard petrol and diesel internal combustion engine vehicles to 
hybrid vehicles in 2010 to 2015.  Conversely, buses swap from hybrid technologies to ICE 
technologies in the early periods of the model, and from battery technologies in the 
mid-periods to hybrid technologies.  There are similar flips across all the transport 
modes.  Overall, transport diesel consumption reduces significantly in the early parts of 
the model with petrol and biodiesel/kerosene increasing.  There is a greater 
consumption of bio-fuels in final transport demand from 2035 (~40 PJ). 
District heating from CHP and heat pumps are the largest providers of space and water 
heating services to both the residential and service sectors from 2035.  Residential gas 
condensing boilers are largely phased out by 2035.  CHP generates >100 PJ heat annually 
from 2030, delivered to residential and service sectors, also meeting ~4% of total 
electricity demand. 
The marginal price of CO2 reaches ~£290/tCO2 in 2050, up ~£70/tCO2 on P2-R2. The 
welfare cost also increases to ~£27B/annum (from ~£22B) in 2050, with the majority of 
the change the result of changes in energy service demands as opposed to system costs. 
8.2 P2-R4-INV-C90-0: Run 4 Increased electricity sector investment 
costs 
In June 2010, DECC published a report composed by Mott MacDonald on the levelised 
costs of electricity generation in the UK (Mott MacDonald, 2010).  The appendices 
contain various assumptions including those for the current costs of electricity plant. 
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Table 26: Comparison of UK MARKAL and (Mott MacDonald, 2010) technology costs 
Technology UK MARKAL 
Range (2000£M) 
Mott Prices (2000£M) Ratio of Mott prices to 
MARKAL 
  
Low High Low/Low High/High 
New IGCC 835-891 1,391 1,761 1.7 2.0 
New IGCC with CCS 944-1,210 1,772 2,117 1.9 1.7 
      New PF plant 791-870 1,255 1,568 1.6 1.8 
New PF plant with CCS 1107-1363 1,772 2,117 1.6 1.6 
      GTCC 400 505 621 1.3 1.6 
      Nuclear - combined E-PWR 
and AP1000 (URN) 
1,050 
1,945 2,606 1.9 2.5 
      Wind - Onshore /Off-shore 675-1315 
    Wind: On shore 675 1,062 1,337 1.6 2.0 
Wind - off shore 1196-1751 1,846 2,869 1.5 1.6 
As noted in the study, the relationship between technology costs is relatively stable, 
such that a nuclear power plant will typically cost 30-50% more than a coal fired power 
station.  However, many of the generation plant share component technologies, so a 
driver that influences a price increase in one or more components will be reflected 
across the generating technologies. 
An important component driver of the increase in capital costs seen for all the 
generating plant in the above table is due to the global increase in commodity prices.  
The recent spike in costs of non-energy commodities such as metals, concrete has 
chemicals has had an impact on current costs of generation plant (as well as most other 
technologies built using the same commodities).  However, UK MARKAL uses long-term 
costs for technologies – the Mott Macdonald (2010) report notes that the long term 
outlook for all technologies are likely to be at lower cost than currently quoted.  
Naturally, the future costs are subject to uncertainties as to their range of possible 
values.  A second contributor to the high costs quoted in the report are supply chain 
constraints, and the long term outlook for most of the technologies lies along similar 
conclusions to those made above – new suppliers will enter the market in response to 
the price increase as a result of the supply/demand imbalance.  Long term costs are 
likely to decrease or at least stay in the same area as those in the UK MARKAL model. 
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The costs in UK MARKAL were subjected to a rigorous peer review process outlined in 
the model documentation (Kannan et al. 2007). 
8.2.1 Results 
This scenario demonstrates the impact of more expensive electricity generation 
technologies, while the costs of other parts of the energy system are not subject to cost 
increases.  The investment costs for all generation technologies (including CHP, wind, 
coal, gas, nuclear, biomass etc.) have been increased by a factor of 1.6 across the model 
time horizon, given the assumption that the differences seen in the Mott MacDonald 
(2010) report are a permanent phenomenon e.g. we have moved to a fundamentally 
more expensive technology landscape due to constrained supply chains, resources, 
commodities, greater demand from BRIC countries etc. 
Main points are as follows: 
 Electricity demand is lower, primarily from reduced demand for hydrogen, again 
used in the transport sector 
 Biofuels displace some of the hydrogen in transport, with some biofuels 
imported 
 Direct consumption of biomass increases, especially in residential and service 
sectors as a cheaper alternative to now expensive conversion devices such as 
CHP and district heating systems 
 Final energy demands switch from heat (now too expensive relatively), coal (too 
dirty given the expense of decarbonising with electricity) and hydrogen, to 
petrol, biodiesel and bio-solids.  Primary demand moves away from coal and 
biomass, to natural gas and nuclear electricity. 
 Primary energy and especially final energy rise in later periods relative to energy 
service demand reductions - as the model switches away from the most energy 
efficient solution in meeting the CO2 constraint (e.g. biomass pellets in 
residential and service sectors) 
 There is an enhanced role for gas and gas CCS in the mid-term as these are 
relatively lower cost electricity technologies 
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 That delivered electricity is reduced most to H2 production but also there is a 
reduction in all sectors (e.g. demise of LGV plug-in hybrid vehicles and assorted 
buildings technologies that use electricity) 
 There is a reallocation of biomass from power and heat to buildings and 
transport 
All comparisons are made to Phase II Run 3 unless stated.       
As expected from a scenario in which the capital costs of power production have 
increased by 160%, the electricity sector is smaller and delivery of secondary fuels is 
reduced.  In this scenario, electricity generation capacity falls by around 15 GW in 2050 
to 121 GW.  In order of decreasing size, the cuts are made in bio-waste & others, wind, 
co-firing CCS and coal CCS.  There is a small increase in nuclear, gas CCS and biomass 
CCS.  Gas investment shifts to earlier periods. 
Electricity demand falls across all sectors, but especially in hydrogen.  Hydrogen 
production from electrolysis is reduced by around 80 PJ from 2030 onwards, with 
around 40 PJ moving to gas SMR with CCS. 
Electricity demand in the transport sector is reduced to an average of ~270 PJ from 
2030, with petrol plug-in LGVs displaced by bio-diesel hybrids.  There are other smaller 
reconfigurations – for example bio-diesel buses displace hydrogen buses in the middle 
periods and hydrogen buses displace battery buses in the latter periods. 
 The consumption of bio-products doubles to around 400 PJ by 2050, with the increase 
divided between transport, service and residential sectors.  Biofuels make up >10% of 
total transport fuel demand from 2035 onwards.  In contrast, hydrogen still makes up an 
increasing fraction of transport fuel demand; 12% in 2030 to >30% in 2050. 
In the residential sector, energy service demands are reduced absolutely, heat from CHP 
is now displaced by gas condensing boilers in the medium term, and there is an increase 
in delivered solid biomass, including pellet boilers for hot water heating in 2050 (~50 PJ).  
The service sector suffers an absolute reduction in final energy consumption in the 
medium term, while in the final period, solid fuel deliveries increase even as energy 
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service demands fall.  In other words, the switch to final consumption in biomass results 
in less efficient delivery of energy service demands. 
In the industrial sector, final demand for electricity and coal falls and there is a 
movement towards process use of natural gas. 
Aside from the difference made to the transport sector and greater consumption of bio-
fuels, the system wide changes are small – in the region of tens of PJ switching from one 
technology to another.  Despite the electricity system shrinking a little in response to the 
increased technology investment costs, the overall effect is of increasing welfare costs 
by around 20% to around £33B in 2050.  Decarbonisation of the electricity sector is still 
the predominant cost optimal strategy for such a deep reduction in CO2 emissions to 
2050.   The marginal cost of CO2 reaches £100/tCO2 in 2030 and £320/tCO2 in 2050. 
8.3 P2-R5-#: Run 5 Stochastic biomass availability 
8.3.1 Changes since Run P2-R3 
A stochastic bound on biomass availability (imports to the UK) is applied in accordance 
with the assumptions made in Phase I.  Note that the SOW bounds are effective only 
from 2030 onwards.  Before this period, central bounds are applied to all scenarios.  
These are summarised in the table below: 
Table 27: Upper bound on biomass imports in PJ/annum 
 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Central 0 210 420 630 840 1050 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 
High 0 420 840 1260 1680 2100 2520 2520 2520 2520 2520 
None 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Three future states of the world (SOW) are defined in the stochastic scenario that 
correspond to the Central, High and None biomass constraints, each weighted with an 
equal 1/3 probability (actually 0.34, 0.33 and 0.33 as total must sum to 1.00).  The 
resolution of uncertainty was set to 2030 – the hedging strategy then runs until the 2025 
period.  Until 2030, the central biomass scenario holds for all states of the world.  From 
2030 to 2050, a recourse strategy is in place, in which the respective upper constraints 
are active. 
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The stochastic scenario was applied to P2-R3-HUR-C90-#, so the modified hurdle rates 
apply in this scenario and are compounded with uncertainty surrounding biomass 
resource availability. 
8.3.2 Results: P2-R5-# 
Key points: 
 The hedging strategy is very minor – no single change amounts to more than 10 
PJ of energy or 2 GW capacity. 
 Neither the central nor high biomass constraints are hit in the relevant scenarios 
(this is also the case for the deterministic scenarios P2-R3-HUR-C90-# and P2-R4-
INV-C90-#).  As such, the recourse strategies for High and Central scenarios are 
identical. 
 Domestic biomass production increases slightly in the none state-of-the-world 
recourse period to <800 PJ by 2050 over <600 PJ in Central and High SOWs. 
 The EVPI of £91M shows that introducing uncertainty in biomass availability has 
only a small cost under the current scenario assumptions  
8.3.2.1 Hedging strategy 
The hedging strategy of the current run, in comparison to P2-R3-HUR-C90-#, has only 
minor differences.  Evidently, either the cost of including uncertain biomass availability 
is minor in comparison to the 90% CO2 reduction target imposed in both the scenarios, 
or the model is unable to respond given the stringency of the decarbonisation target. 
To 2025, the energy system exhibits a minor, inter-temporal reordering.  Final energy 
demand drops a few PJ, with electricity consumption decreasing 12 PJ and gas/bio-
methane consumption increasing by 13 PJ in 2015.  In 2025, gas/bio-methane 
consumption drops back by 24 PJ.  The service sector reduced final energy use by 20 PJ 
in 2025, the end of the hedging period, while the residential sector increases biomass 
consumption by the same amount. 
Note that bio-product imports average ~50 PJ/annum during the hedging strategy, and 
consist of imports of bio-diesel and ethanol to meet the RTFO.  The levels of imports in 
the hedging strategy are the same is in the equivalent years of the P2-R3 scenario. 
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8.3.2.2 Recourse strategies 
As mentioned above, the recourse strategies for Central and High scenarios are 
identical.  The availability of biomass in the Central and High scenarios is the same as the 
P2-R3-HUR-C90 scenario.  The recourse strategies essentially ‘correct’ for the expected-
cost based decisions made in the hedging strategy, while the hedging strategy is 
optimised to minimise the weighted welfare costs in the recourse strategies.  Given the 
minor changes seen in the hedging strategy, the changes in the recourse strategies are 
equally small. 
In 2050, there is 1 GW more wind in the electricity sector and slightly less electricity CCS 
(-1 MtCO2).  The transition, 2030-onwards, shows an increased for district heat (~10 PJ) 
consumed in the residential sector and a minor re-ordering in transport with a reduction 
of bio-diesel in the transport sector in 2035. 
The Low recourse strategy displays relatively more dramatic behaviour in response to a 
ban of biomass imports from 2030 onwards.  There is an increase in size of the electricity 
sector, specifically in co-firing CCS (+3 GW from 2030), gas (+2GW in 2040 to +4 GW in 
2045-50).  Biomass CCS is excluded in the final two periods and ~11 GW of nuclear is 
built between 2040 and 2050.  Wind capacity also increases 13 GW over P2-R3-HUR-C90 
to a total of 37 GW by 2050.  Biomass consumption by co-firing CCS increases by 40 
PJ/annum from 2030 onwards.  The 30% renewable electricity constraint is less binding 
in the Low SOW than other scenarios, indicating that there is some tension between 
availability of bio-energy resources and renewable electricity. 
Domestic biomass production increases in response to the constraint on imports, mainly 
through the exploitation of additional agricultural wastes (up ~190 PJ in 2050).  
Domestic biomass resources are not exploited to their physical limit under the no-
import constraint.  
While primary energy increases by ~180 PJ to 2050, final energy decreases overall by 
~130 PJ, with a number of adjustments to the mix of delivered fuels.  There is a fall in 
wood fired CHP from 2030 (-180 PJ), replaced through a combination of demand 
reduction (3-5% below P2-R3), gas condensing boilers (in the service sector) and electric 
heating in both sectors.  However, space and water heating for both service and 
 113 
residential sectors continues to rely on electricity, heat pumps and district heating from 
wood fired CHP in 2050.  Transport fuel demand decreases by ~40 PJ by 2050, with 
increased consumption of diesel and hydrogen displacing petrol and bio-fuels.  Diesel 
plug-in cars replace diesel hybrids, while hydrogen cars replace petrol hybrids and plug-
ins.  Final use of electricity increases by ~200 PJ in 2050, 60 PJ more to produce 
hydrogen, 85 PJ to industry and ~70 PJ to the residential sector. 
The lack of biomass generates a readjustment in CO2 emissions between sectors.  In 
comparison with P2-R3, residential and transport emissions increase in the mid-term 
(2030 to 2040).  From 2045, emissions savings are found in transport and industry 
sectors to allow for greater emissions in the electricity sector.  Hydrogen production 
switches from gas SMR to electrolysis (~50 PJ) in 2040. 
While consumption of primary biomass is reduced by ~250-500 PJ between 2040 and 
2050, the reduction in final consumption of biomass is much lower.  This is due to i) 
most biomass is consumed by conversion processes such as co-firing CCS or wood fired 
CHP ii) the decrease is transport consumption of bio-products (~70 PJ in 2035) is 
countered by an increase in industry (~30 PJ increase in bio-methane consumption).  The 
constraints on biomass result in a prioritisation of final biomass use in industry and 
service sectors; while transport and residential sectors are able to decarbonise through 
alternative technologies (electricity and hydrogen respectively). 
The constraint on biomass availability results in a steeply rising CO2 marginal price from 
£100/tCO2 in 2030 to ~£400/tCO2 in 2050.   The extra welfare costs incurred are largely a 
result of demand reduction in the latter periods of the recourse strategy (~£2B in 2050). 
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8.4 P2-R6-# & P2-R7-#: Run 6 Stochastic biomass availability with 
crude bioenergy lifecycle emissions at 75% saving of fossil 
equivalents & Run 7 Stochastic biomass availability with crude 
bioenergy lifecycle emissions at 50% saving of fossil equivalents 
In addition to the stochastic bound on bio-energy availability applied in the previous run, 
scenarios 6 and 7 include a crude approximation of the lifecycle emissions from bio-
energy resources. 
The bio-energy lifecycle emission factors have the effect of reducing the carbon benefits 
of biomass resource use.  The 75% saving scenario (P2-R6) is more modest than the 50% 
saving scenario (P2-R7). 
UK MARKAL previously assumed zero carbon emissions for biomass resources. This 
assumption is consistent with the fact that any carbon contained within a plant is 
sequestered from the atmosphere when the plant grows.  However, this assumption 
ignores any carbon emitted from, e.g. harvesting, fertiliser or transport use during the 
production of the biomass.  In UK MARKAL, certain bio-products are able to indirectly 
replace fossil equivalent technologies e.g. co-firing and co-firing CCS plants allow a 
mixture of up to 25% solid biomass in the input fuel stream, and so the carbon benefit 
depends upon the end use of the biomass. The hedging and recourse strategies for both 
scenarios are modest both through 2025 and in the slight amount of reshuffling in the 
later periods. This seems fair given the model is only reacting to a 33% chance of low bio 
imports (central and high cases are identical). 
The largest driver is the assumed biomass lifecycle emission factor which significantly 
diminishes its decarbonisation attractiveness. Laid on top of this, the impact of no bio 
imports is a smaller effect as the demand for biomass has declined significantly anyway. 
The main reasons for the minor hedging strategies are: i) the lifecycle emission factors 
only have a significant effect in the later periods of the model in combination with the 
stringent carbon constraint and critical requirement for low-carbon fuels ii) biomass use 
in the early periods of the model is largely constrained in by the RTFO iii) the difference 
between optimal biomass imports with lifecycle emissions and biomass imports 
constrained to zero is just 28 PJ in 2050 in P2-R7 and 41 PJ in 2050 in P2-R6. 
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Note that both the timing and quantity of emissions change throughout the model 
horizon, depending upon the assumed emissions factor. 
Table 28: Annual lifecycle emissions in the two scenarios P2-R6 and P2-R7 (kilotonnes of CO2) 
 
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
75% lifecycle, central avail. 545 2,864 3,242 8,094 11,294 10,475 
50% lifecycle, central avail. 1,090 5,536 4,923 8,896 9,030 5,624 
For each run, the “-1” suffix denotes Central biomass availability, “-2” Low biomass 
availability and “-3” High biomass availability. 
8.4.1 Results: P2-R6-# 
8.4.1.1 Effect of including biomass emissions 
The obvious effect of including 25% emissions burden on biomass is of significantly 
reducing biomass consumption in comparison to runs without the emissions burden.  By 
2050, 500 PJ less primary biomass is consumed in 90% CO2 reduction scenarios.  There 
are tandem reductions in oil and gas consumption, perhaps indicative of the ‘enabling’ 
power of biomass resources for bio-fuel blends and bio-gas/bio-methane production.  
However, the reductions in primary biomass are not significant until the post-2030 
period when the severe carbon target becomes the most significant constraint upon the 
development of the energy system.  Electricity is the primary replacement for the 
reduction in biomass in the lifecycle emissions scenarios. 
In final energy, there is a large reduction in delivered heat; largely as the wood fired CHP 
in the P2-R3 related scenarios is less viable from a carbon perspective if the lifecycle 
emissions of biomass are included.  Final energy reduces by around 140 PJ by 2050 over 
non-lifecycle scenarios with the largest reductions in residential and service sectors, 
followed by industry and transport. 
While biomass CCS is squeezed to just 1.2 GW in 2050, co-firing with CCS increases over 
the model horizon to a maximum of ~13 GW in 2050.  Primary coal also increases by 50 
to 100 PJ per annum from 2030 onwards.  Nuclear, gas, co-firing CCS and wind make up 
the components of a large (170 GW) electricity system in 2050 producing almost 2,300 
PJ of electricity per annum.  Half of the electricity is generated by a 44 GW nuclear fleet 
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and almost 60 GW of wind turbines produce ~500 PJ of electricity in 2050.  Nuclear 
availability is important (i.e. the nuclear build rate constraint is very restrictive) for 
reducing costs of the decarbonisation in both the scenarios – as a relatively low carbon 
technology independent of biomass. Note that negative emissions do not occur in the 
electricity sector in either scenario; inclusion of the life-cycle biomass emissions cancels 
out the negative emissions from sequestering biomass due to the reduced efficiency of 
biomass combustion, when compared with coal, and the inherent inefficiencies in 
carbon capture and storage processes.  Note that biomass and co-firing CCS processes 
are still chosen, it is just that they are less effective (more costly) at reducing the same 
quantities of CO2. 
As a result of the change in the structure of the energy system, through accommodating 
the lifecycle emissions from biomass, the electricity system sees a >10MtCO2 increase by 
2050, with large decreases in response focussed on the hydrogen, industrial and 
transport sectors. 
Notably, the transport sector does not electrify further given the reduction in biofuels 
consumed, with hydrogen, diesel and demand reduction largely replacing energy 
requirements in the latter two model periods.  The increase in electricity generation is 
consumed primarily by the residential, industrial and hydrogen sectors in 2035 to 2050. 
Demand reduction is deeper than the non-bio-energy lifecycle emission scenarios for 
most energy service demands (especially residential and service sector heating and hot 
water) and less for others (such as residential and service cooling and the iron and steel 
sector).  Contrary to the received wisdom that biomass was essential for transport 
sector decarbonisation; if hydrogen is available (and viable) then residential and service 
sector heating and hot water are the areas in which reductions in biomass are felt most 
keenly.  However, there is an indirect effect on the transport sector, as the reduced 
‘headroom’ under the carbon cap by accounting for biomass lifecycle emissions results 
in greater pressure for demand reduction placed on the inflexible transport options, 
such as domestic navigation and domestic aviation. 
Residential and service sector heating and hot water, moves strongly away (~-80%) from 
district heating and wood CHP and is largely met from increased uptake of delivered 
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electricity for heat.  There is also a small reduction in heat pumps.  There is a mid-model 
increase in the direct consumption of solid biomass for both residential and service 
sectors. 
Between 2030 and 2050, biofuel imports are ~50% of those in the P2-R3 scenario.  Bio-
diesel is lower from 2035 onwards.  Hydrogen production increases (up 3 to 50 PJ) from 
2035 and production shifts to electrolysis. 
8.4.1.2 Effect of introducing uncertainty in biomass availability 
The introduction of uncertainty results in only very small change in primary energy use.  
A deterministic run under a low biomass constraint results in an early response to the 
future reduction in biomass availability.  The hedging strategy is very close to the 
deterministic central and high availability of biomass scenarios.  This is understandable 
given the very small recourse response in the low biomass scenario, coupled with the 
33% likelihood. 
8.4.2 Results: P2-R7 
8.4.2.1 Effect of including lifecycle emissions for biomass at 50% 
The core message of this run is similar to that of the previous run, except that the 
reductions in biomass are deeper, as are the corresponding moves to alternative sources 
of energy.  Primary energy is reduced by ~2 PJ per year from 2025, until 2035 when 
primary energy then increases by around 200-300 PJ for the final two periods as a result 
of significant additional nuclear and renewable capacity.  Primary biomass consumption 
decreases by a further 300 PJ on P2-R6; a total of ~950 PJ on P2-R3.  Primary biomass 
consumption hovers at the low level of 200-250 PJ from 2010 to 2050. 
Final energy is cut by 60 PJ from 2015, to ~300 PJ in 2050.  The largest reductions are 
from district heat, gas/bio-methane and petrol.  Final consumption of electricity (1,600 
PJ) and hydrogen (400 PJ) increase, to equivalent levels to P2-R6.  Note that overall final 
energy consumption is 200 PJ less that in P2-R6 in 2050, but similar in the earlier model 
periods.  A significant proportion of bio-products are directed to the industrial sector, 
with 75 PJ to 170 PJ between 2030 and 2050 comprised of up to 2/3 bio-methane.  This 
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is in conjunction with significant decarbonisation of the industrial sector processes 
through uptake of industrial CCS that hits the build constraints. 
There is a large increase in conservation uptake in the service sector of 130 PJ. 
In the electricity sector, the withdrawal of biomass results in a slightly smaller (in 
capacity) electricity system by 2050.  4 GW of coal CCS displaces 5 GW of co-firing CCS, 
while 11 GW of nuclear displaces 4 GW of wind, 2 GW of bio-waste & others and 8 GW 
of gas.  In energy terms, more electricity is produced in comparison to P2-R6 in the 
penultimate three model periods.  In 2050, however, electricity production is 
constrained by the severe carbon target.  As mentioned above, coal CCS displaces 
around 5 GW of co-firing CCS.  However, the electricity output decreases over the 
horizon, so that the 110 PJ increase over P2-R6 in 2030 decreases to 100 PJ in 2040 and 
0 PJ in 2050.  Nuclear displaces both this decreasing electrical output, and that of wind. 
The sectoral demand for electricity continues the patterns seen in P2-R6.  Hydrogen 
demand increases by ~60 PJ from 2035, and comprises the majority of increase in 
demand.  Residential demand also increases by 20 PJ from 2040, followed by industry in 
2045 (up 20 PJ).  All other sectoral electricity demand decreases. 
There are a number of conflicts between constraints and the biomass emissions in both 
scenarios.  For example, a constraint specifying a minimum quantity of biomass boilers 
in the core scenario is costly, especially in 2050. 
8.4.2.2 Effect of including uncertainty in biomass availability with lifecycle 
emissions for biomass at 50% 
Again, like the previous run P2-R6, exploring lifecycle emissions with uncertain biomass 
availability results in little extra insight besides that from the introduction of lifecycle 
emissions factor. 
There is a minor hedge to account for the (now) small effect of constraining biomass 
imports to zero in the low biomass availability scenario, but this in the order of hundreds 
of TJ rather than PJ (i.e. an order of magnitude lower than that shown in the results 
sheets). 
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The lack of zero carbon biomass has significant cost implications, especially at the 
margin.  CO2 marginal prices rise from £290/tCO2 to £520/tCO2 (£610/tCO2 in the low 
biomass recourse) in the 75% saving scenario to £1320 (£1440/tCO2 in the low biomass 
recourse) in the 50% saving scenario. Welfare costs rise from £27B in P2-R5 to £33B 
(£33.1B in the low biomass recourse) in the 75% saving scenario and to £36.1B (£36.9 in 
the low biomass recourse) in the 50% saving scenario. This is due both to a more 
expensive, albeit smaller, overall energy system and also the cost of increased demand 
reductions. 
8.5 P2-R8-HUR-CUMC90 – Cumulative CO2 constraint (equivalent to a 
C90 scenario)  
In this scenario, the model has full inter-temporal flexibility in allocating emission 
reduction in order to meet a cumulative CO2 constraint (16.56 GtCO2 over a 50 year 
horizon), set to be equal to the Phase 2 core C90 case (P2-R3-HUR-C90-6). Note that the 
cumulative constraint is additionally constrained to match this core P2-R3 case’s CO2 
emission in 2000-2010. Thus the emissions inter-temporal flexibility is from 2015-2050.  
This deterministic scenario is compared directly against P2-R3-HUR-C90-6.  
Figure 8: CO2 emissions in P2-R8 under a cumulative constraint 
 
Generally speaking the temporal flexibility moves abatement action earlier (2015-2030) 
and reduces CO2 abatement in later periods (2035-2050). Note the largest impacts are 
seen in year periods 2020 and 2050 respectively. This inter-temporal switch occurs 
because the model is striving to minimise the very high cost emission reductions in later 
 120 
periods, and replaces them with relatively cheaper near term reductions. This effect 
outweighs the opposing effect of discounting (which is only at 3.5%) which would be 
expected to shift emissions abatement later. This pattern of temporal shifting to earlier 
abatement is consistent for CO2 emissions, final energy, CO2 prices and welfare costs.  
Compared to P2-R3-HUR-C90-6, the cumulative CO2 run reduces emissions by a further 
34 MtCO2 in 2020 and increases emissions by 26 MtCO2 in 2050. Near term emission 
reductions occur across all sectors but especially electricity, industry and transport. This 
raises the 2050 emission cap in 2050 from 59 to 86MtCO2, and critically this additional 
emission allowance means that a range of expensive mitigation options are not 
required. 
Additional flexibility gives clear changes in cost impacts, with 2020 CO2 marginal prices 
rising £40/tCO2 to a level of £70/tCO2, and 2050 CO2 marginal prices falling by £90/tCO2 
to only £200/tCO2. Welfare costs are similarly impacted with an additional £1.9billion 
cost in 2020 (driven largely by loss in consumer surplus from accelerated demand 
reductions) but with a £5.9billion gain in 2050. Discounting (at 3.5%) across the whole 
model horizon, gives a saving from inter-temporal CO2 target flexibility of £4.8billion. 
Final energy is reduced by a cumulative 2EJ, with the biggest annual reduction of 280PJ 
in 2020, and a long term increase of 70PJ seen in 2050. Final energy near- and long-term 
changes are seen in all sectors. In the near term reductions are in coal, diesel, gas and 
manufactured industrial fuels. In the long term, more gas and diesel is allowed with 
reductions in (expensive) hydrogen and biodiesel use. Impacts on heat are further 
nuanced with reductions in the near term due to demand reduction and reductions in 
the long term due to the avoidance of (expensive) biomass-CHP derived heat. 
Primary energy shows a similar pattern with a cumulative reduction of 4EJ. Near term 
reductions in coal, oil and gas, are partially balanced by near-term increases in biomass 
resources. 2020 sees the maximum decline in primary energy of 350PJ. In the long-term, 
additional fossil fuel use alleviates the use of biomass resources and some nuclear. Note 
that primary energy is down in 2045-2050 due to the avoidance of expensive and 
energy-inefficient zero carbon options. In terms of primary bio resources, cumulative 
reductions of 4.3EJ are seen (out of a total of around 28EJ in the core P2-R3 run). 
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Electricity generation sees the avoidance of a range of long-term expensive zero carbon 
options and an overall reduction in electricity of 70PJ in 2050. In 2050 electricity CO2 
emissions are no longer negative (1MtCO2 vs. -12MtCO2 in the core P2-R3 case). 
Specifically, no biomass CCS is required (-90PJ), and around 70PJ of co-firing CCS 
switches to coal CCS. Additionally 55PJ of nuclear is not required and this additional 
system flexibility (combined with more plug-in hybrid vehicle electricity storage) 
facilitates an additional 35PJ of long term wind generation. In terms of electricity 
capacity, early investments (in 2015) in CCS are boosted (1.5GW – up from 1.0GW), and 
an additional 7GW of wind is seen by 2050. 
Transport sees a similar alleviation of expensive long-term mitigation options, with 2050 
transport emission rising from 14 to 23 MtCO2. An inter-temporal switch in use of petrol 
& diesel cars reduces the use of 40PJ of hydrogen and 25-60PJ of biodiesels. This is 
supported by early adoption of bus hybrid vehicles, and near term demand reductions in 
HGV and LGV options. Also in the near-term, higher levels of low carbon electricity 
facilitates LGV plug-in vehicles and an accelerated electrification of the rail network. 
Near-term energy service demand reduction is particularly important with an average 
2020 reduction rising from a core run level of 7% to 9%. Individual energy service 
demand reduction increases (>5% in addition to core P2 reductions) are even more 
striking in the near term, notably industrial subsectors, agriculture, residential space and 
water heating, service space and water heating, HGVs, shipping and non-energy 
demands. 
In remaining impacts, there is a near term coal to gas switch in industrial sectors, 
cumulative CCS requirements rise by 113MtCO2 (but only a 4.3% increase in a total of 
2630MtCO2 and hence no additional constraint on reservoir capacity), while hydrogen 
reductions (50PJ in 2050) are from both methane SMR (-10PJ) but mainly from 
electrolysis (-40PJ). 
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8.6 P2-R9-BUILD – Power sector build-rate sensitivity 
8.6.1 Changes since Run P2-R3 
In this scenario, the build rate constraints enforced in P2-R3-HUR-C90 are relaxed.  
These were: 
Table 29: Build rates for main generation technologies  in P2-R3 
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CCS (elec) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Nuclear 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Wind n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
The new build rates for the current scenario are: 
Table 30: Build rates for main generation technologies in P2-R9 
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Nuclear 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Wind n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
8.6.2 Results 
Figure 9 lists the build constraints in the model and shows an indication of the severity 
at which the build constraints bind in two scenarios.  The nuclear build constraint in P2-
R3-HUR-C90 has a particular effect between 2020 and 2030 inclusive.  In P2-R9- BUILD, 
increasing the build rate constraint from 0.5-1.5 GW per year to 3 GW per year enables a 
lower cost decarbonisation effort.  Likewise, relaxing the electricity sector CCS build 
constraint seems to have had a similar effect – however this is not the case as CCS is 
largely displaced by nuclear in this scenario. 
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Figure 9: Indication of level at which build-rates constraints apply in alternate scenarios 
 
Relaxing the nuclear build constraint allows the model to build earlier than in P2-R3-
HUR-C90, netting out as an additional 6-8 GW total, displacing co-firing CCS in the 
process, as well as later nuclear investment (note that the nuclear share is up 15GW in 
2030 for one period only).  Generally, nuclear capacity averages 37 GW from 2030, in an 
electricity system rising from around 110 GW to 130 GW between 2030 and 2050.  This 
scenario’s electricity system is around 4 GW smaller than P2-R3 in 2050. 
The large increase in the severely binding nuclear build constraint results in extra 
investment of ~8 GW of nuclear in the 2025 and 2030 periods.  This largely displaces 
investments in co-firing CCS, hydro, wind and gas in 2025 and wind, co-firing CCS, coal 
CCS and imports as well as later nuclear investment.  By 2050, the electricity system has 
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R11-LOWGAS), with gas, nuclear and wind holding a 25% share of generation capacity 
each, the remaining 35 GW made up of co-firing CCS, biomass CCS and other 
renewables.  In energy output terms, nuclear generates 50% of the electricity - some 
900 PJ per annum. 
The relaxation of the nuclear build constraint allows earlier and faster decarbonisation 
of the electricity system, allowing other sectors to delay investments in more expensive 
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low carbon technologies.  The peak impact is in 2030 – this greater availability of nuclear 
electricity gives path dependent effects through 2050. 
The reduction in co-firing CCS result in an annual reduction in biomass demand of ~90 PJ 
and ~370 PJ of coal and means that captured CO2 drops by 30-40 MtCO2 to total 85 
MtCO2 in 2050 including 47 MtCO2 from industrial and process CCS technologies.  This 
reduction in CCS results in a -20 PJ demand reduction in upstream electricity use. 
The increase in nuclear capacity results in ~ 72 PJ of extra electricity available for 
consumption in 2030, and this is directed to industry, residential and service sectors.  
The nuclear electricity displaces some gas generation, and this natural gas is instead 
used as delivered fuel for generating residential, service and industrial sector heat. 
The effect on the transport sector is rather modest - there is a small increase in 
transport electricity consumption, and the extra emission freedom allowed by a 'cleaner' 
electricity system accommodates a switch of bio-diesel for mineral diesel in 2035.  
Hydrogen production is relatively stable, although there is a small move to gas SMR with 
CCS from electrolysis in 2040. 
Residential heating switches a proportion of demand from district heating to gas, heat 
pumps and solid fuel/wood in the medium term, some of which is a direct switch from 
the service sector.  A proportion of district heating moves to the later periods from 
(2020-30 to 2035-40), and demand also moves to the service sector.  The service sector 
sees increased early (2025-40) investment in heat pumps, as well as a reduction in solid 
wood fuel, electricity and gas. 
Direct rebound effect in industry and the residential are evident in 2030, as electricity is 
cheaper here although this is reversed in later periods. Those energy service demands 
that are more completely served by electricity are most effected e.g. ‘residential 
refrigeration’ and ‘electrical’, rail transport (freight and passenger), service sector 
lighting and ‘other electrical’. 
The CO2 marginal costs are down by ~£10/tCO2 (70 vs. 80) in 2030s but up £10-20/tCO2 
in 2040s &2050 (300 vs. 290). This occurs as the model is optimizing over the full time 
period and discounts later periods. 
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Welfare gains in 2030s are maintained (but with diminished gains) through 2045 but 
with increased welfare loss (increase of 2.6B to 29.6B) in 2050.  The change in overall 
discounted welfare is ~ £5B. 
8.7 P2-R10-#: Run 10 Stochastic fossil fuel prices on P2-R3-HUR-C90 
This run considers the effect of uncertainty in future fossil fuel prices on the UK energy 
system, given the amended assumptions of P2-R3-HUR-C90. 
For ease of comparison, the resolution of uncertainty is the year 2030, so that a 
stochastic hedging strategy is revealed, demonstrating optimum near-term behaviour 
given the uncertainty in future fossil fuel price.  As in previous stochastic fossil fuel price 
scenarios, the distribution of future prices is defined by four states of the world of equal 
weight; low, central, high and high-high scenarios.  This results in a hedging strategy that 
responds to an, on average, high fossil fuel price future. 
8.7.1 Hedging strategy: 
There is one hedging strategy for the P2-R10 scenario.  The hedge is minor, with primary 
energy increasing in the early periods in comparison to the deterministic P2-R3-HUR-C90 
scenario (used as a reference throughout this analysis).  Natural gas increases the most 
(on average 10 PJ/year), while coal and oil decrease. 
Final energy demand increases, predominantly in the residential, industrial and service 
sectors, again mostly through increases in final consumption of natural gas. 
In the electricity sector, there is some, minor restructuring, with 1 GW less wind by 2025 
replaced by an extra 1 GW of gas CHP.  Electricity demand also changes, with demand 
increasing slightly in industrial and residential sectors, and decreasing in the service 
sector. 
In transport, there is an early adoption of small quantities of hydrogen (+2 PJ) in 2025, 
displacing diesel (-3 PJ). 
Residential and service sector heating configurations see much change, with 
symmetrical swaps of wood between the two sectors in different time periods (probably 
because they share very similar technologies and parameter specifications).  Overall, 
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residential gas consumption increases on average by 10 PJ per year, while oil decreases 
by 2 PJ per year and heat increases by 1 PJ per year.  The service sector increases 
consumption of gas and wood, but decreases consumption of diesel, electricity and 
heat.  CHP output increases by 3 PJ (electricity) in 2025. 
Industrial demand for coal falls. 
8.7.2 Recourse strategies: 
In 2030, there are strong responses to the change in price of fossil fuels from the central 
price prevalent in the hedging period.  Primary natural gas demand increases/decreases 
the most, with the low scenario consuming ~270 PJ more in 2030 and ~40 PJ more in 
2050 than P2-R3. 
General trends are as follows: 
In 2050, as fossil fuel prices increase across the scenarios, the level of primary fossil fuels 
and biomass & waste decrease, while 'low' carbon technologies (renewables and 
nuclear)  increase.  In 2050, the scenarios are relatively similar, with the low and high 
fossil fuel price within 2% of each other.  However, trade-offs within primary resources 
and final energy change between the scenarios for the middle periods (2030 to 2045).  
Across all the scenarios, there is an overall reduction in the consumption of primary 
fossil fuels to 2050, thus reducing the 'exposure' of the system to the changes in fossil 
fuel price.  CHP capacity increases as fossil fuel prices decrease. 
Low fossil fuel price: 
In comparison to the deterministic central fossil fuel price scenario (P2-R3-HUR-C90), 
natural gas displaces biomass, coal and nuclear electricity in the middle periods.  Almost 
two thirds of the natural gas is in final energy (residential and service sectors, with a 
little in industry), with the remaining third used in various conversion technologies (gas 
CCS and hydrogen from gas SMR with CCS). 
Central fossil fuel price: 
Given the minor adjustments in the hedging strategy, the recourse strategy for central 
fossil fuel prices moves to a slightly different energy system to that if uncertainty is 
ignored under a purely deterministic scenario (such as P2-R3-HUR-C90).  The electricity 
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system has less wind and co-firing and more nuclear than P2-R3.  There is a decrease in 
primary energy demand for coal and biomass in the recourse strategy, while there is an 
increase in demand for natural gas and nuclear. 
High fossil fuel price: 
Under a high fossil fuel price investments in coal CCS and nuclear increase over the 
central scenario.  Co-firing CCS and biomass CCS investment is lower than in P2-R3-HUR-
C90.  Bio-fuels and hydrogen (increasing demand for electricity) make stronger inroads 
into the transport sector, while the emissions saved in the transport sector enable 
industry and the electricity sector to emit more. 
High high fossil fuel price: 
The use of natural gas tends to be very sensitive to assumed price, far more so than the 
other energy carriers in the model.  In this scenario, demand for natural gas is very much 
reduced, and this has a large effect on decarbonisation of the electricity system in 2030, 
which takes up a disproportionately large share of emissions (10% instead of 5% in the 
other scenarios).  This means that the burdens for emission reductions are placed on the 
following sectors: transport - through a very large (+100 PJ) increase in imported bio-
diesel; residential – a reduction in gas central heating and increase in district heating and 
demand reduction; and upstream - through using less CCS.  High fossil fuels prices seem 
to slow decarbonisation of the electricity system meaning more pressure is placed upon 
other sectors and more emphasis on demand reduction.  It becomes cost effective in 
2050 to invest in biomass CCS. 
Electricity system: 
Common features between 2030 and 2050 across the scenarios are as follows.  Nuclear 
power increases in capacity from 16 GW to 32-37 GW.  The electricity system increases 
in size from 107-108 GW to 131-141 GW, and electricity output from 1,386-1,432 PJ to 
1,839-1,890 PJ.  As the energy system decarbonises (i.e. out to 2050), the scenarios’ 
energy systems become more alike as they move away from fossil fuels.  Note that the 
percentage of renewables on the system stays constant across the scenarios in 2050 (at 
~33% of energy), but differs in 2030 when renewable investment increases with higher 
fossil fuel prices. 
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Marginal price of CO2 
There is a relationship between the fossil fuel price and the marginal price of CO2 to 
meet a 90% target by 2050, such that as the fossil fuel price increases, the marginal price 
of CO2 decreases.  In the low fossil fuel price scenario, the price increases to £120/tCO2 
in 2030, in comparison to £40/tCO2 for the high-high scenario.  However, as the system 
decarbonises, due to the lack of alternative technological choices and reflecting the 
homogeneity between the scenarios in the 2050, there is a convergence between the 
carbon prices, so that the range sits between £260-320/tCO2 (high-high to low). 
Constraints: 
Under low fossil fuel prices, access to more CCS (e.g. industrial CCS) offers a lower cost 
option to decarbonisation, but this benefit reduces as i) fossil fuel prices increase and ii) 
the energy system decarbonises and the carbon cap lowers.  Conversely, under high-
high fossil fuel prices, constraints on distributed generation and renewables are more 
costly than under low fossil fuel prices.  In all scenarios, build constraints on nuclear 
increase the cost of decarbonising the energy system.  Biofuel consumption is linked to 
fossil fuel demand, so that low fossil fuel prices enable a greater uptake of biofuels in 
the transport sector, but often high fossil fuel prices are required to make biofuels 
appear cost effective.  Hydrogen uptake is relatively stable across all the scenarios, (138 
PJ in 2030 rising to 350-369 PJ in 2050).  Electric vehicle and plug-in hybrid uptake is 
constrained in the core scenario, and there is not much variation around this constraint 
because of this. 
Scenario cost: 
The expected value of perfect information, that is the cost of including uncertainty in 
this scenario is £5B, implying that improving information on future fossil fuel prices (if 
this were possible) would significantly reduce the cost of moving to a low carbon energy 
system.  
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8.8 P2-R11-LOWGAS – Central fossil fuel prices for coal and oil, low 
fossil fuel prices for natural gas 
In this scenario, a low fossil fuel price is applied to natural gas, while all other 
commodities experience central prices.  Note that the price trajectory is not the same as 
that in the stochastic fossil fuel price scenarios (P2-R10-#) as the central price for all 
commodities is held in these scenarios until the resolution of uncertainty period (2030 in 
most cases).  The low fossil fuel price scenario, derived from UK Government figures and 
published by the DECC (2010), begins much earlier and shows a smooth transition to a 
low natural gas price. 
This deterministic scenario is compared directly against P2-R3-HUR-C90-6. 
Primary natural gas demand increases dramatically, peaking at a 600 PJ increase in 2030 
over the P2-R3 scenario.  Natural gas use does decrease over time, as in other low 
carbon scenarios, but remains 100 PJ above that seen in P2-R3 from 2010 onwards.  The 
increase in primary natural gas results in decreasing consumption of other fossil fuels, 
particularly coal and oil.  As coal consumption is largely used in co-firing CCS plants, 
biomass consumption also falls.  Primary energy increases overall as a result of cheap 
natural gas and, in the latter periods of the model, sees increases in nuclear energy. 
Note that there is a mid-term growth in final energy; +160PJ in 2020. This is in effect a 
direct rebound effect. In later periods, the declining role of natural gas and the growing 
proportion of CO2 price erode final energy gains. 
The majority of the increase in primary natural gas is used directly by end-use sectors.  
The remainder of the gas is directed towards a large increase in gas CCS, with 6 GW built 
in 2030 displacing 3 GW of co-firing CCS, 1 GW of coal CCS, 2 GW of unabated gas 
generation and 1 GW of wind.  Despite these changes, the majority of electricity 
generation is produced by nuclear, wind and co-firing CCS.  Note towards 2050, the 
residual emissions from gas CCS are too high, and electricity from gas CCS reduces as the 
carbon cap descends.  Medium term electricity demand increases slightly in the 
residential, industrial and transport sectors.  There is a large (relative) decrease in 
electricity consumption for hydrogen production in the 2035-40 periods, although a 
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small increase in 2045 and 2050 as negative emissions electricity becomes available 
through investment in biomass CCS. 
Bio-fuel in transport increases between 2030 and 2040 displacing similar quantities of 
diesel and petrol.  In the final periods, hydrogen increases, produced from a mixture of 
gas SMR with CCS and electrolysis.  In 2030, emissions from the transport sector are 8 
MtCO2 lower than P2-R3, allowing growth in residential, service and electricity sectors.  
This is afforded largely through a move away from petrol hybrid vehicles to 
diesel/biodiesel hybrids coupled with the displacement of ~100 PJ of mineral diesel with 
biodiesel, earlier adoption of hydrogen HGVs, two-wheelers moving to hydrogen and 
demand reduction. 
In the residential sector, natural gas demand for heating increases in the near term, and 
displaces alternative fuels such as oil, solid fuel and wood fuel.  In the medium to long 
term, district heating is mildly reduced while electric heating and heat pumps increase 
very slightly.  There is an overall increase in energy consumption in residential heating, 
which addresses the large energy service demand reductions seen in the energy service 
demands for hot water and heating in 2015 and 2020.  The model is balancing the 
welfare benefit of lower energy service demand reduction, with the carbon implications 
of consuming cheap natural gas instead of oil, solid fuel or delivered electricity. 
In the mid-term, emissions move around between sectors, with CO2 from electricity and 
residential sectors up and those from transport down.  This is occurs due to the trade-off 
between much cheaper (but slightly dirtier – due to displacement of co-firing CCS with 
gas CCS) electricity making more expensive emissions mitigation in the transport sector 
cost effective at a system level.  Over the longer term, this trade-off flips, so that the 
cheap but (relatively) dirty electricity begins to hit higher cost of further mitigation in 
other sectors.  Ultimately, the result is that gas is pushed out of the electricity system 
and a now-familiar 2050 energy system instated. 
The social benefits of the lower cost electricity and natural gas are evident in the change 
in consumer & producer surplus, with 2020 - 2030 increases over P2-R3 of £5B-£6B (-
£13B in P2-R3 to -£8B in P2-R11).  Welfare costs ease by £6B (2020) to £1.2B (2050) 
largely due to cheaper gas and hence cheaper energy system – hence overall there is 
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only a very small net loss in welfare in 2020 but in 2050 compare welfare losses increase 
from £25.8B to £27.0B. 
The CO2 marginal price is up £20-40/tCO2 – largely as there is cheaper gas, hence the 
need for a higher price signal to decarbonise – to £100/tCO2 in 2025 and £310/tCO2 in 
2050. 
8.9  P2-R12-HUR-C95 – 95% CO2 
This run is run under identical assumptions to P2-R3-HUR-C90-6, except with a 95% CO2 
reduction by 2050.  This trajectory follows the same trajectory in 2015 and 2020 as C90, 
but descends to a steeper reduction to 2025 and beyond.  Emissions in 2050 are 
constrained to 29 MtCO2. 
This run has been compared with P2-R3-HUR-C90-6 from Phase II and COR4-C95-S from 
Phase I. 
The extra 'effort' to meet this more stringent 95% CO2 reduction target is divided across 
all sectors, although a greater proportion of mid-term mitigation is made in the 
transport sector, while electricity system decarbonisation takes greater precedence 
from 2040.  From 2035, net emissions from the electricity sector are negative, reaching -
29 MtCO2 in 2050, equivalent to the entire emissions constraint.  In other words, 
negative CO2 emissions through the use of biomass CCS in the electricity sector 
effectively double the allowable system wide emissions. 
Primary energy is characterised by an early and large move away from natural gas and 
oil from 2025 with a net reduction (compared to P2-R3) in primary energy until 2040.  
Primary energy reaches a minimum of ~6,100 PJ in 2030.   The net reduction is mitigated 
by 2035 with increasing consumption of biomass and waste (250 PJ in 2010 to 1,800 PJ 
in 2050).  From 2040 onwards there is again a large increase in primary energy (a ~ 570 
PJ net increase over P2-R3) due to an additional 5 GW of nuclear generation (note that 
primary nuclear electricity is the heat equivalent). 
The mid-term net decrease in primary energy induces an equally severe decrease in mid-
term final energy demand (-220 PJ in 2025) which relaxes to the end of the model 
horizon.  Natural gas, coal, petrol and diesel in final energy all decrease and are 
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displaced by biodiesels, bioethanol, heat, and from 2035, electricity.  These reductions in 
final energy are focussed on residential, service and industrial sectors.  Final energy 
demand decreases throughout the model horizon and its construction changes over 
time.  The ‘dirtier’ fossil fuels are squeezed out, mostly by 2035, with electricity, natural 
gas, hydrogen and delivered heat making up the majority of delivered energy.  
Residential (~750 PJ in 2050), service (~320 PJ) and transport (~960 PJ) sector final 
energy demands halve from 2000 to 2050, while industry (~1200 PJ) decreases by a 
smaller amount. 
Uptake of conservation technologies does not increase over P2-R3, with ~280 PJ of 
energy delivered through conservation in the residential sector in 2040 and ~100 PJ in 
the service sector.  Between 2040 and 2050 there is then a rapid jump in conservation 
uptake with a total of ~240 PJ in the service sector and ~325 PJ in the residential sector. 
Unabated biomass electricity generation is displaced by 5 GW biomass CCS from 2040. 
This rises to 11 GW in 2050.  By 2050, the installed wind capacity is ~ 8 GW lower than in 
P2-R3, while an extra 3 GW of co-firing CCS and unabated gas (largely for backup) is 
installed.  The result is an energy system that is the same size (in capacity) as that in P2-
R3, but with a larger proportion of base-load generation resulting in an extra 300 PJ of 
electricity from 2040.  Between 2020 and 2040, electricity output almost doubles to 
2000 PJ.  The change in composition of the electricity sector is different to that in P2-R3, 
with a focus on mid-term investment in co-firing CCS (extra 3 GW of capacity in 2030), 
natural gas (extra 4 GW between 2030 and 2040) and lower investment in bio-waste 
capacity.  Between 2025 and 2035 around 8 GW of non-base load capacity is swapped 
for base load generation. 
This increase in electricity production is largely consumed by a slightly larger (~20 PJ net 
increase) hydrogen sector, switching from gas SMR with CCS and industry.  There are 
minor increases in electricity consumption from the residential, service, transport and 
upstream sectors. 
Transport moves increasingly to biofuels from 2025 - 100 PJ switch to ethanol away from 
petrol; 2030 - ~200 PJ switch to biodiesel from mineral diesel plus a 100 PJ switch to 
ethanol from petrol and electricity; converging on a similar transport fuel mix to that 
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seen in P2-R3 by 2050.  While there is a ‘base load’ as such in bio-fuel demand, bio-fuels 
in transport are used as a transition fuel between 2025 and 2045.  By 2050, transport 
biofuel demand returns to 2020 levels.  The increase in ethanol production is consumed 
by a tranche of E85 cars between 2025 and 2035.  Hydrogen consumption is focussed on 
HGVs from 2030, and encompasses a proportion of cars and LGVs from 2040. 
The marginal price for CO2 increases steeply to over £300/tCO2 in 2050.  A high midterm 
price is needed in order to stimulate the near term changes in the energy system (given 
path dependencies).  With this in mind, the CO2 price increases from ~30/tCO2 in 2020 to 
>£100/tCO2 in 2025, then rising to the 2050 value. 
The change in welfare cost from the reference case is significantly greater than for other 
Phase II scenarios (£35B vs. £27B), but the extra flexibility introduced to the model 
during the Phase II additions, such as through incorporating industrial and process CCS 
technologies reduces the pressure on electricity system decarbonisation and thus 
mitigates this increase in welfare cost.  The P2-R12 scenario does not move as far up the 
electricity generation cost curve as COR4-C95-S (£45B) due to availability of the extra 
mitigation options. 
In comparison to COR4-C95-S from Phase I (see page 57), P2-R12 allows an extra 100 PJ 
for energy conservation.  Extra mitigation flexibility, e.g. through the incorporation of 
industrial and process CCS allow a reduction of around 8 MtCO2 from emissions 
categorised as ‘non-energy use’ (which includes all emissions in the NAEI that are not 
captured by the UK MARKAL model, such as industrial non-energy process emissions 
such as those from the chemical reactions in manufacture of concrete).  Note that there 
is a greater average demand-side response to price in the P2-R12 scenario than in the 
COR4-C95-S, with less severe, but more equally spread reductions in energy service 
demands across the different sectors, and also within the sectors.  This seems to agree 
with common sense reasoning, that the greater choice of mitigation options within each 
sector results in a more balanced low carbon energy system. 
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9 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
9.1 Modelling overview 
The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) will provide advice on the 4th carbon budget 
period – covering 2023-2027 – in December 2010. As part of that advice, the Committee 
is undertaking analysis on the feasibility, costs and trade-offs of alternate pathways 
towards meeting the 2050 target.  
Over the last 8 years, the UK MARKAL model has been extensively used for UK long-term 
energy pathway analysis, benefitting from iterative energy model development, and 
developing a strong track record of peer reviewed documentation and outputs. For this 
new examination of possible paths to meeting the 2050 target, this project 
encompassed two areas of major development: 
• Firstly, an extensive model development process to address areas of key 
concern, including bio energy chains and biomass CCS, industrial sector mitigation 
flexibility, operation aspects of buildings technologies, build rates of key technology 
sectors, non-energy emissions, and inclusion of recent energy policy developments 
• Secondly, the development of a stochastic UK MARKAL model to systematically 
investigate key mid-term uncertainties in achieving long term UK decarbonisation 
targets. This retains the strengths of the technological detail, energy systems coverage 
and demand response of the existing model. The major benefit in the new stochastic 
MARKAL model is a two stage stochastic decision (based on expected cost) where key 
parameters are made explicitly uncertain and the model pursues hedging strategies until 
such uncertainties are resolved (with subsequent multiple resolution pathways). 
As a result of these two major areas of development, as well as a focus on more 
stringent CO2 emissions reductions, this project (building on earlier energy systems 
modelling studies), is a core element of CCC’s enhanced evidence base for its 4th 
Assessment Report. 
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9.2 Scenario selection 
CCC required a new set of scenarios to inform their advice to the Government on carbon 
abatement pathways through the 2020s, consistent with meeting the 2050 target. The 
scenario selection process was iteratively undertaken through a ten month period, and 
reflected key uncertainties of interest to CCC and inclusion of findings from 
complementary analysis of key issues. Subsequent model runs were undertaken to re-
examine both these key issues and new trade-offs and findings from the outputs of prior 
runs. 
Scenario design starts with the specification of the reference, or business-as-usual 
scenario.  The reference case is important, because it is against the reference case that 
the costs of constrained scenarios are measured.  All welfare costs in the following 
scenario descriptions are a relative measurement for comparison between scenarios. 
Note that just one reference scenario was used for the entire project to aid comparison 
between scenarios.  The individual scenario changes are therefore included with the 
policy package for CO2 mitigation and are included only in the relevant sensitivity 
scenarios. 
After agreeing a reference scenario with the CCC, four core runs were developed 
(section 5).  These included the main assumptions that CCC wished to explore, notably i) 
the severity of a UK carbon dioxide target that may be necessary and ii) the inclusion of 
a bundle of policy measures consistent with the ‘Extended Ambition’ target specified by 
the Committee.  These runs were labelled: COR1-C90-S, COR2-C95-S, COR3-C90-S and 
COR4-C95-S. 
Following the definition of the four core runs, eight Phase 1 sensitivity runs (section 6), 
comprising both deterministic and stochastic scenarios were run, mainly off the COR1-
C90-S scenario.  These explored less severe and more severe CO2 reduction targets, 
uncertainties surrounding CO2 targets, fossil fuel prices, CCS availability, and uncertain 
fossil fuel prices in combination with different assumptions on biomass availability. 
Iterative discussion following these Phase 1 scenarios generated feedback from the CCC 
leading to a revised set of assumptions for Phase 2 (see section 8).  In the interim period 
a further eight sensitivity runs (section 7) explored uncertain fossil fuel prices, 
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modulated electric vehicle uptake adoption of hydrogen as a transport fuel, and heat 
pump uptake and solid wall insulation mainly based on the COR3-C90-S scenario. 
A new core run for Phase 2 was developed over three runs that explored the effects of 
new technologies such as industrial CCS, grid injection of bio-methane as well as 
modified hurdle rates to represent the investment barriers seen by different actors of 
the energy system.  From this run P2-R3-HUR-C90-5, the final nine sensitivity runs 
covered bio-energy, build rates, uncertain fossil fuels prices and uncertainty over 
biomass availability in combination with approximations of the lifecycle emissions from 
biomass. 
In all, 32 full scenario runs were delivered to the Committee on Climate Change (see 
Table 18). The use of deterministic or stochastic UK MARKAL versions for a given 
scenario was based on a judgement of the most appropriate way to represent given 
uncertainties.  
9.3 Comparing the full scenario set 
It is difficult to summarize the range of insights that come from such a broad analysis. 
This report (sections 5-8) has 85 pages discussing the results, with the CCC reviving full 
data outputs in Excel form (totalling over 400,000 data points). 
To take one metric – welfare costs in 2050 (in £2000) – Table 31 summarizes all 73 
discrete strategies (as stochastic runs give multiple recourse strategies depending on the 
number of state-of-the-world defined per scenario). The table breaks out all runs by the 
stringency of the CO2 emission reduction and the assumption over fossil fuel prices. The 
range of outputs per category is still dependent on the wide range of model variations, 
including assumptions over biomass imports, availability of key technologies (CCS, 
advanced vehicles, heat pumps etc), hurdle rates and other model variation. As the 
scenario set is a discrete selection of runs of interest to policy makers (defined by the 
CCC), it is impossible to undertake a statistical analysis on the range of outcomes. 
However descriptive summary statistics illustrate the extremely wide range in this 
aggregate parameter – by a factor of 4 or more, which outweighs even the convex cost 
driver of CO2 reduction target stringency. Disaggregated outputs, such as technology 
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selection or demand changes would likely show even more variation – as discussed in 
the rich narrative in sections 5-8. 
Fossil Price Low Central High 
High-
high 
CO2 reduction target 90 80 90 95 97 90 90 
Count 13 1 31 4 1 11 12 
Deterministic 2 1 10 3 1 
 
1 
Stochastic 11 
 
21 1 
 
11 11 
Mean 37.7 
 
33.3 41.2 
 
39.5 39.8 
Median 30.3 17.5 29.9 42.6 79.9 30.7 32.3 
Standard Deviation 19.8 
 
13.6 4.5 
 
21.0 19.8 
Range 72.4 
 
76.7 10.1 
 
71.2 72.6 
Maximum 98.2 
 
97.8 44.8 
 
97.9 97.9 
Minimum 25.8 
 
21.1 34.7 
 
26.7 25.3 
Table 31: Welfare costs in 2050 (£2000 billion), from full set of 73 deterministic and stochastic 
(recourse) scenarios 
Other comparative mechanisms could be to compare similar runs on a sensitivity of 
interest (for example on the availability of sustainable biomass imports) across either 
deterministic and stochastic runs, or across similar runs in different iterative project 
phases.  
9.4 Emergent policy themes 
However, results from the 32 different scenarios included in this project give rise to a 
number of emergent themes.  One of the virtues of energy system modelling is that the 
interconnectedness of the energy system elements (sectors, energy chains, and supply 
vs. demand side measures) is able to be represented.   
9.4.1 Links, synergies and trade-offs 
There are multiple final configurations (and costs) for a future UK energy system that is 
almost decarbonised. These alternate final configurations are dependent of the costs, 
availability and timing of key low carbon energy vectors.  Modelling studies will have 
alternate final configurations based on the assumptions on key drivers, the model set up 
(i.e., the model has to include a given mitigation option), and in the timing/consideration 
of uncertainty resolution (e.g., the time period and subjective probabilities in the 
stochastic model formulation). 
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Broad drivers of energy system development (and costs) under alternate scenarios 
include the severity of reductions in carbon dioxide, the investment costs of electricity 
generation technologies, underpinning model parameters including discount and hurdle 
rates, the availability of biomass, and the build rate constraints of key low carbon energy 
chains. 
There are many links, synergies and trade-offs between aspects of the energy system 
model that give insights for the decarbonisation of the UK energy system.  The strongest 
links between factors in the model are exhibited in the relationship between fossil fuels 
and bio-products.  For example, in COR1-STOC-FF, HBFF and LBFF, the constraint on 
biomass availability affected the role of co-firing CCS, with transport relatively 
unaffected.  In P2-R6 and P2-R7, the inclusion of lifecycle emissions for biomass had a 
dual effect on both oil and natural gas consumption; given biofuel blends and bio-
methane mixes enable decarbonisation of conventional fossil fuel vectors.  The complex 
interplay, exhibited in P2-R10, between fossil fuel prices and biofuels extend to bio-
resources and renewable energy (see P2-R5).  There is also a tension between delivered 
biomass, seen in varying amounts across all scenarios and use in conversion 
technologies.  While biomass CCS is unaffected directly by fossil fuel price changes 
(excluding the improvements in financial attractiveness due to more expensive running 
costs for the counterfactual technologies), competition with transport biofuel demand 
(which is linked to fossil fuel price) has a secondary effect. 
 In COR4-C95-S, the forcing in of hybrid vehicles in the extended ambition scenario 
tended to emphasise the links with conventional fossil transport fuels where alternative 
low-carbon options exist. 
Interactions between sectors was a common feature of every scenario, specifically the 
role of negative emissions in the electricity sector from biomass CCS and co-firing CCS 
‘enabling’ less mitigation effort in demand sectors.  However, introduction of improved 
model flexibility in Phase 2, especially through industrial CCS and bio-methane options 
for industrial and ‘other emission’ sectors had a great impact on all other sector 
mitigation options. 
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9.4.2 Resilience, flexibility and uncertainty 
Under stringent CO2 reductions there are robust elements of alternate scenarios, 
especially in the mid-term. Specifically, limited hedging strategies from the stochastic 
formulation are in part derived from the necessary interim steps the UK energy system 
has to make through the 2020s, to achieve 2050 final targets. 
 Many of the stochastic scenarios included in this project had relatively minor hedging 
strategies.  The set of biomass availability runs with uncertain fossil prices (COR1-STOC-
FF, -HBFF, -LBFF) suggested the biomass constraint exhibited a larger effect on the near-
term strategy than the uncertainty.  P2-R5 showed that the model seemed to have 
enough flexibility, even with the severe build constraints imposed, to react to the 
uncertainties modelled.  In this scenario, the fossil fuel price uncertainties were 
outweighed by the severity of the CO2 reduction target.  COR1-STOC-C90S explored the 
effect of an uncertain CO2 reduction – 90% or 95% on 1990 levels by 2050.  Again this 
showed little significant near-term response to the uncertainties, with far more mid-
term investment after resolution of these uncertainties. 
P2-R10 showed that uncertainty in fossil fuel prices has little effect on the 2050 
scenario, again suggesting that the CO2 reduction is the driving factor. 
Under COR3-STOC-FF#-S, demand for natural gas, petrol, biomass and hydrogen were 
not affected by changes in fossil fuel price, although the sector demand biomass was 
affected as described above.  COR3-HP2-FF#-S showed the sensitivity of co-firing CCS to 
high coal prices, due to the decreasing economic competitiveness.  However, carbon 
storage is a resilient technology across all scenarios.  This scenario also showed how a 
smaller overall energy system reduces exposure to fossil fuel price uncertainty and that 
there is significant potential for energy conservation. 
P2-COR3-ALL-S-2 showed the very significant effect of increasing mitigation options in 
one sector has on the whole energy system.  Introducing CCS to industrial processes 
together with grid injection of bio-methane allow potential for mitigation in sectors than 
were previously very difficult to decarbonise.  The scenario results show that there is 
great utility in increasing the number of mitigation options in sectors that are currently 
underexploited. 
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9.4.3 Scope of mitigation measures 
There were a range of insights into the role of the different mitigation measures 
available in the model.  These include efficiency improvements, conservation measures, 
demand reduction and technologies 
The majority of scenarios included a 2050 90% reduction in CO2 emissions on 1990 
levels.  There is a certain amount of homogeneity between the phase 2 scenarios in 
2050, and between the phase 1 scenarios in 2050.  However, the changes in 
assumptions, namely hurdle rates and industrial CCS, between phases 1 and 2 made a 
large impact and resulted smaller overall energy systems.  However, patterns can be 
seen between the two phases that are resilient across all of the scenarios. 
Decarbonisation of the electricity system is a persistent factor in all low-carbon 
scenarios, while the availability of ‘negative emission’ technologies, such as co-firing CCS 
and biomass CCS further establish electricity decarbonisation as an essential element of  
a low carbon system.  However, phase 2 showed that increasing alternative options for 
mitigation reduced the role of electricity decarbonisation, especially in the latter stages 
of the model. 
Decarbonisation of the transport system occurred in all scenarios, primarily through 
improvements in vehicle efficiency (seen in the base case, BM-REF-S, as an optimal 
decision under no low-carbon policy).  However, while efficiency improvements are seen 
fleet wide, P2-R5 showed a mix of highly efficient hydrogen vehicles and moderately 
efficient conventionally fuelled vehicles.  Across scenarios, biofuel use was dependent 
on alternative uses, with the main demand from the electricity sector for co-firing CCS 
and biomass CCS. 
As mentioned above, efficiency improvements are a key factor in near and mid-term 
decarbonisation of the transport sector, particularly road transport (see BM-REF-S and 
COR1-C90-S).  Under carbon constrained cases fossil fuels are forced out of the model in 
later periods.  The uncertain fossil fuel price scenarios demonstrated a shift towards 
more efficient conversion technologies, such as CHP, increasingly important as fossil fuel 
prices increased (see COR3-STOC-FF#-S) and when in P2-R4 there was an increase in 
capital costs of electricity generation.  However, P2-R4 also showed how a switch to low-
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carbon energy vectors like biomass results in a less efficient overall system, generally 
with greater demand reduction due to the increased cost of energy supply. 
Energy conservation technologies have a very important role to play, as seen in COR3-
HP1-FF#-S and COR3-HP2-FF#-S, as they enable a smaller, more resilient and flexible 
energy system, less exposed to uncertainties in fossil fuel prices. 
To fully understanding the results from the 32 scenarios presented in this document, it is 
necessary to acknowledge the limitations of an energy systems model such as UK 
MARKAL.  The model seeks the least cost solution to supply energy service demands and 
is able to invest in a large database technologies and conservation measures or demand 
reduction through price responses.  However, as seen in COR000-C97-S,  the explanatory 
power of the model is limited by the pool of technologies included in the database, and 
stretching the model to its limit can result in seemingly bizarre (but rational under the 
objective function of the model) behaviour.  This includes increasing electricity use to 
‘farm’ negative emissions from co-firing CCS and biomass CCS technologies.  Increasing 
the mitigation options in the database, as seen in the transition to Phase 2, especially 
P2-COR3-ALL-S-2, greatly improves the model flexibility, reducing welfare costs.  P2-R4 
show the importance of recognising the difference between short and long-term cost 
projections, as a short-term increase in the capital cost of investments may have 
negligible effect in the long term.  Overestimation of these impacts could lead to 
significantly different policy decisions, as demonstrated by P2-R4.  In a system wide 
analysis, the relative costs of alternative mitigation options are more important than 
absolute values. 
The effect of changing assumptions, particularly discount and hurdle rates are pervasive, 
significant and should be explicitly recognised when understanding these scenarios.  
However, the effects seen in the model are also common sense, so that increasing the 
investment cost of the electricity sector does result in a reduction in delivered 
electricity.  The strengths of energy system modelling lie in the analysis of the response 
to these changes in assumptions. 
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9.5 Main Policy Insights 
In overall conclusion, five key findings from the broad scope of scenarios from this 
energy-economic modelling analysis project are: 
 UK energy policy makers must be cognisant of a range of external drivers that they 
have only peripheral control over and which will have profound effects on the 
achievability and costs of stringent energy decarbonisation. These include fossil fuel 
prices, biomass imports, technology development and the scale of UK emissions 
reductions required in a global mitigation context. 
 There are a range of final configurations of a decarbonised energy supply with 
alternate elements of supply-side energy resources and secondary infrastructures 
(electricity, heat, hydrogen and liquid fuels), together with demand-side technology  
adoption and behavioural change. However, all deep decarbonisation scenarios 
require elements of change in supply and demand – i.e., technology and behaviour 
 The stringency of deep decarbonisation targets means that there are essential (or 
robust) elements of decarbonisation strategies in the mid-term with either limited 
flexibility to exclude and/or expensive implications of not including. These elements 
include investment in low carbon electricity, technological change in transport,  
implementation of buildings conservation options, and behavioural change to 
moderate demand requirements  
 Stringent decarbonisation targets options means that smaller emissions sources 
become increasingly important and need to be addressed by policy makers. 
Examples in the energy sector including industrial process emissions, residual 
emissions from CCS applications, emissions from essential consumer buildings 
energy service demands, and emissions from smaller transport modes (e.g., aviation. 
Although not covered here, non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions and land-use change 
emissions need to be addressed. 
 The aggregate welfare costs of stringent emissions reductions are substantial, 
amounting to a median value of £30 billion (in £2000), by the year 2050. However, 
the wide range of model variants indicate a very substantial variation in welfare 
costs – by of a factor of four or more. Disaggregated parameters – including the 
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change in energy costs through marginal CO2 values, and the role of sectors, 
resources and technologies – could see even greater variation. The continuation of 
iterative energy system analysis – using a range of modelling techniques – can shed 
further light on the response of consumers, feasibility of change in specific sectors, 
and impacts on the broader economy. 
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